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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART 21.

JULY - DEC. 1927.

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(13439)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XXI

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XXI.

CHAPTER I.—ARABIA.

[E 2940/22/91]

No. 1.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 498.)
Sir,

Rome, July 1, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 483 of the 24th June, I have the honour to report that the Italian Government are sparing no pains to impress the mission from the Yemen with the conviction of both the friendliness and the power of Italy.

2. The programme described in my previous despatch has been carried out as arranged, and has been accompanied by a good deal of pomp and circumstance. On arrival at Naples on the 24th June, the mission was met by Comm. Gasparini, the Governor of Eritrea, in full uniform, accompanied by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Colonies, and by all the principal local authorities. The day was occupied by a visit to Vesuvius, a tea party at Bertoloni's Hotel, and a dinner in the State rooms of the Royal Palace, at which the highest civil, military and naval officers of Naples were again present.

3. The standard set in this first day of the visit has been maintained. The mission attended a review at Naples and then went north to visit the King of Italy at San Rossore, being entertained by His Majesty at dinner. On the 28th June they arrived in Rome, the station being decorated in honour of the occasion, while two squadrons of mounted carabinieri and a battery of artillery were drawn up in the Piazza. The members of the mission were then received by Signor Mussolini, in full uniform, at the Villa Torlonia, and cordial speeches were exchanged. Seif-al-Islam Mohamed-bin-Yahia, the leader of the mission, spoke as the representative of his father, and addressed the Prime Minister as "the cause and the basis of the peace and tranquillity which reign in the universe." He also expressed the gratitude of his country for the signature of the Italian treaty, the good effects of which were already felt, and thanked Signor Mussolini warmly for the way in which the mission had been received in Italy. The Prime Minister made a cordial reply, containing nothing beyond the expressions of goodwill customary on such occasions. The mission also presented to Signor Mussolini a letter from the Imam expressing his gratitude for the friendship of Italy towards the Yemen. The remainder of the programme in Rome has included an official reception by the Governor at the Capitol, airship and aeroplane flights, reviews, fireworks and, in fact, entertainments of all kinds, carried out in such a way that the visitors can hardly have failed to be impressed.

4. The mission's visit to Italy has been received with great satisfaction by the press, which points out that Italy is the first European country with which the Yemen has come into close contact, and that it is for the good of all concerned that the Arab representatives should see for themselves how much Italy can do to assist them in

developing their country on modern lines. The visit is generally described as completing the policy initiated by the signature of the Italo-Yemen treaty in 1926, and stress is laid upon the peaceful intentions of Italy in developing her position in Arabia.

5. As I have already reported, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs assure me that no political negotiations will be undertaken with the mission, whose visit is regarded as a return of that paid by the Governor of Eritrea to Sanaa. This assurance I am prepared to believe, but it is, nevertheless, the fact that unusual efforts have been made to please and impress the members of the mission. At every step they have been shepherded by high officials and surrounded by guards of honour; their leader has received the Grand Cordon of the Order of S.S. Maurice and Lazarus, and his companions have also been given Italian decorations. The hospitality shown has been on a royal scale, and there can be no doubt that it is hoped to strengthen the connection of the Yemen with Italy and to encourage the feeling that it is to this country that the Imam should turn for advice and also for such European supplies as he may require.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 3063/22/91]

No. 2.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 11.)

(No. 508.)

Sir,

Rome, July 7, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 22 of the 8th January last, respecting the ratification of the treaty of the 2nd September, 1926, between Italy and the Yemen, I have the honour to report that the exact date of the exchange of the ratifications of this instrument was the 22nd December, 1926.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 3204/644/91]

No. 3.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 73. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, July 1, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 30th June, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Baghdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartum (through Port Sudan), Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Jeddah Report for the Period from June 1 to June 30, 1927

THE period under review has witnessed the largest pilgrimage for many years. In the opinion of the Government it has established a record. The number of pilgrims arriving in the Hejaz from foreign ports is estimated at roughly 140,000, while the total number at Arafat was not less than 240,000. It was inevitable that the sanitary arrangements made by the Government at Mecca and Arafat should fall far short of perfection. They were, in fact, frankly bad. A large sum of money had been set aside for this purpose, but the Director of the Public Health Department, when taxed by the King with his inefficient handling of the situation, was hard put to it to explain how the money had been spent. There was no lack of water at Mecca, but the price rose to P.T. 15 a tin. Deaths from sunstroke were numerous at Muna. The temperature reached 124 degrees (shade). The Government admit a total mortality at Muna of 1,500 pilgrims, though the figure is probably much higher. The official organisation was unable to cope

satisfactorily with the problem of removing the dead in a sufficiently short space of time; the consequent sights and odours were so revolting that thousands of pilgrims, including my Egyptian colleague, returned to Mecca without completing their religious duties.

2. Security on the roads was complete. The number of cars available was insufficient to meet all needs, and the tracks (there are no roads) were in a bad state, but the introduction of motor-car services between Mecca, Jeddah and Medina is an undoubted boon to the richer classes of pilgrims. There were no cases of robbery or theft on the road. At Mecca, however, police control appears to have been less effective than last year and numbers of pilgrims lost their money and their passports in the precincts of the mosques.

3. The situation as regards shipping is in most cases satisfactory though there is room for improvement as regards the supply of sufficient shipping for the accommodation of returning Indian pilgrims. The arrangements made by the Holt line for the transport of Malay pilgrims have as usual been excellent.

4. At the instigation of the agency the local authorities established a commission for the better regulation of the Indian pilgrim traffic. The commission collects from the guides the passports and tickets of pilgrims as they arrive in Jeddah and accommodation is booked for them in the order of their arrival. The system has worked to the satisfaction of all parties; it was introduced to ensure fair treatment to rich and poor alike; in the past it too often happened that the last 200 or 300 places on a boat were reserved for those willing to pay a premium. The aims of the commission were to some extent defeated by the fact that many pilgrims holding Shustari return tickets lost their turn as only two boats of that line were available, with a carrying capacity of 2,491 pilgrims, while nearly 5,000 awaited repatriation. The reintroduction of the deposit system is the only solution to the Indian pilgrim problem. Shipping companies are now primarily concerned with not transgressing the regulation whereby pilgrims must be removed within twenty-five days of their arrival at Jeddah, whereas, under the deposit system, they would have every incentive to provide as much shipping as possible lest the pilgrims they brought to Jeddah return on the ships of rival companies. The presence in Jeddah for even twenty days of 6,000 Indians clamouring for a ship, or, in lieu thereof, maintenance at the expense of this agency, is a source of very grave annoyance to all persons concerned. They petition the King, they petition the agent, they make night and day hideous with their complaints, and they avail themselves to the full of the time-honoured privilege enjoyed by Indian pilgrims of using the precincts of this agency as a latrine, to the offence of all sense of decency and smell.

5. A statement of the shipping situation to date in so far as it concerns British Indians is attached hereto.

6. The pilgrimage has absorbed so much of the attention and energy of everyone in the Hejaz, that all other matters have perforce had to stand over for consideration when time permits.

7. There is no reason to believe that the 400 odd Russian pilgrims succeeded in introducing any Bolshevik propaganda, or that they even tried to do so. The so-called trade exhibition was not a success; there were samples of Russian specialities, such as samovars and caviare, but the bulk of the exhibits were for sale on the open market—hundreds of yards of cloth quite unsaleable at this time of the year, and a vast amount of flour which found a ready enough sale.

8. Interest and excitement were caused by the arrest on the 4th June of the notorious Javanese Communists, Raginda Tangsi and Mohammed Salleh Dardom, with seven others. They were found to be spreading seditious ideas among their compatriots; they had even intended to set up their own printing press to facilitate the spread of Communistic propaganda.

9. The account of the meeting of Ibn Saud with his tribesmen given in paragraph 4 of the Jeddah report for May was culled from the "Um-el-Kura." Confidential information which has since become available puts a different complexion on the affair. The heads of certain tribes, among which were the Ibn Hamid and Fesil-el-Dervish, refused to attend the meeting called by the King. Ibn Saud, therefore, instructed Ibn Jalwi, Governor of El Hassa, to endeavour to find some means of propitiating the more fanatic of the tribesmen. The hostile tribes were eventually calmed, but at the expenditure of ten lives in a preliminary skirmish, a payment of £80,000 (the sum is probably exaggerated), and a gift of eighty horses. It is, moreover, supposed that Ibn Saud's refusal to allow the Mahmal to visit the Hejaz was also dictated by the fear of reprisals by these fanatics.

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10. An article in the "Um-el-Kura" of the 17th instant commenting on current rumours as to the strained relations between Nejd and Yemen states that relations are good and that friendly communications are being exchanged by the King and the Imam. There were, however, certain outstanding questions relating to the frontier dividing the two countries which had to be settled; the King had, therefore, sent a delegation composed of Abdul Wahab Abu Melha (Director of Finance in Asir), Said Ibn Abdul Aziz Ibn Musheit and Abdullah Ibn Turki Ibn Mahdi to Yemen. The "Um-el-Kura" also reports the appointment of Saleh Ibn Abd-el-Wahed as Ibn Saud's representative to the Idrissi.

11. It was officially announced in the "Um-el-Kura" of the 24th instant that the Turkish representative in Jeddah had assumed charge of Afghan interests in the Hejaz. Suleiman Shefket Bey had informed his colleagues of his assumption of this charge on the 19th May. The change has not relieved the British agency in any way; in fact, it has increased our troubles. The Afghans, in addition to bringing the usual complaints of loss of tickets, destitution, and lack of shipping, now complain of their treatment at the hands of the Turkish representative. There is no member of the Turkish staff who can understand any language which an Afghan can speak; the assistance they render to the pilgrims is therefore limited to charging them the Turkish visa fee of 20 gold francs.

12. The supply of silver coinage has proved insufficient during this pilgrimage season, and the Government have invited Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey, and Mr. Philby to tender for the supply by the Royal Mint of 200,000 mejidiehs and 50,000 half, and 100,000 quarter, mejidiehs.

13. A wireless reception station has been erected at Lith, about 100 miles south-east of Jeddah.

14. Sheikh Yussuf Yassin, editor of the "Um-el-Kura" and ex-Acting Director for Foreign Affairs in the Hejaz, has left for Egypt, Syria and Palestine on forty days' leave. His 14-year-old wife, who is *enceinte*, has left for Syria, possibly in order that the little Yussuf may be born a Syrian.

15. Sir Seyyed Abdurrahman-el-Mahdi, who visited the Hejaz on pilgrimage, has now left. He was the guest of the King during his stay here, and was presented with a stallion from the Royal stables. Another recipient of the King's favour was Sardar Ghulam Mohammed Khan, ex-Minister of the Interior, a picturesque and fiery-tempered old gentleman. The agency incurred his serious displeasure by refusing to allow six first class Indian pilgrims to be removed from the only ship available in order to make room for his Excellency and his suite. He spoke in unmeasured terms of my Turkish colleague's inefficient handling of Afghan interests, and declared his intention of insisting on the appointment of a duly accredited Afghan representative.

16. During the period under review, four slaves have been manumitted and repatriated by this agency.

Appendix to Jeddah Report for Period June 1 to June 30, 1927.

Shipping Situation to June 30, 1927: Indian Pilgrims.

Number of Pilgrims landed in Jeddah from Indian Ports.	Carried by Steamship Company.	Repatriated.	Awaiting Steamers at Jeddah or Mecca.
19,739	Turner Morrison ...	8,014	} 3,700 2,284 34 (Single ticket holders)
7,757	Nemazee ...	1,615	
7,660	Shustari ...	2,491	
943	British India ...	1,339	
36,099		13,459	6,018
<hr/>			
En route for Medina ...			10,265
Remaining in the Hejaz or not returning by Indian steamers (including deceased pilgrims) ...			6,357

[E 3122/119/91]

No. 4.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Brigadier-General Sir G. Clayton.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1927.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 6th June containing the report on your recent mission to Jeddah for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with the King of the Hejaz and of Nejd, together with the treaty signed on the 20th May and the notes exchanged on that occasion.

2. I consider the contents of the treaty and notes entirely satisfactory, and I have much pleasure in conveying to you my hearty congratulations on the success of your mission. I fully realise from your account of the negotiations that your task was one of considerable difficulty, requiring the exercise of much patience and diplomatic skill; and it is gratifying to His Majesty's Government that their efforts to reach an understanding with Ibn Saud have at length been rewarded with success, thanks to your tact and ability. The Secretary of State for the Colonies desires to be associated with me in these expressions of congratulation. I have also read with pleasure the testimony which you bear to the efficient help rendered to you by Mr. Jordan and Mr. Antonius.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3520/1328/91]

No. 5.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 12, 1927.

I HAVE received information that there has been fighting on Yemen frontier—a Nejd force gathered at Taif has been despatched to that frontier 24th July. There are also signs of internal trouble—Feisal-al-Derweish and Ibn Boujad, Nejd chiefs known to be opposed to Ibn Saud, have come from Nejd with a number of followers. The former is at Turba and the latter in Medina, but there have been no incidents.

Ibn Saud has sent Ibn Boujad a considerable money gift.

Six officials holding high administrative positions, amongst whom two influential Nejdīs, have been arrested and removed to Riyadh. Sixteen others also implicated are under arrest at Mecca. I understand there is no evidence that those arrested were in communication with Imam.

[E 3520/22/91]

No. 6.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 12.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 11, 1927.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me to-day with a letter from Ibn Saud stating that he knows Italians to be exercising undue influence in councils of Imam and to be landing for his use large stores of arms and ammunition. He affirms that propitiatory letter which he sent to Imam was shown by the latter to Italians, who are endeavouring to prevent peaceful understanding between Hejaz and Yemen.

King asks me to enquire whether His Majesty's Government have any knowledge of this Italian activity, and if so in what light His Majesty's Government regard it.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I would telegraph as Ibn Saud requested, but that I gathered that Sir G. Clayton had already given King an intimation of His Majesty's Government's views. He agreed, but stated that His Majesty was now faced with definite information that the Imam was being backed by Italy in an unfriendly policy towards him.

[17675]

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[E 3525/22/91]

No. 7.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 16, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 37 of 12th August: Italian influence on relations between the Hejaz and the Yemen.

Please reply to the King in friendly terms in the following sense:—

"His Majesty's Government have no evidence to show, and are loath to believe, that Italians are influencing the Imam in the direction of an unfriendly attitude towards His Majesty. Any such policy on their part would be contrary to their understanding with His Majesty's Government. If His Majesty can furnish definite evidence, and if he will authorise us to do so, we will gladly take the matter up with the Italian Government.

"As regards the supply of arms to the Imam, the latter is free to purchase in Italy or elsewhere, just as His Majesty is free to purchase in Great Britain or elsewhere."

[E 3646/644/91]

No. 8.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 22.)

(No. 85.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 1, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 31st July, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (two), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartum (through Port Sudan), Singapore, Lagos (two).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Jeddah Report for Period July 1 to July 31, 1927.

THE month of July has been devoted to the repatriation of pilgrims. It is hoped that by the 15th August only about some 1,500 Indians will be left for the last steamer due about the 25th August. All Malays and other British subjects and protected persons will have left by the middle of August. The task of repatriating the vast number of pilgrims who visited Mecca this year has on the whole been satisfactorily accomplished. The flow of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah was well regulated, but accommodation at Jeddah, even so, proved insufficient. There has been no shortage of water or food, though the price of both has increased considerably. Permission was this year granted for pilgrims to embark at Yambo. This, though it appeared at first sight a wise and salutary measure, aroused considerable opposition. It had the strange effect of favouring Turkish shipping, as pilgrims travelling direct through the Suez Canal are not obliged to obtain Egyptian visas in Jeddah, whereas pilgrims travelling by Khedivial Line ships and disembarking in Egypt must first obtain a visa from the Egyptian consul here. The French consul also protested strongly that if Syrians embarked at Yambo he could exercise no control, and went so far as to threaten that any pilgrim embarked at Yambo would not be allowed to land in Syria. Eventually few pilgrims other than Egyptians sailed from Yambo, though permission was, I understand, eventually given by the Egyptian Government for Syrian, Persian, Iraqi and Palestinian pilgrims to obtain Egyptian visas at Suez.

2. The Government of Nigeria has generously placed a further £500 to the credit of the Nigerian Repatriation Fund.

3. Among pilgrims of note who have called at the agency on their return was Abdul Kader Kusuri, the notorious leader of the Khilafat Committee. He came,

strangely enough, to express his gratitude for the assistance which had been rendered to Indian pilgrims and to discuss possible measures for the improvement of their lot. He even wished for the appointment by His Majesty's Government of a vice-consul at Mecca to work under the orders of the agent at Jeddah. As a set-off to this desire for co-operation, he has announced his intention of bringing Indian weavers to the Hejaz; he thereby hopes to cut out Manchester goods. As, however, the weavers are to be chiefly occupied in making the small silk squares which form the local head-dress, and as these are imported almost exclusively from Syria, Abdul Kader Kusuri will not be forwarding Indian industries at the expense of British.

4. Rumours of events in Asir have been current, though until recently no authoritative information was available. It now appears clearly that Italian agents have been busily engaged trying to undermine Ibn Saud's authority in that territory. The three agents chiefly concerned were Jemal Pasha, a Syrian officer who, after serving some years with Ibn Saud, deserted to the Yemen, Mohammed Omar Dunkali and Abdullah Sohail. The two latter, found in possession of documents proving their anti-Saud activities, have been arrested. Medi is expected to be shortly in the hands of tribes supporting Ibn Saud. The latter, indeed, appears not only to have consolidated but greatly to have strengthened his position in Asir, as a result of recent disturbances there. Moreover, the fear of any Italian encroachment has been sensibly weakened. Sayed Ali is leaving Mecca for Asir in the near future, and it is not improbable that he may succeed in ousting Sayed Hassan.

5. Although no Moslem Conference was convened this year, the King held several meetings at which leading Moslems of several countries attended, to discuss questions interesting Islam. He is now engaged on the consideration of problems connected with "Waqf" properties. The old Turkish law, whereby only native subjects may buy property in the Hejaz, is being enforced, but I understand that "Waqf" property does not fall within the scope of the law.

6. A commission known as "the Committee of Reform and Enquiry" has been appointed to enquire into the working of Government departments and to make suggestions for improvements. The first findings of the commission have resulted in the dismissal for incompetence and abuse of power of the Emir Feisal's chief advisers, Abdul Aziz Attarki and Shereef Husain Adnan. The Grand Kadi of Mecca has also been asked to resign. Tewfik Bey Esh Sherif, the secretary to last year's Islamic Conference, has been appointed Reis-el-Diwan of Emir Feisal.

7. There is no doubt that Ibn Saud is genuinely anxious to introduce reforms and to organise the Hejaz administration on more modern lines. His ideas are sound, but he is hampered in carrying them out by the dearth in the Hejaz of honest and disinterested collaborators. He is surrounded by Syrians, many of whom are wanted by the French. It is difficult to gather whether Ibn Saud collects these Syrians with a view to establishing contact with Syria, or whether, unwelcome in their own country, they drift to the Hejaz to make their fortunes and live down their reputations. I think the latter is the more probable explanation.

8. The postal administration is introducing parcels post and money orders; it is also hoped that direct postal bags may be exchanged with India, Palestine and Aden. With a view to ensuring the more efficient working of the postal service, the Hejaz-Nejd Government have requested the Government of Palestine to accept for six months' training a limited number of Hejaz postal employees.

9. Orders have been placed with British firms for the supply of a new condenser for Jeddah and for the coils of which mention was made in paragraph 12 of Jeddah report for June. The order for the latter appears to have been placed through Mr. Philby, representative of Sharkieh Company (Limited), though information from a rival firm shows that his quotation was £1,000 higher. He is alleged to have received the contract in consideration of his services to the Government. Although, if this version of the story is correct, it is regrettable that competition between British firms should not be free, yet, so long as Mr. Philby places orders so obtained with British firms, British trade is not thereby damaged.

10. Mr. Philby has left for Egypt and the United Kingdom, his business being attended to in the interval by a recently imported English clerk. Mr. Philby is in very close touch with Dr. Damluji, the Director of Foreign Affairs. So close, indeed, is the touch that there is reason to suspect that Philby acts as adviser on Foreign Affairs.

11. As stated in the last Jeddah Report, paragraph 8, certain Javanese Communists were arrested and deported. Much emphasis was laid in the local press on the fact that this action was taken independently of the Dutch consulate,

and that there was no question of extradition or even of a request for expulsion by the Dutch consul. The King's Syrian advisers had to tread warily; if it were admitted or even believed that the Dutch consul had been instrumental in the removal of the Communists, a precedent would have been set which the French consul would not have been slow to try and follow with a view to the return to Syria of many undesirables.

12. The King has expressed his desire to rediscuss on his return to Jeddah in the near future the question of erecting a lighthouse, to render Jeddah harbour safe of approach at night.

13. Efforts have been made to obtain the King's consent to a reconnaissance of the projected air route crossing his territory between Bahrein and Koweit. Though not averse in principle from the scheme, Ibn Saud shrinks from the responsibility. He fears lest the Hassa tribesmen, who, he says, are among the wildest of those who owe him allegiance, should resent the appearance of Europeans in their midst, with fatal results. He has issued instructions to his representative in Hassa to furnish a report on the tribes occupying the territory where the reconnaissance is to take place. He intends, later, to visit this part of his country, and is unwilling until he has personally studied the situation there to give his consent to the reconnaissance. As Ibn Saud is undoubtedly genuinely desirous of meeting the wishes of His Majesty's Government in the matter, it is hoped that the result of his investigation may prove satisfactory, though delay is inevitable.

14. The Soviet agent and consul-general, Kerim Khakimoff, has left Jeddah for Moscow. He has been here nearly four years and hopes never to return. His reluctance to carry on his work here is easily understood. He is a native of Siberia and was unfit to stand the climate. He lost a small son here. Moreover, he seemed unable to do anything in moderation: either he drank himself into a state of nervous breakdown or was a teetotaller. Withal, he was a pleasant fellow, and will be missed to the extent that his successor will almost inevitably be an abler man and so a greater power for evil.

15. Mahmud Nedim Bey, the counsellor of the Turkish Mission, has left for Constantinople on the termination of his appointment. It is his intention to write his memoirs, covering nearly forty years' service in the Red Sea provinces of the Turkish Empire.

16. During the period under review six slaves have been repatriated by this agency.

F. H. W. S.-B.

[E 3664/22/91]

No. 9.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, August 23, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 29.

In reply to my communication, King advances the following indications of Italian interference:—

1. Imam expressed in unequivocal terms seven weeks ago his desire for an agreement with Ibn Saud. His change of attitude can only be attributed to outside pressure. Italians knew and spoke of failure of negotiations ten days before actual break-off.
2. Ibn Saud's representative in Yemen reports that Italians are influential in Government departments in Sanaa and are striving to cause friction between Imam and King.
3. Yemen has no experts for aeroplanes and guns supplied by Italians, and must be relying on outside assistance for their use.
4. Reports have been received of secret agreement between Italian Government and Imam whereby the former, in exchange for special influence in Yemen, will aid the latter to achieve his territorial aspirations.
5. Italians are known to have been active in Asir in spreading pro-Imam and anti-Saud propaganda.

While recognising that he has no *material* evidence, King states that he cannot overlook these clear indications of an unfriendly attitude on the part of Italy. He

does not comment on His Majesty's Government's offer to take up the matter with Italian Government, but repeats his request for a statement of their attitude.

If you feel the case is strong enough to justify reference to Italian Government, I would propose, subject to your approval, to urge on the King acceptance of His Majesty's Government's offer. He expects to be in Jeddah this week.

[E 3692/22/91]

No. 10.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Wingfield (Rome).

(No. 1047.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 25, 1927.

THE Italian Ambassador called to-day to ask for information as to the state of the conversations between Paris and London on the reduction of the numbers of the troops of occupation. I told him the facts up to date and stated that the Cabinet would be considering the question this afternoon.

The Ambassador then passed to the Yemen. He had received a long telegram from the Italian Government, the gist of which was that Ibn Saud was becoming more aggressive in his attitude towards the Imam and that it would be difficult for the Italian Government to continue to exercise a restraining influence such as they had been doing upon the latter if Ibn Saud's aggressive activities continued. The Italian Government asked, therefore, for information as to the policy of His Majesty's Government and whether we were encouraging Ibn Saud to attack the Imam. I replied to the Ambassador that the complaints which the Imam had addressed to the Italian Government appeared to be the counterpart of complaints which we had received from Ibn Saud. He alleged that the Imam, encouraged by Italian support, was constantly becoming more aggressive and we had replied that we did not believe that any such encouragement was being given by the Italian Government, but that if he would state precisely the facts of which he complained we would examine them and see whether we could properly say anything to the Italian Government upon the subject.

I had to confess that I did not exactly remember whether any further reply had yet been received, and I invited the Ambassador to discuss the whole question with Mr. Oliphant. It was clearly to the interest of both of us that there should be a free exchange of opinion and that we should not be led into difficulties by disputes amongst these Arab chieftains.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3664/22/91]

No. 11.

Sir Victor Wellesley (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, August 31, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 42 of 23rd August: Italian influence on relations between the Hejaz and the Yemen.

On the very date of the receipt of your telegram Italian Ambassador called here to complain that Ibn Saud was acting in a manner extremely provocative to the Imam, and that in the face of this provocation the Italian Government could not continue to exercise restraint on him.

They accordingly asked whether His Majesty's Government on their side could not restrain Ibn Saud, and whether the two Governments could not concert any action for averting a seemingly impending conflict between the two Arab rulers.

More explicit information regarding alleged provocation by Ibn Saud has been promised. Complaints of the Imam mentioned by the Italian Ambassador were that Ibn Saud's mission to Sanaa was not a genuine attempt to reach agreement, but was only intended to secure time to enable Ibn Saud to arm himself, that his despatch of a representative to Asir was an act of deliberate provocation, and that he was preparing to occupy Asir.

In reply, the Ambassador was informed that Ibn Saud had made very similar complaints of the Imam and of the Italian Government to His Majesty's Government, that His Majesty's Government had no reason to suppose that Ibn Saud wanted

war, and that as far as we knew he had neither the money nor the arms and ammunition necessary for a campaign, whereas, on the other hand, the Imam must by now be fully armed from Italian sources. The Ambassador was also reminded that by the Treaty of Mecca, Ibn Saud had every apparent right to send a representative to Asir.

You should inform Ibn Saud that the Italian Government have complained to us that in view of his alleged provocation to the Imam they find it extremely difficult to continue to exercise restraint on the latter, and that in reply to this communication the Italian Government have been informed of his own complaints of their activities. You should add that while His Majesty's Government have no reason to credit Italian allegations that His Majesty is contemplating hostilities or is deliberately provoking the Imam to a point where hostilities are inevitable, they nevertheless desire to urge him to avoid any action that would lead to war or would expose him to the accusation of having provoked hostilities. The Italians are giving similar advice to the Imam, and the efforts of both Governments will continue to be directed to the preservation of peace in Arabia.

[E 3664/22/91]

No. 12.

Sir Victor Wellesley (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 32. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 31, 1927.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

For your own information only.

We quite realise that the counsels of restraint which you have been instructed to convey to Ibn Saud will appear to him a far from satisfactory response to his own complaints of the Imam and the Italians, but you should endeavour to make them as palatable and sympathetic as possible.

Please telegraph any evidence you may obtain from Ibn Saud or other sources that will help us to establish that the Imam is adopting a more aggressive attitude and that he is being encouraged thereto by the Italians.

[E 3664/22/91]

No. 13.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Wingfield (Rome).

(No. 1064. Confidential.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1927.

I INFORMED you in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 1047 of the 25th August that I had invited the Italian Ambassador to discuss with Mr. Oliphant the whole question of the position in Arabia. In Mr. Oliphant's absence, Signor Bordonaro had a long conversation with Mr. Osborne on the 26th August. His Excellency developed the theme that he had outlined to me, namely, that the Italian Government could not continue to exercise restraint on the Imam in the face of Ibn Saud's provocation, encouraged, so it was suggested, by His Majesty's Government. In these circumstances, the Italian Government were anxious to exchange information and counsel with His Majesty's Government with a view to concerting any action possible to avert a seemingly impending conflict.

2. You will have seen from Jeddah telegram No. 42 of the 23rd August that the Imam's complaints of Ibn Saud, communicated to us by the Italians, synchronised with very similar complaints on the part of Ibn Saud against the attitude of the Imam and the activities of the Italians. The opportunity was taken to inform the Ambassador of Ibn Saud's complaints. He was also informed that His Majesty's Government had no reason whatever to suppose that Ibn Saud wanted war, since he was fully occupied with his own affairs in Nejd and with his reforms and with pilgrimage matters in the Hejaz. He had little money to spare for a campaign and, as far as we were aware, quite inadequate supplies of war material, whereas the Imam must by now be armed to the teeth from Italian sources.

3. As regards the alleged provocation by the despatch of a representative to Asir, his Excellency was reminded that by the terms of the Treaty of Mecca between Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, the latter had practically placed his territory under the suzerainty of Ibn Saud, who was consequently entitled to send a representative to

Asir. As against this right, the Imam's aspirations in Asir would appear to have no solid or legal basis. In this connection his Excellency enquired whether His Majesty's Government had recognised the Treaty of Mecca. He was informed that they had not done so because the occasion had not arisen and because, at the request of the Italian Government, they had undertaken to postpone recognition for as long as possible, but should occasion arise they could not refuse to recognise, and, in any case, the treaty existed and was in force independently of their recognition.

4. Signor Bordonaro referred to local British agents, who were alleged to be encouraging Ibn Saud in his aggressive designs. He was asked if he could obtain the names of these persons. In return, he was informed of the persistent reports of the activities of Italian agents, and he was given the names of the individuals referred to in paragraph 4 of the report enclosed in His Majesty's consul at Jeddah's despatch No. 85 of the 1st August.

5. In reply to an enquiry whether Sir Gilbert Clayton was shortly going on a mission to the Imam, his Excellency was informed that unfortunately there was still no immediate prospect of the opening of negotiations for the purpose of reaching a settlement with the Imam in regard to his occupation of portions of the Aden Protectorate.

6. An uncharitable, but not altogether improbable, explanation of the Ambassador's *démarche* would be that, now that the Imam was fully armed, the Italians anticipated with equanimity a Zeidi attack on Asir and were anxious to disclaim beforehand any responsibility therefor. Failing definite evidence, however, this explanation need not be accepted. Signor Bordonaro seemed, indeed, to be genuinely anxious that the two Governments should exert their influence in keeping the peace. He suggested, therefore, that His Majesty's Government should inform Ibn Saud that the Italian Government could no longer restrain the Imam in the face of the provocation now offered to him, and he asked whether they could not exert their influence on Ibn Saud to restrain him both from further provocation and from actual hostilities. He was informed that His Majesty's Government could and would take this action, and I enclose, for your information, copies of two telegrams which have been addressed to His Majesty's consul at Jeddah; should occasion arise, the substance of the first of these telegrams may be communicated to the Italian Government. At the same time, it was made clear to his Excellency that His Majesty's Government could not accept for themselves, or impress on Ibn Saud, the Imam's claim that intervention by Ibn Saud in Asir constituted an affront to the Imam which would justify hostilities on his part.

7. Unless the Italian Government raise the question with you, it would perhaps be preferable that you should not do so, since it is being dealt with by the Italian Ambassador here.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3931/22/91]

No. 14.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 94.)

Sir,

Jeddah, August 28, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the communication from King Ibn Saud on which my telegram No. 42 of the 23rd August was based.

2. I fear that my telegram may have been unduly long. The King begged me not to omit any of his points, and as he has no other means of communication with His Majesty's Government than through me, I considered it fair to communicate the gist at least of each of his arguments, though I did not feel justified in telegraphing his letter *in extenso*.

3. The letter from the Imam of the Yemen to which reference is made in the King's letter, and of which I forward a translation taken from the original, affords in Ibn Saud's opinion strong evidence that the Italians were responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations in July. He maintains that in his letter to which the Imam's is a reply, the terms of the agreement were stated and that the Imam's letter is tantamount to an acceptance of these terms. I feel myself that Ibn Saud has read into the letter much more than the Imam wished to convey—the tenor of the letter is cordial and shows a desire to arrive at a compromise; it does not

indicate a full acceptance of the proposed terms. Ibn Saud did not think fit to communicate to me the text of his own letter to the Imam. Had he done so I should have been better able to judge of the strength of his case.

4. The reports of Italian anti-Saud propaganda in the Yemen and Asir are not supported by documentary evidence, though as regards Asir they agree with information supplied in confidential reports from Aden.

5. The supply of large quantities of arms and ammunition by Italy to the Yemen, though not itself a proof of Italy's unfriendly attitude, is yet in Ibn Saud's opinion evidence of undue assistance to the Imam in an aggressive policy. A supply of arms with which the Imam was familiar and for which he could pay would arouse no adverse comment, but aeroplanes and heavy guns are being imported for which the Imam has neither funds nor experts available.

6. Ibn Saud maintains that the Italians knew, and made no secret of their knowledge, that the negotiations would fail days before the actual rupture. He further alleges, though he advances no proof, that at the time of the signing of the commercial treaty, a secret understanding was also arrived at.

7. As Ibn Saud himself admits, he has no material evidence, but the "indications" of Italian interference do perhaps justify his nervousness, especially in view of the signs of disaffection among several of the more prominent of his own Hejdi supporters.

8. Copies of this despatch and its enclosures are being addressed to Cairo, Aden and Khartum (through Port Sudan).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD

Enclosure 1 in No. 14.

Ibn Saud to Consul Stonehewer-Bird.

(Translation.)

Compliments and respects,

WE beg to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 18th instant on the subject of the present situation in the Yemen and the interference therein of the Italian Government.

With regard to the enquiry from His Britannic Majesty's Government as to whether we have definite evidence to prove that the attitude of the Italian Government towards us is unfriendly, we submit the following reply:—

Although we realise that the evidence submitted by us in proof that the Italians are inciting the Imam of the Yemen against us is not material, we feel, nevertheless, that it cannot be overlooked, and we submit the following evidence in order that you may place the same before your Government.

1. You will note, after perusing the letter dated the 2nd Moharram, 1346, received by us from the Imam Yahya, that, after he was informed of our terms, which we sent through our representative, he had hopes of good results being obtained from our agreement, but those hopes became fruitless owing to the efforts of the Italians to induce him to stop the negotiations, as your Excellency will note from the following:—

2. Our representatives were assured by the Italians that any negotiations with the Imam would prove fruitless.

A responsible Italian stated to one of our representatives, ten days before the break-off of the negotiations, that the negotiations had failed.

3. The interference by the Italians in Yemen affairs, especially the report sent by our representative to the effect that the Italians are influential in the Government Departments in Sanaa, and that they are endeavouring to stir up trouble between us and the Yemen.

4. It is certain that the Italian Government has supplied, and is still supplying, the Imam with large quantities of arms and ammunition. Recently, a large quantity of arms, guns and aeroplanes have been landed in the Yemen. We cannot understand the reason of this, as these are useless to the Imam unless he wishes to use them against us or our friends.

He has no men expert in the use of this war material, and so must, naturally, obtain outside assistance.

5. The repeated news of the secret agreement made between the Italians and the Imam, which has been made in addition to the Commercial Agreement which was concluded two months ago. According to this secret agreement the Italians are to exercise wide influence over the affairs of the Yemen, and there is also a paragraph which deals with the unity of the Yemen countries according to their proper geographical limits and assistance to be given in obtaining this unity.

6. The efforts, of which we are well aware, of the Italians to stir up the tribes in Tihama, Asir and the Idrisi countries under our control, against us.

These and many other facts force us to believe that the Italians are ill-intentioned towards us.

We ask again, what is the attitude of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and request your Excellency to forward their reply to us as soon as possible.

(Seal) IBN SAUD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 14.

Imam Yahya to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdul Rahman-el-Faisal.

(Translation.)

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 27th Zilkida, and in reply beg you to express my pleasure at your intention to conclude an agreement.

This was my will, and I would point out to you that no one is against the conclusion of this agreement between us except the Christians and their followers, who wish to stir up strife between and weaken the Arab countries. May God forbid that they will ever see anything but amity between us. I am most desirous of concluding this agreement, and pray to God that it may be brought about.

I am content to obtain in my natural rights, and am even prepared to accept less, for the obedience of God and the progress of Islam, and hope similar actions from you. If our two hearts are joined, other hearts will beat in vain.

Your honoured mission has arrived and negotiations have started. I have a strong hope that the issue will be successful.

(Seal) IMAM YAHYA

2nd Moharrem, 1346.

[E 4115/644/91]

No. 15.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Foreign Office.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 95. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 1, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 31st August, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Singapore and Lagos.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Jeddah Report for Period August 1 to 31, 1927.

THE political situation during the past month has given cause for some anxiety. Negotiations conducted at Sanaa for an agreement between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya were broken off at the end of July, and the King's representatives returned to the Hejaz. They arrived with accounts of Italian interference in the

affairs of the Yemen and Italian unfriendliness to Ibn Saud. As indications of Italian activity, the King adduces the following:—

The Italians are pouring into the Yemen such quantities of arms and ammunition as can only be required in the event of a war of aggression against the Hejaz. Moreover, the Imam is importing guns and aeroplanes; he disposes of no men trained in their use and outside (Italian) help must be called for.

Italian influence is spreading to all departments of the Yemen administration, and this influence is being exerted to promote anti-Ibn Saud feeling.

The breakdown of the recent negotiations was due to Italian pressure, as previous to their inception the Imam was ready to accept Ibn Saud's terms. As proof of Italian pressure, it is alleged that responsible Italians announced the failure of the negotiations several days before the actual breakdown.

Italian agents have been active in Asir in promoting pro-Imam and anti-Saud propaganda among the tribes.

Ibn Saud further alleges that a secret agreement was arrived at between the Italian Government and the Imam Yahya, whereby a special position should be assured for the former in the Yemen in exchange for assistance in the pursuance of the latter's policy of aggrandisement.

That the Italians are taking a very active interest in the affairs of the Yemen there is no doubt, but that, so shortly after the conclusion of the agreement with His Majesty's Government, they should be inciting the Imam to hostile action against Ibn Saud is hardly credible, and is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to prove. That the considerable help in the shape of supplies of arms and ammunition, guns and aeroplanes afforded by the Italians causes Ibn Saud anxiety is natural. Theoretically, nothing prevents Ibn Saud from purchasing a similar supply either in Great Britain or elsewhere, but he does not dispose of the necessary funds, and it is doubtful whether purchases of large stocks on a credit basis, even if feasible, could be allowed. The granting of extensive credit for such a purpose is open to misinterpretation, and it is the fact that the Italians are supplying the Imam with more arms than he can at present pay for, which has aroused Ibn Saud's suspicion.

2. The situation in Asir generally seems to have improved. On the Farsan Islands, however, the Red Sea Petroleum Company are experiencing difficulties. On the 11th August a communication was received from the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Sloops, explaining the present situation. It appears that the tribesmen are dissatisfied with the manner in which the preliminary conditions of the contract are being carried out, and are demanding a larger supply of arms than the company are willing to provide. Shortly after the receipt of this communication, the King addressed a letter to the agency to the effect that the Idrisi, unable to settle the dispute himself, had called upon him (Ibn Saud) to find a solution. Ibn Saud proposed that the question should first be discussed in Jeddah by himself and the British agent, and that, the ground being thus cleared, representatives from himself, His Majesty's Government, the Idrisi, and the oil company should meet at Jizam and come to an agreement satisfying all parties. His Majesty's Government have been asked for an expression of their views on this proposal.

3. In addition to the alleged activities of the Italians in the Yemen and the disturbances in Asir, internal troubles have also claimed Ibn Saud's attention.

As stated in Jeddah report for July, certain highly-placed officials were removed from their offices on the score of their incompetence and abuse of power. These officials, in company with some twenty others, of whom six held positions of importance in the Hejaz Administration, were arrested on the 7th August. The charge against them was that of conspiring against the Government. It is perhaps significant that the arrest of these individuals should have coincided with the appearance in the Hejaz of Ibn Boujad and Feisal-el-Derweish, turbulent Nejd chiefs, well known for their lack of sympathy with Ibn Saud. As a sop to these fanatics Ibn Saud caused the wireless and telephone stations at Medina and Taif to be dismantled. Ibn Boujad received from the King, on arrival at Medina, a large present of money, horses and camels. His appearance a fortnight later in Mecca was marked by a strict prohibition of any act calculated to offend his Wahabi principles. The circulation of cars in the town was prohibited and the regulation forbidding smoking in the streets was strictly enforced. It is distressing, if not alarming, that Ibn Saud should be obliged to offer such sops to his Nejd chiefs.

4. There are signs that the principle of Hejaz for the Hejazis and Nejd is gaining ground. Within the last month no fewer than ten Syrians holding respon-

sible positions have been invited to leave the country. Of these the most important are: Dr. Khalid-el-Khotab; Wasli Bey, Director of Posts; Khalid Bey Hakim; Kamil-el-Kasab, Director of Education; Dr. Mahmud Hamdi, Director of the Public Health Department. The two latter have not left the country, but have tendered their resignations; Dr. Mahmud Hamdi is being retained in his functions until his accounts have been audited. In addition to these, several Syrian school teachers have been dismissed and are returning to Syria.

The removal of Syrian influence from the Hejaz should have a salutary effect and should result in a better feeling between Ibn Saud and the French, who have never ceased to take exception to the hospitality afforded to Syrian adventurers, many of whom are actually fugitives from justice. How Ibn Saud proposes to fill the posts so vacated is not yet clear. There is reason to believe that the post of Director of Public Health may be offered to Abdul Ghani, an Indian, who, from all accounts, is a capable man, but with anti-British tendencies. He was principal of the Habibia College, and, later, of the Islamic College, Lahore. He was arrested in 1909 in connection with a plot to kill Amir Habibullah Khan, and was released in 1919. At present Hafiz Wahba, who is fortunately on excellent terms with the agency, appears to be in temporary control of all Departments, save that of Foreign Affairs, where Dr. Damluji remains. As Hafiz Wahba is an Egyptian, and Dr. Damluji a Kurd, the cry of Hejaz for the Hejazis seems merely to have been an excuse to remove the Syrians.

5. The pilgrimage is still causing endless work and worry. All pilgrims could and should have been evacuated at latest by the 15th August, yet on that date nearly 6,000 pilgrims awaited repatriation to Singapore or Indian ports. Messrs. Nemazees are responsible for this state of affairs, and it is hoped that both India and Singapore will think fit to issue very serious warnings to this company. On the 31st August, 1,800 pilgrims still remain, and there is little prospect that all will be removed before the 11th September at earliest. The unprecedented agglomeration of pilgrims certainly made it difficult for shipping companies to comply with the regulations as to the removal of pilgrims within a specified time, but with the single exception of Messrs. Nemazees's, the agents of the companies were willing to advance on behalf of their principals the amount of the fine leviable in respect of the detention of pilgrims holding their tickets. The refusal of Messrs. Nemazees's agents to move in the matter was, they informed this agency, occasioned by their knowledge that their principals would refuse to meet their liabilities. This agency has no power to insist on the payment of the fine in Jeddah, as the provisions of the Indian regulation in question stipulate payment in India. The matter was therefore referred telegraphically to the Government of India for necessary action. In the meantime life for the British agent, and more especially for the Indian pilgrimage officer, is made hideous by the petitions and clamourings of the pilgrims for assistance. Meetings to protest against the Government of India, the agent, the pilgrimage officer and the shipping companies are held daily. The introduction of the deposit system is in the opinion both of the agency and the pilgrims themselves the best solution. The number of Indian destitutes to be repatriated at Government expense is pleasingly small, about 200 or 0.7 per cent. of the total number of pilgrims as against 472, or 2.5 per cent., last year.

6. The Italian consul, Commendatore Fares, who for some time has been suffering from ill health, has been transferred to Rome. He left here on the 27th August by the ship on which his successor, Dr. Cesano, arrived from Massowa. Commendatore Fares had a thorough command of the Arabic language and a wide experience of the Red Sea and the east coast of Africa, where indeed his entire service of nearly forty years has been spent. He was, however, inquisitive and indiscreet and was not *persona grata*, either with the King or with the majority of his colleagues. Dr. Cesano is fresh from accompanying the Yemenite Mission to Rome, and in present circumstances may at first experience some difficulty in gaining the King's confidence. On the occasion of his first visit to this agency he was most entertaining on the subject of the Yemenite Mission to Rome. He said that in his opinion the only lasting impression made on the mission was one of complete bewilderment. The Prince had never before seen the sea, a railway or even a town. Dr. Cesano complained of his difficulties on ceremonial occasions, especially of his inability to induce the Royal guests to control their abdominal and throat muscles when dining in distinguished company. He complained that the more earnest the lectures on deportment delivered by him, the more eager the Yemenis were loudly to express in approved oriental fashion their repletion and content. These expressions

of gratitude for their good fare were, I was told, especially strong in the presence of His Majesty the King of Italy.

Dr. Cesano went on to say that the inhabitants of the Yemen did not seem to take kindly to the few Italians, engineers and doctors, who were working there. In his opinion the Yemen was not ripe for the introduction of any reforms or improvements on European lines. They disliked and distrusted Europeans and European methods. He did not mention their obvious liking for European arms and ammunition. Whether these remarks represent Dr. Cesano's real views or whether they are merely an indication of the line he proposes to take to allay Ibn Saud's suspicions it is hard to say. If the Italians are pursuing an honest policy with regard to Ibn Saud and wish to persuade him of the fact, they have done well to change their representative, who may succeed where his predecessor would most certainly have failed.

7. Reports, apparently originating in Iraq, of an attempt to assassinate the Emir Saud were given wide circulation—they appear in the "Times," the "Near East" and in the Syrian and Egyptian press. Some of the reports state that the plot was aimed at both Ibn Saud and his eldest son, the Emir Saud; some lay the scene of the attempt in Riyadh, some in Mecca. As the King left Riyadh in April last, and the Emir Saud has not visited Mecca this year, it was from the outset obvious that the information was basically false, as the King and his son have not been together at any time during the last four months. Pilgrims' gossip based on garbled versions of the disagreement between Ibn Saud and Nejd chiefs reported on in the June report and tendentious accounts of the arrests in Mecca on the 7th August were probably at the root of the highly improbable stories. The "Um-el-Kura" of the 19th denies in strong terms the existence of any plot against the Emir Saud. Emir Mahommed and Emir Khalid, the supposed authors of the attempt, are, the paper informs the public, on the best of terms with the Emir Saud.

8. The King has recently transferred to England, through the Dutch bank, fairly considerable sums of money and speculation is rife in British commercial circles in Jeddah as to the purpose for which these remittances are destined. They are believed to be not unconnected with the purchase of arms and ammunition. Mr. Philby's protracted stay in England is also supposed by local gossips to be connected with the purchase of arms.

9. A factory and school of weaving is being established at Mecca. It is intended that for the future the Kiswah (Holy Carpet) shall be woven in Mecca. Indian weavers are to be employed, and these will be specially selected and sent from India for the purpose. In addition to their special duty of manufacturing the Holy Carpet the Indians will be employed in instructing the people of Mecca in their art. This decision is undoubtedly the outcome of Abdul Kader Kussuri's efforts, to which reference was made in paragraph 3 of the Jeddah report for July.

10. Two Egyptian engineers have been engaged, one to undertake the repair of the Jeddah-Mecca road, the other to deal with the problem of water supply at Mecca and Muna.

11. Jeddah is shortly to be supplied with ice from its own plant. The plant, capable of producing 1 ton a day, was brought to the Hejaz some months ago by Arthur van de Poll (Haji Mahommed Hussein-el-Mahdi), the apostate Dutch merchant and shipping agent. The King, apparently considering that van de Poll's personal religion did not confer Moslem status on his firm, refused the concession. While negotiations were in train the ice plant was collecting customs and warehouse charges at an alarming rate. In order to avoid these onerous charges van de Poll decided on a *beau geste* and made a free gift of the plant to the King. The plant is to be in working order and the requisite supply of ice is to be forthcoming in three days. "In three days" is a fairly accurate Hejaz equivalent of the Spanish *mañana* or the Serbian *sutra*.

12. During the period under review, seven slaves have been repatriated by this agency.

[E 3867/1328/91]

No. 16.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 8, 1927.

ITALIAN consul has informed King that Italian Government are now willing to recognise him. A representative is being sent by Ibn Saud to Massowah to discuss certain details with Governor of Eritrea, but I gather recognition is to be unconditional.

[E 3961/22/91]

No. 17.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 19. L.N.A.) (Extract.)
Sir,

*British Delegation, Geneva,
September 12, 1927.*

IN the course of our conversation to-day, Signor Grandi spoke both of Egypt and of the relations of our two countries with Ibn Saud and the Imam. As regards the latter, he said that the Imam continued to complain of the aggressive tendencies of Ibn Saud's policy, and that the Italian Government continued to preach caution and moderation. They were now entering into conversations with the King of the Hejaz, which they hoped might be successful. Signor Mussolini trusted that on our side we would use our influence to moderate and restrain the King of the Hejaz.

2. I replied that I attached the greatest importance to our co-operation to maintain peace in that quarter of the world, that we had urged moderation on the King of the Hejaz, and that we should continue to keep in the closest touch with Rome, communicating fully and freely with the Italian Government on all developments of the situation. I would venture, however, to ask that Signor Mussolini should watch carefully over the policy of the Italian Colonial Office to see that it was conducted in accordance with the policy which he himself had laid down.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3995/119/91]

No. 18.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 48.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 17, 1927.

YOUR despatch No. 87.

Ratifications exchanged at 10.30 A.M. 17th September. King proposes 23rd September for publication.

[E 3994/119/91]

No. 19.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 17, 1927.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I presume that decision to publish notes with treaty is irrevocable.

Ibn Saud had hoped notes would not be published. He would prefer not to publish them at this juncture, but will abide by your decision.

[E 3994/119/91]

No. 20.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Consul Stonehewer-Bird (Jeddah).

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, September 19, 1927.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 48 and 49 of 17th September: Ratification and publication of Jeddah Treaty and notes.

Please inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government agree to 23rd September, and will publish on that date. They have every desire to oblige Ibn Saud, but regret that it is impossible to exclude from publication the eight notes signed by him and Sir G. Clayton, publication of which simultaneously with the treaty has always been contemplated (see paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 87 of 31st August). Silence regarding the matters dealt with in the notes would be misleading and expose both Ibn Saud and His Majesty's Government to criticism for neglecting to deal with questions agreement on which is of importance to both parties.

You should point out that apparent neglect to deal with such vital matters as are contained in the notes might seriously impair the credit and good faith of the signatories—two most valuable qualities which it is the duty and interest of both parties to carefully preserve and promote in their relations to each other.

[E 4071/119/91]

No. 21.

Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 24.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, September 23, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 37.

Ibn Saud, to whom I explained position, fully appreciated your point of view, and notes were published to-day with treaty.

[E 4168/3642/91]

No. 22.

Foreign Office to Acting Consul Jakins (Jeddah).

(No. 114.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 3, 1927.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that he has had under consideration the enquiry made in Mr. Stonehewer-Bird's letter of the 1st August to me (a copy of which is enclosed*), regarding the attitude which he should adopt in the matter of the Capitulations and jurisdiction over British subjects.

2. It will be seen from paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the report on Sir G. Clayton's recent negotiations with Ibn Saud (a copy of which is enclosed herein†) that Ibn Saud refused to agree to the terms of article 6 of the draft treaty presented to him (see enclosure in Foreign Office despatch No. 47 of the 27th April), the effect of which in practice would have been that His Majesty's Government gave up their claim to capitulatory rights without making a definite statement to that effect. The attitude of Ibn Saud was that he required a formal renunciation of the Capitulations by His Majesty's Government, and to this demand Sir G. Clayton refused to agree. In the end article 6 of the draft treaty was dropped, and in place of it the following words were added to article 5 of the treaty in its final form: "it being understood that the principles of international law in force between independent Governments shall be respected."

3. In proposing article 6 to Ibn Saud for acceptance, His Majesty's Government were fully prepared to drop their claim to capitulatory rights in Ibn Saud's territories. At the same time they hoped that, as the question of disputes between British subjects (as contrasted with those to which one party only was a British subject) was not specifically mentioned, His Majesty's consular officers would be left free to intervene, as in the past, to secure an amicable settlement of such cases.

4. The omission of article 6 from the treaty as finally signed does not indicate any change in the attitude of His Majesty's Government, namely, that they no longer

* Not printed.

† Part XX, No. 43.

claim capitulatory rights in Ibn Saud's territory, but do not intend to make any formal statement to that effect. You should therefore take no definite step which would show either that His Majesty's Government regard the Capitulations as being in force, or that they have definitely agreed to their abolition. In practice this will mean that you should endeavour, as your predecessors have done in the past, to settle as many cases out of court as possible; but if the local authorities insist on arresting and trying British subjects for crimes against local subjects, you should acquiesce. If you think it desirable in the interests of justice to make an oral or formal protest, you may do so at your discretion, without claiming that your intervention rests on the Capitulations.

5. In criminal cases in which both parties are British subjects, you should again consent to the jurisdiction of the native courts. It would not be possible for you to send British prisoners in such cases to Port Sudan or Egypt for trial, as the courts in those countries would not have jurisdiction to try them. The Secretary of State does not doubt that the Hejaz authorities would permit you to be present at the trial of such British subjects, and your presence and any representations which you might make in the matter would probably ensure that any British prisoner would receive a fair trial.

I am, &c.

L. OLIPHANT.

[E 4220/22/91]

No. 23.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Wingfield (Rome).

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 5, 1927.

MY despatches Nos. 338 of 10th March and 962 of 3rd August: Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Imam of the Yemen.

Yemen forces have made fresh incursion into Aden Protectorate territory, burning and looting as far as neighbourhood of Turan.

Raid is in flat defiance of warning issued by His Majesty's Government to Imam that if further encroachments on protectorate occurred he would expose himself to measures of retaliation.

Royal Air Force will therefore drop warnings on places containing concentrations of Yemen forces to effect that if newly occupied territory and any other occupied villages in immediate neighbourhood on protectorate side of frontier are not evacuated by 6th October bombing operations will be carried out. Usual warning as to removal of women will be included in message. Bombing operations may have to be carried out in intensive manner and against places in territory of Imam in order to ensure efficacy of action and safety of friendly tribes.

You should inform Italian Government of impending action, explaining that you are authorised to do so in view of close relations between our two Governments, and urgently point out that new development is due solely to Imam's action in renewing encroachment in disregard of explicit warnings from His Majesty's Government.

[E 4261/22/91]

No. 24.

Mr. Wingfield to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 178.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, October 7, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 237.

Head of Department concerned said that Italian Government would telegraph to advise Imam to give satisfaction to His Majesty's Government. He expressed regret, however, that they received this information too late for their advice to arrive before ultimatum expired, and felt doubtful whether it would be possible to secure evacuation of territory already occupied before recent raid.

I pointed out in this case of armed invasion of their territory protectorate authorities were bound to act without delay.

[E 4274/22/91]

No. 25.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 102.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 16, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the note which I addressed to King Ibn Saud in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegrams Nos. 31 and 32.

2. I trust that in endeavouring to act in the spirit of the latter telegram I have not departed too far from the terms of the communication indicated in the former. It appeared to me advisable, on the eve of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty and at a moment when for the first time since my arrival I had an opportunity of discussing personally with Ibn Saud the various questions which have arisen during the past five months, to couch my communication in the most conciliatory terms compatible with my instructions.

3. On the receipt of the note, Ibn Saud informed me that he would like to talk the matter over at a private interview. I found him in good humour. He requested me to express to His Majesty's Government his thanks for their action and advice. He assured me that he had no intention of attacking the Yemen or provoking the Imam. He did, however, wish the Imam and the Italians to keep their hands off Asir, which had always been geographically one with the Hejaz.

4. He then told me that the newly appointed Italian consul had recently been to see him and had treated him to a long discourse on the poverty of the Yemen, the ignorance and xenophobia of its inhabitants and the shortcomings of the Imam himself. Ibn Saud considered Dr. Cesano's rather flippant remarks about the Imam's primitive mode of life in rather bad taste. The Italian consul had been authorised to state that Italy was ready to recognise Ibn Saud and to request him to send a representative to Massowa to discuss matters with the Governor of Eritrea.

5. The King harped on the old theme of Italian intrigue and interference, which had resulted in his failure to conclude an agreement with the Imam. I said that whatever the Italians might or might not have done in the past, he had every good ground for the belief that they would not now be guilty of unfriendly activities; his views had been communicated to the Italian Ambassador in London, who had promised that Italian influence was being and would be exerted in the interests of peace. Moreover, if Italy was now according him recognition, she could scarcely at the same moment be inciting the Imam against him.

6. Ibn Saud replied that if the Italians were really making a move towards a more friendly feeling, it was due to the action taken by His Majesty's Government. I thought it well not to disturb that impression.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 25.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, Nejd and its Dependencies.

Your Majesty,

(After respectful compliments.)

Jeddah, September 9, 1927.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State has informed me that the Italian Ambassador in London recently called at the Foreign Office in London and stated that the Imam Yahya was afraid that your Majesty contemplated hostile action against the Yemen. The Ambassador was informed in reply that your Majesty had brought to the notice of the Foreign Office your news of Italian activities in the Yemen, activities which your Majesty feared might provoke the Imam to hostile action.

The Italian Ambassador declared that the Italian Government are urging the Imam to avoid any hostile action.

His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that the Imam's fears have any foundation, but as your Majesty's sincere friends they beg your Majesty to refrain from any action which might possibly be construed as an act provocative of hostilities.

As your Majesty is aware, it is the earnest desire of His Britannic Majesty's Government that peace should be preserved in Arabia.
(Respects.)

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

[E 4275/22/91]

No. 26.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 103.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 16, 1927.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 46 and previous correspondence, I have the honour to report that Seyyid Murghani called on me yesterday morning and, in the course of conversation, broached the question of the dispute between the company and the Idrisi.

2. As Seyyid Murghani has recently paid a visit to Asir, his views on the subject are of interest. He attributes the present state of affairs to the fact that the Idrisi, when making the agreement with the company, did not take the Asir chiefs into his confidence. He wished the major benefits to accrue to himself. Seyyid Mustafa, however, who acted as an intermediary between the Idrisi and the company, appears to have promised the chiefs, on behalf of the company, to supply a quantity of arms. Seyyid Murghani does not himself believe that the company authorised Seyyid Mustafa to make these promises, but the tribes feel that a promise made ostensibly on behalf of the company should be kept. The Idrisi is probably well aware of the true position, but is too weak to make a stand against the tribes' demands.

3. Seyyid Murghani endorsed the view generally held that Italian agents had been at the root of the trouble; there was no doubt in his mind that the Asir chiefs had received gifts of money from the Italians. An Italian company had, moreover, offered £50,000 for the concession. The chiefs were greedy and were normally inclined to back the side which paid best. The Asiri naturally preferred Ibn Saud to the Imam, but they wished no interference from either. They were, above all, afraid that if Ibn Saud's influence in the Asir became paramount, Wahabi doctrines, for which they had little sympathy, might be imposed upon them.

4. He thought that the dispute could be settled locally if the manager would personally interview and discuss matters with the five or six important chiefs of tribes. He thought also that if unable to accede to the tribesmen's hopes in the matter of the supply of arms, the company might compromise with gifts of food-stuffs, which, in present conditions prevailing in Asir, would be most welcome.

5. Seyyid Murghani's visit was a visit of courtesy only and in no way official. His position in the Hejaz appears to be that of unofficial adviser to the King on Asir and Yemen questions. He is a man of intelligence and breadth of mind and is thought by many to have ambitions to take the Idrisi's place. He is pro-Saud, in so far as he has a strong personal admiration for the King himself, but he has little sympathy with Wahabi doctrines.

6. A copy of this despatch is being addressed to the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD

[E 4268/22/91]

No. 27.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 1236.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1927.

WITH reference to Mr. Wingfield's telegram No. 178 of the 7th October and to my reply No. 239 of to-day's date, I have to inform your Excellency that the Italian Chargé d'Affaires called here on the 7th October and, under instructions from Rome, expressed the surprise of the Italian Government at the communication which had been made to them in accordance with the instructions contained in my telegram No. 237 of the 5th October.

2. Count Rogeri said that his Government regarded this case of Zeidi encroachment on the Aden Protectorate as precisely the kind of matter which should have been dealt with by co-operation with themselves, in accordance with the understanding arrived at at the conversations which took place at Rome at the beginning of this year. They were also surprised that Mr. Wingfield's notification to them

should have been made on the very day fixed for the expiry of the ultimatum. They felt somewhat nervous as to the general situation in Arabia, and felt that, should action be taken against the Imam, it might have an unfortunate influence on Ibn Saud. They therefore begged that action should be postponed until they had had an opportunity of investigating the matter in the hope of finding some peaceful solution. Count Rogeri added that his Government attached the greatest importance to the matter, and he asked that he might, if possible, be given a reply on the same day.

3. Owing to the necessity of consultation with the Colonial Office and Air Ministry, this was not possible, but on the following morning Count Rogeri was invited to call at the Foreign Office and was given a reply to his representations.

4. He was informed that, in the recent action arising out of the Imam's occupation of territory in the Aden Protectorate, His Majesty's Government had in no way departed from the spirit of the Rome conversations. They had never understood in the course of these conversations that the Italian Government were to act as mediators in any difficulty that might arise between His Majesty's Government and the Imam Yahia in connection with the Aden Protectorate. Count Rogeri explained that he had never intended to suggest that his Government were to act as mediator between His Majesty's Government and the Imam. Their only idea was that they might have been able, had their assistance been invoked, to effect a settlement of the difficulty and thereby avert possibly dangerous developments in Arabia. For they feared that, should His Majesty's Government take military action against the Imam, however justified they might be in so doing, this might be misconstrued by Ibn Saud or by other Arabian chiefs or tribes.

5. It was pointed out to Count Rogeri that in a case, like the present one, of an unprovoked and entirely unjustifiable invasion of the Aden Protectorate in defiance of specific warnings, His Majesty's Government could hardly be expected to take into consideration the ultimate, and possibly disagreeable, effects which their retaliatory action might exercise on the Imam's position in Arabia. The latter had behaved abominably and in flat defiance of explicit warnings, and the retaliatory measures contemplated would have been entirely justified. The preliminary warnings had, however, had their effect, and the invaded territory had been evacuated, so that the bombing was no longer necessary. If, however, it had taken place and had unfavourably affected the Imam's position elsewhere in Arabia, it must be remembered that a failure on the part of His Majesty's Government to punish him would equally have reacted most unfavourably on their own prestige in Arabia. It was now proposed that aeroplanes should fly over Taiz, Kataba, Yarim and Ibb and drop warnings which, after referring to the recent raid and its consequences, would give formal notice that, in the event of a further raid taking place, those towns and any other places which it might be thought fit to bomb would be bombed at once without any preliminary warning.

6. As regards the fact that the Italian Government had only been notified of the proposed retaliatory action on the day of the expiry of the ultimatum, Count Rogeri was informed that it would hardly have been possible to notify his Government at an earlier date, since the fact of the Imam's invasion was only confirmed on the 3rd October, the retaliatory measures were authorised on the evening of the same day, and communication to the Italian Government at Rome took place on the 5th. The matter was one, as Mr. Wingfield has already pointed out, calling for the most expeditious action, and it would have been difficult for His Majesty's Government to hold their hand until the Italian Government had investigated the question.

7. Count Rogeri was relieved to hear that the villages had been evacuated and the bombing would consequently not take place. His attitude was entirely friendly, and he was at pains to disclaim any suggestion that his Government considered themselves entitled to mediate between His Majesty's Government and the Imam. It seems clear, however, that the Italian Government would like His Majesty's Government to subordinate their policy in dealing with the Imam in the Aden Protectorate to the general policy, on which the two Governments have agreed to co-operate, of maintaining peace in Arabia. They appear to be apprehensive lest, should His Majesty's Government find themselves compelled to undertake hostile measures against the Imam, Ibn Saud might be thereby encouraged to embark upon the attack on the Imam which the Italian Government are convinced he contemplates.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 4387/249/91]

No. 28.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 109. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 24, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith my report on the 1927 pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to India, Singapore, Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 28.

Report on the Pilgrimage, 1927.

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Introductory and General.

THE pilgrimage of 1927 was the largest since the war, and, indeed, is thought by many to have established the record of all times, both as regards the number of overseas pilgrims and as regards the total number who gathered at Arafat and Muna. More than 130,000 pilgrims were disembarked at Jeddah, and the total attendance at Muna, including pilgrims from the interior, is stated to have been not less than 220,000. The chief cause of this unprecedented influx was the knowledge that a complete state of security prevailed in the Hejaz. The pilgrims' confidence in Ibn Saud's ability to maintain order was fully justified by events. A certain number of pilgrims may also have chosen this year to perform the Haj in the belief, generally held, that the "Aid" would fall on a Friday, thus increasing sevenfold the merit attaching to the pilgrimage. The faithful were, however, disappointed, as the moon heralding the eve of the Holy Day was espied on Wednesday, the 8th June.

If the magnitude of the task of supplying the bodily and spiritual needs of this multitude of pilgrims is taken into account, it may be said that the pilgrimage was most creditably managed by all authorities concerned. It was no small matter for the Government to provide transport, food and water for this vast concourse. There have been, as may be expected, numerous complaints—some serious, but many frivolous. The most numerous and the best-founded complaints were those made against the mutawwifs, or pilgrim guides, who have been trained in the tradition that a pilgrim is lawful prey. They cheat the living and they rob the dead, but there is good ground for belief that their happy days are numbered. The King has devoted much time to the study of this problem, and is framing stringent rules for next season. Meanwhile, several of the worst offenders are in prison, others have had heavy fines inflicted on them, and all those against whom evidence was available have been made to disgorge their illicit gains.

Much criticism has also been levelled against the Government for their inability to take adequate sanitary measures and to ensure a sufficient supply of water, especially at Muna. Arrangements were certainly defective, but it must be remembered that Ibn Saud's Government has been established only two years, that his advisers and coadjutors are mostly adventurers whose one aim is to line their own pockets, and that a really efficient and up-to-date sanitary organisation would exhaust the greater part of the revenue of the Hejaz. There is every indication that the King is fully aware of the need of reform, and that next year will see a vast improvement. A falling off in the number of pilgrims would not only react adversely

on Ibn Saud's prestige in the Moslem world; it would spell disaster for the country. The King realises this, and is unlikely to relax his efforts to popularise the pilgrimage.

It is unfortunate that certain shipping companies, notably Messrs. Nemazees, should have given cause for so much just criticism for their failure to provide sufficient shipping for the removal of pilgrims. Fines were imposed in cases where pilgrims were delayed for longer than the regulation periods; but the root of the evil lies in the knowledge of the shipping companies that they can with impunity delay the despatch of vessels until pilgrims have been lying at Jeddah for twenty days under the Straits Settlements and twenty-five days under the Indian regulations. The appointment of a committee with powers to register pilgrims arriving in Jeddah from Mecca or Medina after the pilgrimage and to allot them to ships in the order of their arrival did much to defeat the malpractices of certain shipping agents. It was no longer possible to demand premiums for early bookings. Shipping companies were, moreover, requested by the agency, and loyally responded to the request, not to issue single tickets while return ticket holders required accommodation.

Motor transport was this year brought into use on a much greater scale than in 1926.

No Moslem congress was held this year, though a few leading representatives of the larger Moslem countries met with the King's approval to discuss questions relating to the pilgrimage. A few pilgrims of note and importance visited the Hejaz this year, among whom were Sir Seyyid Abdurahman-el-Mahdi, Sardar Ghulam Mahommed Khan, ex-Afghan Minister of Commerce, and Abdul Kader Kusuri, the notorious non-co-operationist.

A notable feature of the Haj was the presence for the first time for some years of a fairly strong contingent of North Africans, undoubtedly drawn to the Hejaz not by any revival of religious feeling but by the knowledge that security reigned in the country. The fact that the Mahmal was not sent and that the Egyptian Government disclaimed responsibility for their pilgrims did not deter the Egyptians from performing the Haj in great numbers. Indeed, more than 15,000 visited the Holy cities this year, a very small decrease on last year's official pilgrimage. It seems improbable that the Mahmal will again be brought from Egypt. The King looks upon the Egyptian insistence on an armed guard as a slight on his powers of maintaining order, and the Egyptian Government either dare not or do not wish to send the Mahmal without the guard. The general opinion in the Hejaz was, and still is, that the Egyptian Government was not much grieved at the failure to reach an agreement. With the Mahmal used to come to the Hejaz a large monetary contribution, and this is so much saved for the Egyptian Government.

The Persians, for whom the pilgrimage was also unofficial, were very few in number compared with previous years.

Opinions are divided as to whether next year's pilgrimage will be even greater than this. The probability is that if all Moslem countries give countenance to the pilgrimage and if the present state of security continues, the number of pilgrims will increase year by year for some years to come. The sceptical, however, among the Moslems, point out that education is spreading, and with its spread the number of the ignorant and uncultured, who compose more than 90 per cent. of the pilgrims, will decrease. It is all important to the Hejaz that the numbers should not only be maintained, but increased. The King is spending money freely. Foreign engineers are being engaged. A new condenser is being erected at Jeddah, pumps are being imported for wells in Mecca and Muna, the roads are to be repaired, the Public Health Department is being reorganised and hospitals are to be better equipped. The maintenance of these services is dependant on the revenue from the pilgrimage from which source also come the salaries of all officials.

Statistics.

The number of pilgrims who arrived at Jeddah by sea from various foreign countries is as follows:—

Country of Embarkation.	No. of Pilgrims.	Country of Embarkation.	No. of Pilgrims.
British Malaya ...	29,604	Egypt ...	18,876
Dutch East Indies ...	39,157	Syria ...	1,977
India ...	36,089	Tripoli and Tunis ...	1,855
East Africa ...	104	Russia ...	315
Massowa, Mokalla, Hodeida and Aden ...	1,945	Turkey ...	574
Sudan ...	1,613	Total ...	132,109

Pilgrims included in the above list were of the following nationalities:—

No. of Pilgrims.		No. of Pilgrims.	
British Malayans ...	29,604	South Africans ...	100
Javanese ...	39,704	Zanzibaris and other East Africans ...	104
Indians ...	26,496	Egyptians ...	15,547
Afghans ...	3,858	Syrians ...	1,511
Bokharans ...	3,469	Palestinians ...	333
Cingalese ...	18	Turks ...	684
Sarawakis ...	102	Russians ...	315
Persians ...	2,248	Mograbis (Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and Morocco) ...	2,735
Muscatis ...	117	Sudanese ...	957
Iraqis ...	677	Nigerians ...	589
Kurds ...	73	Senegalese ...	124
Arabs ...	187	Total ...	132,109
Hajazis ...	335		
Hadramis ...	669		
Yemenis ...	1,334		
Nejdians ...	39		
Somalis ...	180		

The number of pilgrims carried in ships of different nationalities was as follows:—

Flag.	No. of Pilgrims.	Flag.	No. of Pilgrims.
British ...	79,272	Russian ...	315
Dutch ...	31,353	Turkish ...	574
Italian ...	18,812	Total ...	131,414
Egyptian ...	977		
Greek ...	111		

Ships employed on the pilgrimage were as follows:—

Flag.	Ships.	Flag.	Ships.
British ...	102	Russian ...	1
Dutch ...	27	Turkish ...	1
Italian ...	30	Total ...	163
Egyptian ...	1		
Greek ...	1		

Quarantine.

Quarantine regulations at Kamaran caused a good deal of discontent, especially among the Malays, who envied the Javanese their exemption from the irksome formalities. All pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies are vaccinated and inoculated against cholera before embarkation. Dutch ships can therefore, on presentation of a clean bill of health, hope that two hours will see the formalities at Kamaran completed, whereas ships sailing from Indian ports or from Singapore are often delayed twenty-four hours and, on occasion, even forty-eight hours, while pilgrims are disembarked and disinfected.

Several of the leading Indians complained that the constitutions of the more aged pilgrims were unable to resist the cold bath at Kamaran, and that many who went on shore quite fit came back suffering from chills. Moreover, the benefits accruing from disinfection of the bodies and clothes of the pilgrims were largely discounted by the fact that the bulk of the pilgrims' baggage remains on board. Complaints of petty theft on board ship during the absence of the pilgrims at the quarantine station were, however, few in number.

It is to be hoped that, before the coming pilgrimage season, regulations will be introduced to enforce the compulsory vaccination and inoculation of all pilgrims. Leading Indian pilgrims were in favour of it. A regulation of this nature would be beneficial to the pilgrims, who would thereby avoid the necessity of landing at Kamaran, and, moreover, be protected against the risk of infection in the Hejaz; it would be beneficial to the shipping companies, for whom an avoidable delay of forty-eight hours is a serious matter; it would minimise the risk of a serious outbreak of cholera and smallpox in the Hejaz.

As the pilgrimage was declared clean, no ship called at Kamaran on the return voyage.

The quarantine authorities at Jeddah performed their duties quietly and more efficiently than might have been expected. A wooden covering was erected over the large pen into which pilgrims are herded on arrival and departure. Early in the season there were complaints of pilferage of baggage from the Customs while pilgrims were passing through the quarantine barrier, but, considering the difficulty of control, such losses were conspicuously small.

There is a growing tendency among pilgrims to question the necessity of the three days' quarantine at Tor in seasons when the pilgrimage has been declared clean. In addition to the considerable inconvenience and delay caused to the pilgrims, the regulations result in a loss to shipping companies and a delay in the removal of north-bound pilgrims. As the station at Tor must obviously be maintained, quarantine dues must be paid for its upkeep. At the same time, it might perhaps be possible to relax the regulations to some extent during a clean pilgrimage. I understand that the regulations were relaxed in the case of the Soviet Russian pilgrims, none of whom were, for political reasons, permitted to land, their ship being detained only one day.

Health.

Diseases.

During the months of February, March and April there was an epidemic of smallpox which, towards the end of April, was assuming somewhat alarming proportions. It subsided in May, and during the days of the actual pilgrimage there were only rare cases. The Medical Department at Mecca accused the Javanese of having introduced the disease, though, as smallpox is always prevalent in an epidemic form among the Bedouins, it is possible that the infection was spread by the latter.

Enteric, dysentery and typhoid fever are also endemic at Mecca, and are likely to remain so until the whole question of water supply has been thoroughly and scientifically studied—a consummation not to be looked for in the near future.

Enteric and measles did not develop into an epidemic, though there were many isolated cases among pilgrims of various nationalities.

Malaria and dysentery were also prevalent, but fatal cases were few.

Sanitary Conditions at Mecca and Muna.

Sanitary conditions at Mecca left much to be desired. Latrines were lacking and the streets were foul with animal and human excreta. Houses were dirty and sanitary arrangements therein defective. Though most of the blame for this state of affairs naturally falls on the Hejaz Sanitary Administration, not a little attaches to the pilgrims themselves, who, however near a latrine may be, relieve nature when and where nature calls. The precincts of the agency bear fragrant witness to this habit.

At Muna sanitary arrangements were thoroughly bad; there was little excuse, as a considerable sum had been granted by the King to be devoted to improving conditions at Muna; little of the money can have been spent on the purposes for which it was destined. Better arrangements were made for the slaughter of sacrificial animals, a special enclosure being railed off for the purpose. In spite of this, a vast number of animals were slaughtered in the camp and left to decompose. The worst features at Muna were the complete lack of latrines and the failure of the sanitary authorities to make adequate arrangements for the removal of the dead. The resulting stench was such that many of the more tenderly nurtured pilgrims, among whom must be counted the Egyptian consul, left Muna without completing the ritual three days' stay.

Water Supply.

The water supply at Mecca appeared at first sufficient, though the cost was very high. When, however, the number of pilgrims assembled there passed 200,000, the supply of good water proved to be inadequate, and the price rose to 15 piastres a tin (4 gallons).

At Arafat the supply was adequate, but the water was impure and required filtering before use. The price rose to 20 piastres a tin.

At Muna the supply was quite inadequate, and water was procurable with great difficulty even at the exorbitant price of 60 piastres a tin. In this connection the Foreign Minister informs me that the Government have procured the services of

specialists from Egypt, and are importing pumps, and that next season there will be no shortage of pure water, either at Mecca or Muna.

Mortality.

The average mortality this season was probably no higher than in previous years, though, in the absence of official statistics, it is difficult to gauge with accuracy. From unofficial data which I have collected from my colleagues, I should place the figure at roughly 8 per cent. for all pilgrims. The Netherlands East Indies lost about 10 per cent., Malaya about 12 per cent. and India about 6 per cent.; the death-rate among other nationals whose stay in the Hejaz is of short duration was insignificant—a sufficient proof that the heavy mortality was not due to any special hardship undergone by pilgrims during the actual days of the pilgrimage, but rather to their inferior state of health. Javanese and Malays live for months in Mecca in the filthiest conditions, and numbers, unable to resist owing to physical unfitness or old age, do not live to perform the pilgrimage. Mortality was heavier at Muna; the cause in most cases being heat stroke. Pilgrims became detached from their parties, wandered about, often with no protection for their heads, looking for their friends or searching for water. The heat was intense (124 degrees shade), and it is not surprising that the aged and infirm who visit the Hejaz in spite of the Prophet's ruling that only those sound in health and limb are to perform the Haj, fail to survive.

Medical Attendance and Hospitals.

Hospitals provided by the local Government at Mecca and Jeddah are small, understaffed and unequipped. More work was thus thrown on the agency doctor and his staff, who had great difficulty in meeting all the demands on their time. During the doctor's stay at Mecca, extending from the 14th May to the 18th June, 1,083 pilgrims attended for treatment at the Indian dispensary. The Government of India had sanctioned the appointment of an assistant doctor for the pilgrimage season, but final arrangements were not completed until June, too late for it to be worth while to send him to Jeddah. An assistant is certainly necessary, though I am inclined to think that if the suggestion made to the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Governments by their Protector of Pilgrims at Singapore, that an experienced Malay dresser should be attached to the Indian doctor's staff, is adopted, there will be no need for a second Indian doctor, unless the number of Indian and Malay pilgrims increases very greatly next year.

Dr. Hakim Din, who has supplied me with most of the information contained in this section of the report, carried out his very arduous duties during the pilgrimage with commendable zeal.

The Government of India have generously supplied furniture for the use of the doctor, and it now remains to find a suitable house in Mecca, in which to house the pilgrimage officer and the medical staff. There is no appreciable difference between rents payable for the pilgrimage season or for the whole year, and I would suggest that efforts should be made to find and procure on a long lease a house conveniently situated and providing adequate accommodation. A house of this description could probably be secured at an annual rental of about £180.

Motor.

Transport.

Motor transport was introduced on a small scale in 1926, the concession for the service between Jeddah and Mecca being granted to an Egyptian company. This year permission was granted, on application, to any Moslem company or car owner, with the result that the number of cars for pilgrim transport steadily increased until, by the end of the season, there were some 200 cars and small lorries on the road. Motor transport was, of course, only possible owing to the complete security obtaining.

The charge per person from Jeddah to Mecca was 25s., of which the Government share was 5s. The service between these two towns was open during the whole year; the only restriction being that cars must leave Jeddah at certain stated times so as not to interfere with the camel caravans. Camels in the Hejaz are as yet shy of mechanically propelled vehicles, and the track is in places too narrow to permit of passing. A certain number of complaints were addressed to the agency with regard to the awkward hours of starting, departures were either early in the day when the heat was overpowering or in the evening which necessitated spending the night at Bahra to avoid meeting the camel caravan. As the Government regulations were eminently

reasonable, there was no justification for official action on these complaints, though in certain cases they were relaxed in favour of prominent pilgrims travelling with their women folk.

Motor traffic on the Jeddah-Medina road was permitted between certain dates throughout the pilgrimage. The service was first opened on the 14th May and ran till the 4th June. It was suspended during June and again towards the middle of July, when the last camel caravan started from Medina. The appended provisional regulations are perhaps interesting as illustrating the great advance made by the Hejaz since the days of King Hussein, when a motor service, much less an efficiently organised service, would have been unthinkable. On the whole, the regulations were surprisingly well adhered to, largely no doubt owing to the fact that the engineer entrusted with the task of passing the cars was the English engineer in charge of the Jeddah condenser. Article 4, which fixes the return fare at £15, of which £5 represents Government tax, was, however, frequently contravened, and a stream of complaints of overcharges poured into the agency and were taken up with results satisfactory to the complainants but most unsatisfactory to their compatriots, who later sought accommodation in cars. Prices followed, as was only natural, the law of supply and demand. Cars were few, time was short and pilgrims were numerous. Seats went to the highest bidder; some pilgrims paid high prices willingly, some paid them grudgingly, others paid them smilingly and then reported the matter to the agency. Better-class Indians were numerous in the latter class; the car owners or the mutawwifs were fined, the overcharge was returned to the pilgrim, but distinguished Indians found it increasingly difficult to obtain accommodation. Car owners not unnaturally preferred the "grin and bear it" class of pilgrim.

It is doubtful whether large profits accrue to car owners from the pilgrimage traffic. The life of a car in the Hejaz is short; the cost of petrol is very high (2s. 6d. a gallon), and for six months or more of the year a car is unproductive of any revenue. As the number of cars increases the competition will be greater, fares will decrease and the margin of profit be even less. The introduction of motor traffic is interesting also in its probable effect on camel transport. This season the number of pilgrims was so great and the difference in price between camel and motor hire so considerable that there were no signs of falling off in the demand for camels, but a time will presumably come, and that at no distant date, when the camel-men will either have to be satisfied with smaller profits or change their occupation for that of chauffeur. That camels will altogether disappear from the pilgrimage traffic I do not believe. There is a very large class of pilgrim to whom every rupee makes a difference and it is most improbable that car owners will succeed in so reducing their fares as to capture this market. There is at present a difference of £7 10s. between the return fares to Medina by car and camel, and though the gap may be diminished and still leave a margin of profit, an appreciable difference must always exist.

Camel Transport.

Although the price of fodder was nearly four times as great as last year, there was a very slight increase in fares. The cost of journey by camel to each pilgrim from Jeddah to Mecca was roughly 10 rupees, though at the rush periods it rose to nearly 12 rupees. From Mecca to Arafat 15½ rupees were charged, a slightly higher rate than last year. There was a shortage of shuqdufs, and though the Government rate was fixed at about 3 rupees, as much as £1 was often paid. Many of the poorer pilgrims unable to pay so large a sum dispensed with shuqdufs; but as they were thus directly exposed to the sun, many suffered from sunstroke in consequence. As the number of camels available was insufficient for the transport of all pilgrims on the day of the exodus from Mecca to Arafat, a large percentage of the pilgrims were sent on in advance before the date of the Haj. They were thus obliged to remain at Arafat as many as five days; this caused discontent, but these pilgrims were at least better off than those who attempted the journey on foot under a burning June sun. On the return, the same difficulty arose and many pilgrims did not reach Muna in time to perform certain religious ceremonies necessary to the accomplishment of the full Haj.

The cost of the journey from Mecca or Jeddah to Medina and back was 95 rupees to 100 rupees. Of this the camel-men only received about 50 rupees. Considering this sum insufficient, they refused for some days after the Haj to provide camels and pilgrims were held up at Mecca for about fifteen days. Of the Indians who visited Medina before and after the Haj, 1,800 travelled by camel, 4,000 on foot and 1,000 in cars.

Motor Car Service between Jeddah and Medina.

Provisional Regulations.

Article 1.—A service of motor cars, between Jeddah and Medina is authorised for the period, the 14th May to the 1st June, 1927 (12th–30th Zil Kedah). Persons desirous of travelling from Mecca to Medina shall first proceed to Jeddah, and from thence take cars for the journey.

Art. 2.—No car shall undertake the journey to Medina unless it is passed for service by an engineer to be appointed by the Government—this engineer will grant a certificate, in which will be laid down:—

- (a.) The number of tools to be carried on the journey.
- (b.) The amount of spare parts, such as tyres, tubes and wheels necessary.
- (c.) That two tins of fresh water are available for the passengers.
- (d.) The authorised number of passengers to be transported.

The Director of Finance will then collect the tax leviable on the owners of the car and allow it to proceed, after granting a further certificate. As the car leaves the town by the "Bab Djedid," the police officer on duty will satisfy himself that the car owners have complied with the terms of their respective certificates and then allow them to proceed. An employee of the Finance Department at "Kadima" shall then perform the same formality, as laid down in the preceding paragraph, initialling the relevant certificates.

Art. 3.—With every three loaded motor cars travelling to Medina, one empty car in addition, carrying the spare parts, &c., shall accompany the convoy. Any persons desirous of sending a spare car with a convoy of less than three cars are authorised to do so.

Every driver must be accompanied by an assistant. Every passenger must carry food sufficient for two days.

Art. 4.—The inclusive fare to Medina is £15 sterling.

Art. 5.—Automobile owners can hire their cars out to pilgrims, through the intermediary of their mutawwif's agent—these agents will collect the fares from the passengers and then pay it over to the car owners.

Art. 6.—Pilgrims desirous of travelling by car from Jeddah to Medina must pay the customary mutawwif's fees to the latter's agent in conformity with a previous decree of His Royal Highness.

Art. 7.—Pilgrims are allowed to stay 72 hours in Medina.

Art. 8.—Government officers responsible for the issuing of permits and certificates must submit daily returns, showing thereon:—

- (a.) The number of cars which left for Medina on that particular day, with the name or names of the owners.
- (b.) The registered number of the cars.
- (c.) The number of passengers and the serial number of their passes.

These returns will be forwarded to his Highness the Viceroy's Administration in Mecca.

Art. 9.—Any chauffeur sighting a derelict passenger car must inform the nearest Government post, so that steps can be taken to succour the distressed.

Art. 10.—The Officer Commanding the Jeddah Garrison and Admiralty will supervise the duties of the engineer, mentioned in article 2.

Art. 11.—A fine of no less than £20 sterling will be imposed on any person found contravening the spirit and terms of the present regulations.

Art. 12.—All Government Departments concerned must satisfy themselves that these regulations are being complied with.

Art. 13.—The present regulations are considered effective from the date of their publication.

Indian Pilgrimage.

The pilgrimage from Indian ports this year is probably the largest recorded, and surpassed by many thousands the numbers of recent years, as may be seen from the following list:—

1909	21,587	1919	14,389
1910	19,080	1920	21,672
1911	22,068	1921	10,940
1912	13,401	1922	12,769
1913	13,348	1923	24,052
1914	11,670	1924	17,790
1915	2,442	1925	2,372
1916	Nil	1926	24,205
1917	Nil	1927	36,089
1918	Nil				

Of the 36,089 pilgrims who sailed from Indian ports, 27,546 were British Indians.

It may be of interest to the Government of India to know roughly the proportion of pilgrims coming from the various provinces. It is not possible to guarantee the absolute accuracy of the following figures, but they afford a good basis of comparison:—

Bengals	15,495	United Provinces	...	70
Punjab	4,572	Delhi	...	39
Madras	600	Other provinces	...	4,809
N.W.F.P.	703			
Baluchistan	1,208			27,546
Ajmere	50			

Foreign pilgrims—

Afghans	3,858	Arabs (Mokalla)	...	187
Chinese	2,493	Hejazis	...	335
Persians	898	Others	...	102
Cingalese	18			
Javanese	620			8,543
Iraqis	32			

I realised very early in the season that unless some measure of control were exercised, the abuses practised in previous years could and would, in view of the greatly increased numbers of pilgrims be indulged in on a much vaster scale. I foresaw the detention in Jeddah of many thousand impoverished pilgrims, while their richer brothers paying heavy premiums for early bookings, succeeded in leaving by the first ships. As it was impossible with the staff at my disposal to introduce any system of control of arrivals in, and departures from, Jeddah after the pilgrimage, the possibility of evolving a scheme with the help of the local authorities was considered. The Governor eventually agreed to invite the president of the local Haj Committee and representatives of the shipping companies interested to co-operate with the agency, and a committee was formed of which Ihsanullah was made president, with powers to receive all tickets of pilgrims as they arrived in Jeddah and to allot them to ships in the order of their arrival. It was impossible to deal individually with the pilgrims, of whom 13,000 arrived and were accommodated between the 17th June and the 21st June. It was therefore agreed that the mutawwifs should hand in the tickets of all pilgrims under their charge. Serial numbers were then allotted to the pilgrims, and the ships filled in accordance with the lists so made. The system worked admirably, thanks to the zeal and integrity of Munshi Ihsanullah. The only complaints received were from certain of the better-class pilgrims, who, had no control existed, would have been able to bribe their way to earlier bookings. The chief advantages of the system were:—

1. Poor pilgrims had an equal chance with their richer brothers of securing early bookings.
2. The booking of pilgrims was taken out of the hands of the agents who had no scope for malpractices so frequent in former years.
3. Mutawwifs were in close touch with the agency, and complaints against them could be settled on the spot.

4. Passes and tickets were kept by the committee until the date of departure of the ship for which they were available. There was thus no risk of loss or sale of tickets, and the number of destitutes was consequently much reduced.
5. The agency was in a position throughout the season to gauge the situation as regards the supply of shipping.
6. The number of days for which any pilgrim had been detained could be determined and proved without question. It was thus possible to invite shipping companies to conform with the regulations in force and to furnish detention certificates.

Shipping.

The following statistics show the number of pilgrims carried to and from the Hejaz by the various steamship companies engaged:—

(A.)

ARRIVALS.

Name of Line.	Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims.
Mogul Line	7	15	19,739
Nemazee	4	7	7,757
Shustari	2	6	7,660
B.I. Line	1	1	933
Total	14	29	36,089

DEPARTURES.

Name of Line.	Number of Ships.	Number of Voyages.	Number of Pilgrims.	Not Returning to India.
Mogul Line	7	15	19,328	411
Nemazee	2	3	3,920	3,837
Shustari	2	6	7,095	565
B.I. Line	1	1	1,339	
Total	12	25	31,682	4,813
Less extra carried by B.I. Line				406
				4,407

The first column represents the actual number of ships employed in the transport of pilgrims, the second the total number of single voyages made by all ships; thus, Shustari's had two ships and each ship made three voyages; Nemazee had four ships of which one made three voyages, another two, and the third and fourth one voyage each. Turner Morrison had seven steamers, of which three made three voyages, two made two, and two one voyage.

On the return journey, the Shustari Line employed two steamers, each making three voyages; Nemazee had two steamers, one of which made two, and the other one voyage only; Turner Morrison employed seven steamers, of which two made three voyages, four made two voyages, and one made one voyage.

Of the 4,407 pilgrims shown in the last column, 800 Bokharans and 617 Javanese returned to their homes via Odessa, 268 Indians and Persians via Beirut. Of the balance more than 800 are known to be remaining in the Hejaz. The 2,000 unaccounted for represent the total mortality among pilgrims from Indian ports—roughly 5 per cent.

The following table shows the number of pilgrims carried from and to Indian ports by each line, classified according to ports of departure and nature of tickets held:—

(B.)

ARRIVALS.

Name of Line.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Mogul Line.. ..	12,491	7,248	..	19,739
Nemazee	4,069	2,508	1,180	7,757
Shustari	4,506	3,154	..	7,660
B.I. Line	933	933
Total	21,066	12,910	2,113	36,089

Name of Line.	Return Tickets.	Single Tickets.	Deposit Passes.	Total.
Mogul Line.. ..	18,523	1,200	16	19,739
Nemazee	6,495	324	938	7,757
Shustari	7,200	460	..	7,660
B.I. Line	933	933
Total	32,218	1,984	1,887	36,089

DEPARTURES.

Name of Line.	Bombay.	Karachi.	Calcutta.	Total.
Mogul Line.. ..	14,075	9,173	..	23,248
Nemazee
Shustari		2,791	..	7,095
B.I. Line	1,339
Total	19,718	11,964	..	31,682

Name of Line.	Return Tickets.	Deposit.	Cash.	Total.
Mogul Line.. ..	21,491	1,255	502	23,248
Nemazee		128	432	7,095
Shustari		77	..	1,339
B.I. Line
Total	29,288	1,460	934	31,682

The following table shows the number of ships available on given dates for the repatriation of pilgrims awaiting accommodation:—

(C.)

Date.	Number of Ships in Harbour.	Pilgrims awaiting Shipment.	Pilgrims Accommodated.	Pilgrims Remaining.
June 17 to June 21 ..	11	18,320	13,415	4,905
July 4	1	5,677	1,158	4,519
July 11	1	4,519	1,168	3,351
July 13	1	3,481	1,505	1,976
July 14	1	1,976	1,540	436
July 24	1	3,320	1,305	2,015
July 26	2	3,549	2,441	1,108

Date.	Number of Ships in Harbour.	Pilgrims awaiting Shipment.	Pilgrims Accommodated.	Pilgrims Remaining.
July 27	1	2,224	1,427	797
July 28	1	3,475	1,505	2,764
August 16	1	5,611	1,611	4,000
August 22	1	4,100	1,158	2,945
August 28	1	2,955	1,168	1,787
September 2	1	1,794	1,008	786
September 4	1	786	295	491
September 14	1	491	About 900, including 188 Indian and 66 foreign destitutes and the remainder Mutawwifs and other Hejazis.	

The following table shows the distribution between the companies of return-ticket holders awaiting shipment:—

(D.)

SHUSTARI Line.

Date.	Number of Ships.	Pilgrims Carried.	Pilgrims Left.
June 17 to 24	2	2,491	1,786
July 4	1,958
July 11	1,958
July 13	1,958
July 14	1	1,540	418
July 24	1,012
July 26	1	1,007	315
July 27	315
July 28	711
July 31	1,516
August 1	1,516
August 16	1	1,611	..
August 22	3
August 28	13
September 2	20
September 4	1	295	..
September 14

MOGUL, Nemazee and other Lines.

Date.	Number of Ships.	Pilgrims Carried.	Pilgrims Left.	Remarks.
June 17 to 24	9 (a)	9,319 (a)	3,119	(a) 7 Mogul Line, 1 Nemazee, 1 B.I. Line.
July 4	1	1,158	2,561	
July 11	1	1,168	1,393	
July 13	1	1,505	18	
July 14	18	
July 24	1 (b)	1,305	1,003	(b) Nemazee.
July 26	1	1,434	793	
July 27	1	1,427	482	
July 28	1	1,505	2,053	
July 31	3,085	
August 1	3,316	
August 16	4,000	
August 22	1	1,158	2,942	
August 28	1	1,168	1,774	
September 2	1 (c)	1,008	766	(c) Nemazee.
September 4	491	
September 14	1	905 (d)	..	(d) Including 188 Indian and 66 other destitutes, also mutawwifs, &c.

The following facts are clear from these statistics:—

- (1.) Messrs. Shustari brought in two ships more pilgrims than they could repatriate in two return trips.
- (2.) Messrs. Nemazee brought 7,257 pilgrims to the Hejaz and by the 31st August had provided shipping sufficient to accommodate 2,910. Had they provided for the return journey the number of ships they provided for the outward, every pilgrim would have been evacuated by the 15th August.
- (3.) Messrs. Turner Morrison repatriated some 1,216 more pilgrims holding their return tickets than they brought.

Messrs. Shustari's agents deserve all praise in that they paid on demand and without demur the fine of 1 rupee per day per pilgrim, imposed upon them in respect of their ticket-holders detained for more than twenty-five days. They paid in all 4,838 rupees, which sum was distributed among the pilgrims. It would be unfair to attribute to Messrs. Shustari too much blame for what occurred. They set themselves the impossible task of repatriating in the two ships at their disposal a number of pilgrims equal to that brought by Nemazee's. They made the greatest efforts to achieve the impossible and although a number of their pilgrims were inevitably detained for more than the regulation period, they succeeded in removing all their ticket-holders by the 16th August on which date there were still in Jeddah 4,000 pilgrim for whose repatriation Nemazee was responsible. Their agents moreover established a record in efficiency which will stand for all time. The steamship "Zayani" arrived at 8 A.M. on the 26th July, embarked 1,007 pilgrims and sailed the same evening. The fact that another day's stay in port meant a further payment of 1,007 rupees no doubt acted as a spur.

Messrs. Nemazee as, I note, has invariably been the case in past years, failed lamentably in their management of both the Indian and Malay pilgrimages. On the 17th August when every pilgrim could and should already have been repatriated, there were in Jeddah more than 6,000 Indian and Malay pilgrims for whose return Nemazee was responsible. Two ships removed the Malays on the 17th August, but as will be seen from table (d) above that it was not until the 14th September that the last Indian pilgrim was removed.

Messrs. Turner Morrison had an excellent record; their one mistake was joining forces with Messrs. Nemazee, as some of the odium rightly attaching to Messrs. Nemazee for their failure to provide shipping fell on Turner Morrison's. Complaints against the masters and officers of pilgrim ships of all lines were few and, in most cases, of a frivolous nature. They related in nearly every case to the supply of water. As a result of enquiries, I found that the complaints were not of non-compliance with the regulations, but of the fact that the regulations did not allow of a sufficient supply. The regulation supply appears to me ample, but Indian pilgrims have an insatiable thirst; they are inclined moreover to waste their water.

Several of the leading pilgrims raised the question of feeding pilgrims on board ship and appeared to be in favour of it. This system, if introduced, would have many advantages of which the following may be noted:—

- (1.) A certain amount of danger attends cooking on board by the pilgrims. Although concrete platforms are provided on which to build fires, pilgrims cannot always be relied upon to use them.
- (2.) In rough weather the difficulty and danger of cooking on board are multiplied.
- (3.) Pilgrims returning to India after the Haj are in a poor state of health and need nourishing food, whereas they are usually at the end of their financial resources and can only procure the minimum sustenance required.

As against these advantages, there is the difficulty of catering for different classes and nationalities of pilgrims. I am not sufficiently well versed in the habits of the natives of the various provinces and countries from which pilgrims are drawn to offer a personal opinion on this point, though I am assured by those in a position to know that the difficulty is not insurmountable.

The appearance in Jeddah Harbour of a ship of the British India Line raises hopes that this line will participate to a large extent in future pilgrimages. Though it is a question for the Government of India to decide, it has struck me and all

persons connected with the pilgrimage that a direct line of steamers from Jeddah to Calcutta would go far to ease the strain of removing pilgrims after the Haj. Of the 28,000 Indians who performed the pilgrimage this year, more than 50 per cent. were Bengalis for whom direct shipment to and from Calcutta should surely prove a benefit. At present 85 per cent. of Bengali pilgrims return via Bombay. If they have return tickets or deposit passes issued at Calcutta and return via Bombay they can recover 30 rupees for their train journey. As neither the mutawwifs nor the pilgrims can read what is written on tickets or passes and as these passes and tickets are in no way distinguishable from those issued at Bombay, exchange often takes place with the result that Calcutta pilgrims cannot reclaim their 30 rupees. A combination of the enforced deposit system and a direct service to Calcutta is the only complete solution, though the issue of different coloured tickets and passes with the word Calcutta prominently marked thereon both in English block capitals and in Bengali would go far to remedy the evil.

The Indian pilgrimage officer went on board all incoming pilgrim ships with a view to helping pilgrims with the disposal of their baggage, obtaining accommodation on sambuks and explaining the various passport and quarantine formalities to be complied with on landing. He moreover interviewed leading pilgrims and obtained from them an account of the voyage and heard and reported to His Majesty's agent any serious complaints.

It is the practice to allow coolies to go on board the steamers as soon as the medical inspection is completed and to collect pilgrims' baggage. The system leads to much confusion and often loss. This year an endeavour was made to induce shipping companies to use their derricks for the unloading of pilgrims' baggage and to allow no boatmen on board. Messrs. Shustari's agents alone agreed.

When all passengers and their effects had been disembarked, the pilgrimage officer proceeded to the quarantine quay to await the arrival of the pilgrims. He was enabled in this way to afford much assistance, and especially to ensure the gentle treatment of pilgrims by the mutawwifs and local police.

The system whereby passes and tickets were collected at the quay and returned to pilgrims later, led to much confusion, loss of time and often loss or transference of passes. At the urgent request of the agency the system was abandoned, and tickets and passes were collected from the pilgrims by their mutawwifs after they had reached their houses; consequently, considerably fewer cases of loss were reported.

No duty was charged by the Government on *bona fide* luggage, including a reasonable quantity of food. The system whereby pilgrims' baggage is landed at the customs quay, while pilgrims themselves land at the quarantine quay, leads to confusion and theft, and much avoidable delay and loss was caused early in the season by the obstructions and dishonest methods of the Customs officials. Strong representations were made to the local government with good results, though there is still much room for improvement. Pilgrims were this year protected from the sun while awaiting the completion of quarantine and customs facilities by the erection of a wooden roof over the hitherto open pens. It is impossible for the pilgrimage officer to be in constant attendance on all pilgrims both at the quarantine and the customs, especially when, as sometimes happens, two ships arrive on the same day. In another part of this report it has been suggested that two or three Indians from different provinces should be attached to the staff of the agency during the pilgrimage season to act as doorkeepers and messengers. If ex-members of the police force could be sent out for this purpose, they would prove invaluable on the occasions of the landing or embarkation of pilgrims.

I submit the following recommendations to the Government of India in this connection:—

- (1.) Masters of pilgrim ships should be instructed to facilitate the visit of their ships on arrival and departure by the pilgrimage officer, should hand the effects of deceased pilgrims to him and the lists of the pilgrims carried.
- (2.) Shipping companies engaged in the Indian pilgrimage traffic should be requested to afford to pilgrims the same facilities for the unloading of their baggage as are afforded by the Blue Funnel Line, namely, that the ship's derricks should be employed and only coolies and boatmen provided by the company should be allowed on board.
- (3.) Companies should be induced to include the cost of sambuk and coolie hire in the price of the ticket.

Detention of Pilgrims.

It was possible this year, owing to the system introduced for checking arrivals of pilgrims, to keep a record of the number of pilgrims detained for more than the regulation period of twenty-five days. It was not, however, so easy to induce shipping agents to pay the amount due. Messrs. Shustari's Jeddah agents paid without demur, but Messrs. Nemazee's agents refused. The regulation—No. 209A (1925 Amendment) of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act—provides for the payment of the fine of 1 rupee to the local Government (in India). The British agency has, moreover, no power to enforce the payment in Jeddah. Messrs. Nemazee's agents did not, however, question the legality of my demand; they demurred on the score that their principals would refuse to meet their liabilities. Eventually, the Government of India, on receipt of a telegram explaining the situation, sanctioned the payment of compensation out of Government funds, hoping themselves to recover from Messrs. Nemazee. Sanction was unfortunately not received until most of the detained pilgrims had left Jeddah, with the result that, of 16,484 rupees owing in this respect, only 4,213 rupees were distributed. The following table shows the number of pilgrims detained over twenty-five days and the amount of compensation payable to them:—

MESSRS. Nemazee and Turner Morrison.

No. of Pilgrims.	Detained for the following days over 25.	Compensation due. Rupees.
27	17	459
38	16	608
36	15	540
27	11	264
533	10	5,330
407	9	3,663
279	8	2,232
76	7	532
9	6	54
27	5	135
88	4	352
70	3	210
937	2	1,874
231	1	231
2,782		16,484
Actually paid		4,213
		12,271

MESSRS. Shustari.

405	11	4,455
7	9	63
40	8	320
452		
Due and paid		4,838

Apart from the question of the payment of compensation, another difficulty arose: that of the powers of the British agent in the matter of repatriating detained pilgrims on the ships of another company. The steamship "Intaba" (Messrs. Nemazee) and the steamship "Zayani" (Messrs. Shustari) arrived in Jeddah the same day, the 3rd September. There were some 1,640 Nemazee and Turner Morrison return ticket holders detained more than twenty-five days awaiting shipment. The steamship "Intaba" accommodated 1,000, and the remaining 640 had no prospect of accommodation before the arrival of the steamship "Dara" on the 10th September. Under article 209A quoted above, the local Government in India may recover from the shipping company the cost incurred in repatriating such pilgrims. As, however, I foresaw that the difficulty of recovering the sum so disbursed would be considerable and eventual failure to do so would involve the Government of India

in heavy loss, I decided, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, to detain these pilgrims until the arrival of the steamship "Dara." One hundred and sixty of the pilgrims, however, preferred to buy fresh tickets for the steamship "Zayani," and risk obtaining a refund in India. In this action they were not encouraged by the agency, as the regulations in force do not appear to cover their case.

I venture to suggest that if the return ticket system is maintained next season, the wording of article 209A might be so modified as to make its stipulations more stringent and more easily enforceable. I would suggest that His Majesty's agent at Jeddah be empowered to pay on behalf of the Government of India to every pilgrim detained more than twenty days the sum of 1 rupee for each day of his detention, the sum so disbursed to be recoverable from the company responsible against a consular certificate of detention. He should further be empowered, when circumstances justify, to embark pilgrims so detained on the first available steamer, drawing on the Government of India for the sum disbursed and providing the usual detention certificate to enable this sum to be recovered in India.

The general authority so conferred would enable His Majesty's agent to deal with situations as they arose; moreover, the knowledge that he had and would exercise such power would go far to ensure a stricter compliance with regulations on the part of the shipping companies.

Destitutes.

The number of destitutes repatriated this year and the cost to the Government of India was unusually small and compares very favourably with the figures for last year, as shown below:—

1926	472 (2.5 per cent. of total pilgrims) at a cost of 25,602 rupees.
1927	188 (0.5 per cent. of total pilgrims) at a cost of 3,450 rupees.

The main reason for the decline in the number of destitutes was undoubtedly the care exercised at Bombay and Karachi to allow only those pilgrims to proceed to the Hejaz with single tickets as had genuinely no intention of returning to India by sea. Of the 188 destitute Indian pilgrims who applied for repatriation only thirty-seven were single ticket holders. Forty-four were return ticket holders who had failed to notify the agency of the loss of their tickets before passages had been booked against the latter by the shipping companies. The balance, 107, were pilgrims who had travelled overland or by dhow from Aden, Muscat or Hadramout.

Owing to the strong rivalry at the end of the pilgrimage between the agents of Messrs. Shustari and Messrs. Turner Morrison, both of whom had ships with more accommodation than they could fill, the hitherto undreamt of rate of 15 rupees per pilgrim was finally offered by Turner Morrison. The previous lowest rate of which I have any record was 25 rupees in 1923, while the cost of repatriation last year was 52½ rupees per pilgrim.

It is suggested in this connection that the Government of India might consider the possibility of allowing His Majesty's agent to draw on them for the cost of repatriation of destitutes without awaiting previous sanction. The reasons for making this request are strong. It has been found wise to make no mention of repatriation at Government expense until the very end of the season, but rather to discourage any idea of such repatriation until shortly before the arrival of the last Indian-bound ship. This procedure is followed in order to minimise the temptation to pilgrims to sell tickets and pose as destitutes. Enquiries into the number of destitutes, and the veracity of their statements cannot therefore safely be instituted until a few days before the last ship's departure. If an immediate reply to the telegram from the agency to the Government of India requesting sanction for expenditure is not received, His Majesty's agent must in any case advance the cost in anticipation of sanction. The greatest care will, of course, be exercised to ensure that only *bona fide* Indian destitutes benefit by repatriation at Government expense, and every effort will be exerted to obtain the lowest possible terms from the shipping agents.

Deposit System.

Year after year successive consular officers in charge of this post have advocated the introduction of compulsory deposits by all pilgrims leaving India. While it would be idle to pretend that the return ticket system is a failure, yet experience has shown that the system operates to the advantage of the shipping companies and to the

disadvantage of the pilgrims. Under existing rules shipping agents or companies must pay in respect of every pilgrim detained at Jeddah more than twenty-five days the sum of 1 rupee per diem until accommodation is provided for him. Twenty-five days is a long time for a half-starving Indian pilgrim, suffering from the hardships of the Haj, to lie about the streets of Jeddah. On two occasions this season there have been more than 5,000 Indian pilgrims in Jeddah with no prospect of a ship for some twenty days. They are a drain on the resources of Jeddah, especially as regards water, a commodity which they consume in incredible quantities. In Enclosure No. 2, paragraph 5 of the letter of the 23rd March, 1922, from the Secretary to the Government of India to His Majesty's Under-Secretary of State for India, the former writes: "I am to observe that the best method of avoiding the stranding of destitute pilgrims is to foster competition." I heartily endorse this statement, and would go further to say that the best method of avoiding the detention of pilgrims at Jeddah is to foster competition. Competition is not fostered by the return ticket system; on the contrary, it is eliminated thereby. Pilgrims hold return tickets either by Turner Morrison, Nemazee or Shustari lines. They must return by the ships of those companies; the companies therefore have no interest in removing pilgrims within twenty-five days of their arrival. Under the deposit system companies would have a definite interest in removing their pilgrims lest they be transported by ships of other companies.

As has been stated elsewhere, a list was made by the committee appointed for the purpose of Indian pilgrims arriving in Jeddah, and accommodation was allotted to them in the order of their arrival. Of the first 13,000 pilgrims who arrived in Jeddah, 3,300 were Shustari ticket holders. Shustari, although they brought 7,000 pilgrims to Jeddah, only dispose of two ships with a carrying capacity of roughly 1,250 each. There therefore remained at Jeddah some 800 pilgrims who, though they had arrived among the first from Mecca, had to look forward to a stay of some thirty days before the return of a ship of the Shustari Line. The agency was bombarded with petitions, with delegations, with requests for monetary assistance. It was only after twenty-five days had elapsed that the company became liable to a fine. The fine was duly imposed, and in all a sum of 4,838 rupees so levied was distributed among the pilgrims holding Shustari return tickets. Thanks only to the fact that Turner Morrison had by the first week in August already repatriated not only the number of pilgrims they themselves had brought but a number of Nemazee ticket holders, the latter company managed until the end of the season to keep within the law, though, as stated elsewhere, their record for this pilgrimage has been deplorable. Had the deposit system been in force, Turner Morrison's ships could have removed the Shustari pilgrims and Shustari's ships could have removed later arrivals, thus avoiding much misery among the pilgrims. The steamship "Zayani," which sailed on the 4th September, could have removed the 480 pilgrims holding Nemazee and Turner Morrison tickets, who were obliged to await the arrival of the steamship "Dara" on the 10th.

Had the deposit system been in force, and had the shipping companies felt that there was any risk of losing their passengers or any chance of booking pilgrims who had come on other lines, there would, I am convinced, have been a sufficiency of shipping to remove all pilgrims by the 10th August at the latest, whereas on the 2nd September there were still 1,800 pilgrims, over 1,300 of whom had been detained for periods exceeding twenty-five days, and the last pilgrim did not leave till the 13th September, three months after the completion of the Haj.

To sum up, I advocate the introduction of the deposit system for the following reasons:—

- (1.) It fosters competition, and so makes for the speedy return of pilgrims.
- (2.) It enables pilgrims to leave Jeddah in the order in which they arrive.
- (3.) A pilgrim deposit pass is less easily disposed of by the bearer or by the person who has stolen or found it, especially if passes with photographs are issued.

Every intelligent Indian with whom I spoke of the advantage of deposits as opposed to return tickets was whole-heartedly in agreement with me. I foresee no opposition on the part of the Moslem community. I see, moreover, from copies of correspondence forwarded to me that the Government of Bengal, which provides 50 per cent. of Indian pilgrims, is in favour of the system. Another proposal made by certain leading Indians was that the sum deposited by the pilgrim should be increased to include some 20 or 30 rupees to be transferred to this agency

as a guarantee against an enforced stay in Jeddah without means of subsistence. This plan, though excellent in its conception, would be difficult, if not impossible, of operation. The task of handing out to 30,000 pilgrims separately on demand nearly a million rupees in sums of 30 rupees, obtaining each pilgrim's receipt and accounting for the total sum so disbursed is one which the agency could not possibly undertake even if supplied with a very large Indian staff. Personally, I have every hope that the introduction of the deposit system will go far to remove the risk of undue detention; I look forward to the day when ships will be waiting for pilgrims instead of pilgrims waiting for ships.

Passes.

Much has been written in vain on the subject of photographs on passes, and it is with little hope of inducing the Government of India to modify their views that I submit the following considerations:—

- (1.) Hejazis, and even Nejdis (most fanatical of Moslems), have photographs attached to their passports.
- (2.) No Indian to whom a passport or an emergency pass has been issued in Jeddah has ever raised the slightest objection to having his photograph taken.
- (3.) The absence of a photograph on a pilgrim pass has the following results:—

(a.) Passes without photographs may be sold and easily lost; passes may be used by undesirable Arabs or domiciled Indians, who can thus proceed to and land in India without check or control. The rightful owners, who in most cases have lost or sold their return tickets with the passes and have failed to report the loss in time for action to be taken, must be repatriated at Government expense.

(b.) There are pilgrims holding passes who wish to proceed to India via Syria and Iraq. I had the very greatest difficulty in inducing the French consul to visa their passes, and I think it most improbable that he will agree next year to do so. This difficulty can be overcome by the passport authorities in India providing any pilgrim travelling to countries other than the Hejaz not with a pilgrim pass but with a proper British (Indian) passport endorsed valid for the necessary countries and bearing the holder's photograph.

A determined effort was made to prevent the abuse mentioned above under 3 (a). The police were requested not to visa passes presented by any person known to be domiciled in the Hejaz, shipping companies were warned, and the pilgrimage officer was, when his services could be spared, posted on the gangway of the pilgrim ships to control the embarkation of pilgrims. This latter measure resulted in the turning back of some 100 persons in wrongful possession of pilgrim passes.

Loss of Passes and Tickets.

The loss of passes and return tickets throws a considerable burden of extra work on this agency, on the shipping agents and on the authorities at Bombay and Karachi. When a pass and ticket are reported as lost to the pilgrimage officer, the shipping agents are warned of the loss and requested to impound pass and ticket if presented. On the receipt of the agent's note to the effect that such ticket has not been presented, an emergency pass is issued which agents accept in lieu of the original. This system works admirably on condition, first, that the loss is reported to the agency before the original pass has been used, and, secondly, that the shipping agents take reasonable care not to issue return tickets against passes the loss of which has been reported. If tickets are issued against both original and emergency passes, the shipping agents are alone to blame.

Registration and Collection of Passes and Tickets.

Much thought has been given to evolving a system whereby loss or sale of passports during the Haj may be prevented. Registration and deposit of passes and tickets at the agency is a solution adopted with success by the Straits Settlements

and Federated Malay States Governments. In the case of Indian pilgrims, it would be impracticable for the following reason:—

Whereas in the case of Malayan pilgrims there is a continual stream of ships arriving and leaving at intervals of a few days, ships bound for India await in harbour the arrival of pilgrims from Mecca immediately after the Haj. This season there were in port when pilgrims arrived from Mecca eleven ships with a carrying capacity of nearly 13,000. With the most perfect system of registration and filing and with a special staff of Indian clerks it would not have been possible to hand out this number of tickets in less than twenty days, thus causing unnecessary delay to shipping and pilgrims. Moreover, a small police force would be necessary to maintain order.

The expense involved, apart from other considerations, would be out of all proportion to the benefits accruing. Other means must, therefore, be found to combat the evil. The following plan commends itself to me as affording a complete check on loss or sale of passes and tickets, while necessitating only a slight increase in the Indian staff:—

Mutawwifs should take charge of and retain at Jeddah the passes and tickets of all pilgrims in their care. They will furnish the agency immediately with a list of all such passes and tickets, and will be responsible to the Government for any loss. The names of the pilgrims under each mutawwif can be checked from the lists furnished by Bombay and Karachi. Such lists should accompany the ship to which they refer and should be handed over immediately on the ship's arrival to the pilgrimage officer. The co-operation of the Hejaz authorities would be required for framing and enforcing a regulation fixing the responsibility of mutawwifs, but I foresee no difficulty in this respect.

This system would have a further useful result. The agency would be in possession of a list of all pilgrims classified under the heading of their mutawwifs and would be enabled to institute immediate enquiries into the fate of any pilgrim who had failed to return to India.

Staff.

Munshi Ihsanullah, the Indian pilgrimage officer, has performed his duties with great zeal and ability. During the rush period immediately following the Haj he was often working fourteen hours a day. Though he must at times have been goaded to distraction by the pilgrims for whom no hour is sacred to sleep or rest, and who filled his personal residence day and night, he was never rattled, nor did he lose patience. It has been suggested to the Government of India that if it is thought necessary to maintain the fiction of an Indian vice-consulate at Jeddah, that the honorary title of vice-consul now enjoyed by the Indian doctor should be bestowed on Munshi Ihsanullah, together with such emoluments as the doctor enjoys in his capacity as vice-consul. While it is pleasant to have a highly qualified young surgeon attached to the agency, an experienced general practitioner, such as I understand a "sub-assistant surgeon" to be, would supply all needs; his salary would presumably be lower, and the saving so effected could well be devoted to the increase of Munshi Ihsanullah's pay. An Indian doctor attached to the agency can, and does, have a good private practice; doctors are scarce and fees are high, so that even on a comparatively low salary, Jeddah should be financially attractive to the agency and pilgrimage doctor. Ihsanullah's services to the Government of India this year certainly call for official recognition, and I trust that my recommendation may commend itself.

Although it is, in my opinion, unnecessary and even inadvisable to maintain a permanent representative in Mecca, it is most necessary that the pilgrimage officer should visit Mecca at fairly frequent intervals after his return to Jeddah to deal with complaints of pilgrims remaining. I would, therefore, request that either a fixed sum be allotted for this purpose, of about £80, to cover five visits, or, alternatively, sanction be granted for the pilgrimage officer to visit Mecca when circumstances justify the journey.

Housing of Staff at Mecca.

Arrangements for housing the pilgrimage officer and the medical staff have, in the past, been made from year to year, and a house rented for the pilgrimage months. The accommodation so procured has been poor and the house inconveniently situated.

It is essential, if the Indian pilgrimage office and hospital are to be of full benefit to the pilgrims, that the house occupied by them should be situated in that part of the town where Indians congregate. A suitable house is at last available. The house is the property of the Hejaz-Nejd Government, and could be rented on a yearly lease for the whole year. This would offer many advantages. It is often necessary to send Ihsanullah up to Mecca in the months following the pilgrimage, and even out of the season. He has hitherto been obliged to accept the hospitality of friends. Rents are unfortunately very high at Mecca; as much as £100 has been paid by richer Indians for the rent of two rooms for the period of their stay of, roughly, fifteen days. The rent of the house offered by the Government is £180 per annum—a high figure, though Ihsanullah, who knows the house, considers it very good value. If my recommendation that 1 rupee should be charged for each pilgrim sailing from Indian ports is approved, all expenses connected with the pilgrimage, including salaries of medical staff, could be met from the revenue so accruing to the Government of India.

The experience of this year's pilgrimage has made it abundantly clear that an increase in the Indian pilgrimage staff is indispensable if even the measure of success attained this year is to be maintained. Some control must be exercised over the booking of pilgrims or the old abuses will once again be prevalent. With the help of two Indian clerks, one of whom should be a Bengali, it should be possible to undertake the work performed this year by the committee. One clerk could be permanently attached to the staff of the agency to act as understudy to Ihsanullah and a second clerk could arrive with the first and leave with the last pilgrim ship. The Malay pilgrimage officer, with one-third of the number of pilgrims to cater for and with many fewer difficulties to contend with, has a staff consisting of a pilgrimage officer and two clerks, with sanction for a third clerk if required. It is inhuman to expect Ihsanullah to do the work of three men, nor is it possible to shirk responsibility for the pilgrims. An Indian doorkeeper and two messengers (a Punjabi and a Bengali) should also be temporarily attached during the season. The Government of India may demur on the ground of expense, but the total cost of the establishment could be more than met by a small charge for each pass. The cost of the pilgrimage, even to the most economical pilgrim, can fall little short of 800 rupees, and the payment of one additional rupee could not be felt by even the poorest pilgrim; and it is difficult to see how the Moslem community at large could object to the payment of a small fee for a definite service rendered. The sum so collected would be far in excess of requirements in Jeddah, and the balance could with advantage form the nucleus of a repatriation or relief of destitutes fund. A fee of one dollar is levied on every pilgrim leaving Singapore.

If the idea of making a charge to Indian pilgrims does not appeal to the Government, the fee could perhaps be levied on foreign pilgrims, Afghans, Persians and Bokharans. As explained elsewhere in this report, these foreign pilgrims are a source of constant worry, and 1 rupee a head is a very small return for the services rendered them.

Cost of Pilgrimage. Mutawwifs.

An endeavour is made in the accompanying table to show the total cost, item by item, of the pilgrimage. Although it would obviously not be feasible to insist on every intending pilgrim giving a guarantee that he has sufficient funds to undertake the pilgrimage, it would be well to give as wide a circulation as possible to the list. It might also be advisable, though this obviously can only be done by the various Haj committees, to warn pilgrims when circulating the information that by proceeding on the pilgrimage insufficiently supplied with money they are contravening one of the Prophet's commands.

In this connection the activities of the mutawwifs touting for pilgrims in India may be mentioned. In their desire to secure as many pilgrims as possible they often underestimate the cost of the Haj. They are accused especially by Bengali pilgrims of playing on their ignorance and making extortionate charges for advice and fictitious services. If any serious complaints are made against mutawwifs at Bombay or Karachi, this agency would be grateful for information in order that a visa may be refused next season.

Many of the minor complaints against mutawwifs in Mecca or Jeddah were settled unofficially by the Indian pilgrimage officer. More serious complaints were brought to the notice of the local or central authorities with the result that heavy fines were imposed; several mutawwifs have been imprisoned and have lost their

opportunity of proceeding to India. More stringent rules are to be introduced next season, and the number of pilgrims to be entrusted to each mutawwif is to be limited.

MINIMUM Expenditure likely to be Incurred by a Pilgrim on Haj.

Unloading baggage, steamer to sambuk, approximately ...	R.	a.	p.
Sambuk hire—	0	8	0
Outer harbour, 1 r. 4 a.			
Middle harbour, 1 r.	1	0	0
Inner harbour, 10 a.			
Unloading baggage from sambuk at customs ...	0	1	0
Porterage from quay to lodgings, 5 P.T. ...	0	11	0
House rent at Jeddah for at least four nights (first two nights at 2½ P.T. and following two nights at 1½ P.T.) ...	1	0	0
Fee to Jeddah mutawwif ...	2	8	0
Fee to naqaib ...	0	4	0
Fee to Haj Committee, ¼ P.T. ...	0	1	6
Municipal tax ...	0	4	0
Passport fee ...	0	6	0
Miscellaneous expenses at Jeddah ...	10	0	0
Camel hire for pilgrim and luggage ...	17	0	0
Half shuqduf hire (varies from 2 r. 8 a. to 5 r.) ...	5	0	0
Rope, basket and other expenses on journey ...	3	0	0
*House rent at Mecca, fixed by Government ...	14	8	0
Fee of Mecca mutawwif ...	15	0	0
Fee of the Zamzani ...	3	0	0
*Tent hire at Arafat ...	4	0	0
Miscellaneous expenses at Arafat, including water, &c., approximately ...	20	0	0
Half camel hire to Arafat and back, approximately ...	17	0	0
Half shuqduf hire to Arafat and back, approximately (from £1 to £2) ...	15	0	0
Expenses at Muna, including purchase of sacrificial sheep and taking into account high cost of water ...	40	0	0
Return journey to Medina from Jeddah or Mecca by camel (the same by car, 252 r.) ...	130	0	0
Fee of mutawwif at Medina ...	3	0	0
Other expenses at Medina and in visiting the Holy Places, approximately ...	10	0	0
Municipal and other taxes at Medina, approximately ...	6	0	0
Hire of camel to Jeddah (or motor hire), approximately ...	17	0	0
Half shuqduf hire or camel hire for luggage ...	15	0	0
Jeddah expenses, health certificate, house rent, agent's fee and sambuk hire ...	8	0	0
Presents (these have to be purchased even by the poorest pilgrim), at least ...	20	0	0
Health certificate and other Jeddah expenses on return journey to Jeddah ...	15	0	0
Living expenses at least for three months in the Hejaz, at 1 r. daily ...	90	0	0
Living expenses on board ship and at Bombay ...	30	0	0
Steamer fare ...	200	0	0
Railway and other miscellaneous expenses in India ...	63	13	0
	778	1	0

The minimum inclusive cost of the pilgrimage is roughly 800 rupees, though if pilgrims prefer to travel from Jeddah or Mecca to Medina and back by car rather than by camel the cost is increased by approximately 120 rupees.

* House rent at Mecca and tent hire at Arafat are fixed for poor pilgrims only, who live ten to twenty in a room at Mecca; the same holds good at Arafat and Muna. The well-to-do or middle-class pilgrims do not stay in these houses or tents, but rent special accommodation; the rent of a suitable room varies from £5 to £20 per head according to the locality of the house, and tent hire is about £4 for a good small-sized tent.

Afghans.

The number of Afghans who visited the Holy cities this year was about 3,858.

The Turkish representative informed his colleagues in May that he was in charge of Afghan interests. I have, however, as yet to hear of an occasion on which he afforded any assistance to an Afghan. Neither he nor any member of his staff understands Persian or Pushtu. His usual procedure when an Afghan applied for help was to send him round to the Indian pilgrimage officer with a Qawas. As Afghans travel, almost without exception, on Indian pilgrim passes, they consider themselves while on the pilgrimage entitled to British protection. The task of dealing with British or British-protected pilgrims already overtakes the powers of the agency. The Afghans are the noisiest, the dirtiest, and the most obstinate of all pilgrims.

In spite of the fact that they had their own representative, they were in effect afforded by the British agency the same measure of protection as British Indians; their complaints against their mutawwifs were taken up, emergency passes were issued to them on their report of the loss of their return tickets, and arrangements were made for repatriation of the destitutes.

In view of the number of Afghans who perform the Haj, it would, in my opinion, be advisable to move the Afghan Government to appoint a pilgrimage officer or a competent clerk to assist the Indian pilgrimage officer. The appointment of an independent Afghan representative would, unless the present system of issuing Indian passes to Afghans is discontinued, be of little benefit to this agency, whereas an Afghan clerk would be of considerable help.

Malay Pilgrimage.

Introductory.

Malay pilgrims arrived in record numbers this year, their total exceeding that of the previous year by more than 6,000, while the total number, including pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies, who sailed from Singapore, was nearly 20,000 in excess of the corresponding figure for 1926.

The first pilgrim arrived in Jeddah on the 2nd December, 1926, and the last to leave sailed on the 27th August. Thus, for nearly nine months there were Malay pilgrims in the Hejaz—a fact which to a very large extent accounts for the higher death rate recorded this year. It was to be expected that some difficulty would be experienced in repatriating within a limited time pilgrims who had dribbled in during the course of the six months preceeding the Haj; and, as will be seen from the paragraph of this section of the report dealing with shipping, the situation towards the middle of August was far from satisfactory.

Early in May Mr. Hamilton paid a visit to Jeddah in his capacity of "Protector of Pilgrims." He travelled on a pilgrim ship, and was thus enabled to furnish a report on conditions which should be of great value, and it is to be hoped that his recommendations may be followed. His stay was of insufficient duration to allow of his meeting and discussing pilgrimage problems with the local authorities; but the fact of his presence in Jeddah was, nevertheless, useful in showing the Hejaz Government that Malaya was concerned with the well-being of her pilgrims.

The total number of pilgrims who arrived from Malaya was 29,604. There were eighty-nine deaths and twenty-nine births on board before the arrival of the ships at Jeddah. Of this number, 12,184 were Malaysians, the balance being natives of the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Siam and China. The register kept by the Malay pilgrimage officer shows the following distribution of Malay pilgrims according to their colonies or States of origin:—

1. Singapore ...	1,637	8. Johore ...	2,499
2. Penang and Province Wellesley ...	490	9. Kedah ...	519
3. Malacca ...	1,086	10. Perlis ...	7
4. Perak ...	3,006	11. Kelantan ...	230
5. Selangor ...	1,418	12. Tringganu ...	128
6. Negri Sembilan ...	760	13. Brunei ...	11
7. Pahang ...	393	Total ...	12,184

It is to be noted in this connection that the figure 1,637 represents the number of Malay pilgrims to whom passes were issued at Singapore; many were natives of other States who had neglected to obtain passes from their own local authorities.

There were 1,492 deaths reported among the Malay pilgrims, as shown in the following table:—

Singapore	128	Johore	234
Penang and Province		Kedah	61
Wellesley	58	Perlis	—
Malacca	201	Kelantan	31
Perak	333	Tringganu	20
Selangor	174	Brunei	1
Negri Sembilan	185		
Pahang	66	Total	1,492

It will be seen that the death rate, roughly 12 per cent., was considerably higher this year than in 1926, but slightly lower than in 1924. This increase may be ascribed in large measure to the greater length of time the pilgrims remained in the Hejaz. The chief causes of death were, as in the case of the Indian pilgrims, senile debility and heat prostration. A number of deaths occurred at Muna, especially on the first day of the Haj, when the temperature reached 124° and water was difficult to obtain. Considering the really vile climatic conditions obtaining in the Hejaz during the summer months, and taking into account the high percentage of the old and the unfit who attempt the ordeal of the pilgrimage, it is indeed surprising that so many survive.

A strenuous effort should, in my opinion, be made to prevent the old and feeble and the unhealthy from performing the pilgrimage. Many come to the Hejaz with the deliberate intention of leaving their earthly remains in the sacred soil of the Hejaz. This is contrary to Moslem doctrine.

Shipping.

Pilgrims were carried by Holt's, Nemazee's and the Straits-Hejaz Steamship Company as follows:—

Holt's	22,554
Nemazee's	4,855
Straits-Hejaz Company	2,195
Total	29,604

As was to be expected in view of the large number of pilgrims who sailed from Singapore, the problem of repatriation presented difficulties. The only satisfactory method of repatriating pilgrims is that adopted by Holt, namely, a continuous stream of ships picking up pilgrims in the ordinary course of their voyage. The system of return trips workable in the case of India, owing to its greater proximity to Jeddah, is only possible in the case of Malay pilgrims if a very close check is kept on the number of pilgrims carried from Singapore by any one company. A company must not be allowed to transport to Jeddah more pilgrims than the ships available can repatriate in two voyages; even so there is a risk as supposing a company disposing of three ships brings 6,000 pilgrims to the Hejaz in two trips, 4,000 of these may be ready to return immediately after the Haj. The three ships available would repatriate 3,000, leaving 1,000 at Jeddah for forty days at least. Messrs. Nemazee and the Straits-Hejaz Steamship Company both failed to remove their pilgrims within the regulation period of twenty days after the pilgrims' arrival in Jeddah and both were constrained to pay for distribution to the pilgrims the sum of 1 rupee per diem in respect of each pilgrim so detained. The Straits-Hejaz steamship "Lok Sun" was unfortunate in meeting very heavy weather on the voyage to Jeddah, but this was not considered sufficient excuse to justify the waiving of the payment.

Messrs. Nemazee have shown both in their management of the Malay and of the Indian pilgrim traffic a complete lack of organising ability and comprehension of the problems to be faced. When application was made for the payment of the fine, their agents endeavoured to satisfy the pilgrims with doles of rice. When payment in cash was insisted on, the agent explained that his principals were already several thousand pounds in his debt and that he was convinced that if he paid this sum he would be unable to recover it. After much further discussion I agreed to accept a draft on Messrs. Nemazee of Hong Kong. This I was unable to negotiate through the usual channels owing to the prevailing lack of confidence in Messrs. Nemazee

financial stability. The draft was therefore endorsed payable to the Director of Political Intelligence (*i.e.*, the Protector of Pilgrims), Singapore, and it is hoped that no difficulty will be experienced in effecting collection.

A number of Malay pilgrims, Nemazee return ticket holders, were repatriated by steamship "Lok Sun" as there was no prospect of their being accommodated on a ship of Nemazee's line. The price of passages was the subject of arrangement between the two companies, but here again Nemazee's agent refused to pay cash, and the agents of the Straits-Hejaz Company finally agreed to accept a draft on condition that the agency took official cognisance of the arrangement. I consequently addressed a telegram to Singapore and furnished a certificate of detention which could be used in case of Nemazee's refusal to honour the draft.

It is my opinion as it has been that of previous consular officers at this post that Messrs. Nemazee are not a firm to which the carriage of pilgrims can with advantage be entrusted. If their shortcomings are not such as to deserve complete elimination, their activities should, I feel very strongly, be limited to either the Indian or the Singapore traffic. They have neither the ability nor the ships to cope with a share in each.

Some 300 Malay pilgrims travelled via Bombay apparently in the belief that this was a cheaper route. They seem to have fallen among thieves. A certain Abdul Rahman Quddus is alleged to have impersonated a mutawwif and to have succeeded in relieving the unfortunate Malays who fell into his clutches of considerable sums of money. A detailed report on the pseudo mutawwif's activities has been addressed to Bombay.

I understand that the question of feeding pilgrims on board ship is receiving the attention of the Government, and that Mr. Hamilton strongly urges the introduction of this system which is in force on Dutch ships. I do not know how far the proposal commends itself to the pilgrims, but there is no doubt that the introduction thereof would be in their interests and in the interests of the masters and owners of ships. The superficial space allotted to each pilgrim is generous and amply sufficient were it not that some two-thirds of it is encumbered with rice bags, fire wood and cooking utensils. The danger of fire and the extreme discomfort and difficulty of cooking in foul weather must also be considered. Moreover, on the return journey, pilgrims' stocks of food are necessarily low, and it is just at this time when they are worn out with the hardships of the pilgrimage that the need for nourishment is most strongly felt.

A further suggestion connected with shipping is that some means should be devised to enable the pilgrimage officer to distinguish from the ship's list of pilgrims, both incoming and outgoing, the Malays from the Javanese. At present all pilgrims leaving or bound for Singapore are included, irrespective of their nationality, on one list. If it is not practicable to make separate lists, lists might be made in duplicate with a distinguishing mark, *e.g.*, "B." against the name of every British pilgrim carried. As regards the procedure at Jeddah, it would be possible for the pilgrimage officer to mark with a "B" the return tickets of all Malays; shipping companies could then mark their lists accordingly, and inform the pilgrimage officer of the number of Malays carried on each ship. Under the present system we are perpetually in the dark as to the number of Malay pilgrims embarked on any given ship.

Pilgrim Passes.

For the first time pilgrim passes were obligatory and were issued at various centres in Malaya, a charge of 1 dollar being made. This enabled the pilgrimage officer to keep an accurate and comprehensive register of all pilgrims. The Dutch did not at first, and, I gather, still do not, view the system of registration and filing of passes and return tickets with much favour. They admit that it provides a check on the sale of tickets and passes, but maintain that this habit is not prevalent among the Javanese, and that few tickets are lost by pilgrims. The labour involved, they feel, is out of proportion to the benefits accruing from the system. It was certainly difficult when the pilgrims started pouring into Jeddah in the first days after the pilgrimage to return a sufficient number of tickets to satisfy the shipping agents. The advantage of the system is three-fold; it permits of a perfect check being kept on incoming and outgoing pilgrims, it affords every pilgrim the opportunity of coming into direct contact with the pilgrimage officer, and it removes the risk of loss or sale of passports and tickets. If the Dutch and Malay staffs were overworked for a few days, they merely shared the fate of every other person

interested in the pilgrimage, and their effort called for caused bodily rather than mental fatigue.

Mutawwifs.

Complaints against mutawwifs were, with very rare exceptions, not of sufficient gravity to call for representations by the agency to the local or central authorities. Disputes were settled either through the head mutawwif at Mecca or the Malay pilgrimage officer. Complaints chiefly related to over charges for various services rendered. Although at the beginning of the season mutawwifs' charges were fixed by the Government, they varied considerably, as may be seen from the following statement:—

	Between—
(1.) Payment at Jeddah for boat-hire, portorage of luggage and house rent ...	Ds. 3-30 and 3-50.
(2.) Camel hire for each person, with luggage, Jeddah to Mecca ...	£2 10s. and £3 10s.
(3.) Payment at Mecca for house rent, Government tax, and food at Arafat and Mina, popularly known as "duit jamu" ...	£5.
(4.) Camel hire to Medina and back for each person ...	£5 10s. and £8.
(5.) Camel hire, Mecca to Arafat, Mina and back ...	£1 and £2.
(6.) Camel hire for each person, with luggage, Mecca to Jeddah ...	£2 10s. and £3 10s.
(7.) Payment at Jeddah for house rent, portorage of luggage, boat hire, and Government fee for health certificate ...	Ds. 5-50, or 7 Mejidies.

The trouble seems to have been that the official list of charges as drawn up was not comprehensive and so left loopholes for additional charges. Many pilgrims prefer to pay a lump sum to include all charges rather than to pay for services as rendered.

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, the whole question of mutawwifs is claiming the earnest attention of the King, and it is hoped that official charges will be more strictly adhered to next season.

Malay pilgrims suffered, as did those of other nationalities, from conditions at Muna. Although reliable official statistics are not available, I gather that some 200 Malays, out of a total of 2,000 casualties, died on the first day at Muna, their deaths in most cases being due to heat prostration.

There appears to have been a greater shortage of funds than usual among the pilgrims, and there was much poverty, if not actual destitution. Relief was afforded out of the fund placed at the disposal of the agency by the Government, by the sums collected from the Straits-Hejaz Steamship Company and Messrs. Nemazee. The total sum so distributed amounted to just over £200.

Estates of Deceased Pilgrims, and Return Tickets unclaimed.

As in nearly every case, the name of the next of kin or accompanying relative authorised to take charge of the effects of a deceased pilgrim was inserted on the passes, the problem of estates has not presented much difficulty. Where tickets were not claimed by authorised relatives, they have been taken back to Malaya by the pilgrimage officer for distribution. There remain in the agency 959 return tickets, of which 148 issued in 1926 and 10 issued by the Straits-Hejaz Steamship Company in 1927 are no longer valid. The tickets available for next season are being retained and the remainder forwarded to Singapore for collection of sums due thereon from shipping companies.

In the separate report which the Malay pilgrimage officer has forwarded to Singapore, there is a recommendation that the price of return tickets of deceased pilgrims should be recoverable (1) from the agents in Jeddah of the issuing steamship company, or (2) through the Dutch Bank at a small discount, or, alternatively (3) that this agency should advance the value and recover from the Straits Settlements Government. If the principle of refunds in Jeddah is acceded, either of the three systems proposed by Haji Abdul Majid is possible, though each has its drawbacks.

If either solution (1) or (2) were adopted the return ticket of every deceased pilgrim would have to be endorsed "pilgrim deceased, valid for refund" or words to that effect. Without this endorsement the gate would merely be opened for the indiscriminate sale of any return ticket. Moreover, if the relative is to collect the money before his departure, which is the only object of the proposal, many endorsements would have to be made at times when the Malay staff is working overtime in the effort to keep pace with the shipping agents' demand for tickets. Moreover, if plan (1) is adopted I foresee difficulty in inducing Messrs. Nemazee's agents to comply; as shown elsewhere in this report, they are ever shy of advancing any money on their principals' behalf. It must be remembered that with the universal adoption of the return ticket system, agents are continually giving out money for quarantine and other charges and are unable to recoup themselves locally. As regards the final suggestion that the amount due on return halves of tickets should be advanced by the agency, it is the only solution which commends itself to me as being less open to abuse and confusion than the alternatives. Yet, though I consider the project workable, especially under plan (3), I am inclined to query the necessity for it.

Staff.

The question of staff was discussed in detail with Mr. Hamilton on the occasion of his visit to Jeddah and his recommendations for the appointment of a permanent pilgrimage officer and a personal clerk have been laid before his Government. The advantages of a permanent pilgrimage officer are many; the pilgrimage ends as far as the pilgrims are concerned with the departure of the last ship, but as far as the agency is concerned it does not end until the next season's pilgrimage is well under way. The presence of the Malay pilgrimage officer either in Mecca or Jeddah and the presence of a Malay clerk during what may be termed colloquially the "cleaning up period" which follows the pilgrimage would be most useful.

I trust that the Government may see their way also to arranging for the despatch to Jeddah, for the season, of a dresser and an assistant to supplement the staff of the Indian doctor. They could proceed straight to Mecca, remain there until after the Haj, and return to Jeddah with the Indian doctor or stay in Mecca until all Malays had left that city.

Haji Abdul Majid reverts in his separate report to his desire to see a Malay vice-consul in Mecca. Mr. Jordan, in his pilgrimage report of last year, gave it as his strong opinion that such an appointment was undesirable. I share his views. It would merely result in adding considerably to the work of this agency without much resultant benefit to the British subjects concerned. It is open to any British subject to call upon the agency to help him whether he lives in Mecca, Medina, Jeddah or Yambo. The fact that Malays rarely, if ever, ask for such intervention is some evidence that intervention is not required. I do feel, however, that periodical visits from the pilgrimage officer would be of advantage, and I would ask that sanction for payment of such journeys as appear necessary may be granted, the number not to exceed an average of more than one visit a month.

Haji Abdul Majid and the two Malay clerks performed their duties conscientiously and cheerfully in very trying conditions, both on the pilgrimage and at Jeddah.

Nigerians.

Statistics issued by the local authorities show that 589 British West Africans arrived in Jeddah on pilgrimage this year. These figures are of little value, as they merely show the number of pilgrims arriving by ship from Suakin, whereas considerable numbers are reported to have travelled by sambuk from Massowa and landed at ports other than Jeddah to avoid quarantine dues; some 400 are known to have landed at Kunfidah. Thanks to the measures taken by the Sudan Government, few, if any, arrived by sambuk from the Sudan. Accurate statistics regarding the number of pilgrims in the country are, moreover, difficult to obtain, as these pilgrims do not as a rule employ mutawwifs. It is difficult to say how far the new Sudan regulations will affect the Nigerian pilgrimage. It will be distressing if the bulk of the pilgrims in future arrive via Massowa, thus eluding control and the payment of a deposit against their return journey. The number of Nigerians applying for repatriation via Suakin will, it is hoped, be lower than that of previous years, and it is hoped that the sum generously placed at the disposal of the agency by the Nigerian Government will suffice for their repatriation to Suakin.

Nigerians, unlike pilgrims from other countries, often stay in the Hejaz for several years. Of those who have, to date, applied for repatriation, the majority arrived in the Hejaz in 1925, though many arrived before that date. West Africans constitute the only labour class in the Hejaz, and during the pilgrimage season good wages can be commanded by them. With the pilgrimage ends the necessity for the presence of the majority; there will thus probably be every season an outgoing stream of Nigerians. If the authorities at Massowa could be approached with a view to the introduction of regulations similar to those in force in the Sudan, the cost of repatriation would no longer fall on the Government of Nigeria. It would be difficult and unfair to the pilgrims to refuse permission to sail from Massowa once they had arrived in that port, but it might perhaps be possible, if the Eritrean authorities are unwilling to frame special regulations, to deflect the pilgrims to Suakin at an earlier stage of their journey.

Sudanese.

Sudanese pilgrims were carried by the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company's steamers to and from the Hejaz. The admirable system of passes and deposits recently introduced resulted in the almost entire elimination of destitutes requiring repatriation at Government expense. The last hundred Sudanese pilgrims to be repatriated caused a certain amount of trouble. They were unfortunate enough to arrive in Jeddah the day after the departure of a ship for Suakin, and were obliged to remain for ten days. They congregated alternately outside the agency and the shipping offices of Messrs. Gellatly, Hankey and Co., loudly demanding a ship or, in lieu thereof, pecuniary assistance. As I was satisfied that they were not suffering any undue hardship and that the shipping company was not in any way to blame for their plight, the complaints of the pilgrims fell on unsympathetic ears.

A misguided and abortive attempt was made by the Hejaz authorities to levy a fine of £500 on the local agents of the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company on the score that one of their ships transported to Jeddah from Suakin a number of pilgrims in excess of that sanctioned. This attempt, an obvious "try on" on the part of a high official, who considered that he had not received due remuneration from the company for an alleged service, was easily dealt with on the receipt of a telegram from Port Sudan providing sufficient evidence that Gellatly, Hankey and Co. had been authorised to carry the additional number.

Iraqis.

The pilgrimage from Iraq had no official countenance, and intending pilgrims were advised not to perform the Haj this year. This did not prevent a considerable number from visiting the Hejaz and in applying to the agency for assistance when in difficulties. However strong the dissuasion of the Iraq passport authorities may have been, it is difficult to use the unofficial nature of the pilgrimage as an argument for refusing help to a starving and decrepit Iraqi. Assistance was refused to certain able-bodied Iraqis, who were invited to return as they had come, on foot. Whilst appreciating the Government of Iraq's desire that previous sanction should be obtained before repatriating destitute pilgrims, I venture to point out that this entails considerable delay and expense. I trust that, whether the pilgrimage is officially sanctioned or not next year, no passport or *laissez-passer* may be issued to any pilgrim who has not either guaranteed or deposited the cost of his repatriation.

The total number of Iraqis who performed the pilgrimage this year is stated officially to be 677, of whom thirty-two travelled via India, the remainder by Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Egypt.

Palestinians.

The number of Palestinian pilgrims landed at Jeddah, according to statistics supplied by the Hejaz quarantine, was 333. They were brought and repatriated for the most part by the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company, though a small proportion were carried by Italian steamers.

The regulation whereby pilgrims are obliged to possess booklets comprising pass, return railway ticket and deposit receipt is admirable, as it enables this agency, without risk and without reference, to advance to penniless pilgrims a sufficient sum to ensure their return to their homes. I venture to suggest, however, that the amount to be deposited in Palestine should be slightly raised. An increase of £1 would

probably prove sufficient. This would permit of a reasonable sum being advanced for subsistence and still leave a small balance to be recovered by the pilgrim on his return. If the sum advanced by the agency approaches too nearly the sum deposited by the pilgrim, there is a risk that the latter may fail to present himself to the authorities on his return. In all, eleven Palestinians were advanced sums to meet the cost of their passage and subsistence.

Sarawak Pilgrimage.

One hundred and two Sarawak pilgrims performed the Haj this year, among whom were the following notables:—

Tuanka Ali-bin-Tuanka Hossein.
Tuanka Osman-bin-Tuanka Mohsin.
Tuanka Drahman.
Tuanka Ismail-bin-Tuanka Saleh.

The party of Tuanka Osman, bearing a letter of recommendation from His Highness the Rajah, was provided with a special letter to the Mecca authorities, who afforded all possible facilities.

Nine deaths are recorded, mostly of pilgrims of advanced age.

All pilgrims arrived with a sufficient supply of money, and no requests were made for pecuniary assistance.

[E 4389/644/91]

No. 29.

Consul Stonehewer-Bird to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 111.)

Sir,

Jeddah, September 27, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st September to the 27th September, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Transjordan, Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

I have, &c.

F. H. W. STONEHEWER-BIRD.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Jeddah Report: Period September 1 to September 27, 1927.

THE situation, both internal and external, has improved since the date of the last Jeddah report. Ibn Bujad and Feisul-el-Derweish have given no signs of unfriendly feeling, though the latter has shown himself embarrassingly inquisitive on the subject of the establishment of military posts near the Iraq border. This action, taken, I gather, as much in the interests of Nejd as Iraq with a view to minimising the risk of border raids, has aroused much speculation and hostile criticism. Ibn Saud is much worried, and has protested to the Iraq Government on the grounds that, in virtue of the agreement between the two countries, fortifications may not be erected in such close proximity to the frontier.

2. Though Iraq is no doubt fully justified in taking these measures to prevent the recurrence of the raiding evil, it is unfortunate that news of the establishment of the posts should have disturbed the minds of the Nejd at a moment when the King, as the result of continual pressure, was on the point of giving his consent to the projected Air Force reconnaissance in Hassa. His Majesty had declared

himself anxious to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, and had made it clear that the deciding factor would be the temper of the tribesmen. When last questioned on the subject on the eve of his departure from Jeddah, the King regretted that he could not, in view of the present feeling in Hassa, give immediate sanction; he trusted, however, that the feeling was merely transitory; he renewed his promise to visit Hassa in the near future, and hoped to be able to give the necessary sanction.

3. Ibn Saud paid his first visit to Jeddah since the departure of Sir Gilbert Clayton on the 6th September, and remained until the 24th September. Ratifications of the Treaty of Jeddah concluded on the 20th May were exchanged on the 17th September, and the text of the treaty and of the notes exchanged at the time of signature was published on the 23rd September in an edition of the "Um-el-Kura" devoted almost entirely to this purpose. This official organ, the only newspaper in the Hejaz or Nejd, makes no comment whatsoever on the treaty. From official sources I learn that it received an excellent reception by the public. Private information reveals surprise on the part of the Jeddah public that so few and such minor questions were treated; they had been waiting for something much more sensational. It is as well that the publication of the notes exchanged was not withheld as the King originally wished, as the idea that a separate unpublished agreement was concluded would certainly have gained currency.

4. The King, in the course of a private interview, opened his heart on the subject of Italy. He was in his own mind thoroughly convinced that the Italians had been giving active support to the Imam in a policy which could only lead to hostilities. The Idrisi had placed himself under his, Ibn Saud's, protection. Asir was, moreover, geographically one with the Hejaz. He had no hostile intentions towards the Imam, but he could not allow him to interfere in Asir. The recent trouble in Asir was undoubtedly caused by the Italians with the object of ousting the British Oil Company and establishing themselves in its stead. Ibn Saud renewed his offer to mediate between the oil company and the Idrisi if His Majesty's Government wished. Seyyid Murghani, who has no official position here, but acts as general adviser to the King on Asir and Yemen affairs, informed me, on the occasion of a friendly visit, that the Asir chiefs had been deceived by Seyyid Mustafa, who had, unknown to the company, promised on its behalf more than he was authorised to offer. The Idrisi understood the situation, but stood in awe of the chiefs and was afraid to insist on their keeping to the letter of the written contract. A wireless apparatus has recently been ordered for erection at Jizan, and Ibn Saud intends to keep in close touch with events.

5. After some hesitation, the King agreed to the proposal made through the agency that Nejd-Iraq and Iraq-Nejd claims should be wiped out, and that delegates should merely meet to record their agreement to this mutual cancellation of claims. In order that neither side should feel that the other had given anything away, it was agreed that letters putting forward the proposal should be addressed simultaneously by the King and the High Commissioner in Iraq. This solution, besides affording an immense saving of labour, time and worry, removes a potential source of considerable friction and ill-feeling.

6. The solution proposed for the settlement of Nejd-Transjordan claims, namely, that the first assistant to the Chief British representative at Amman should be appointed to arbitrate, does not, in spite of every endeavour on the part of the agency, commend itself to Ibn Saud. He agrees fully with the principle of a British arbitrator and would willingly accept his awards, but he feels strongly that he cannot, without providing hostile criticism among the Nejdīs, consent to the appointment of an arbitrator officially employed in Transjordan. He does not question the integrity of any British official, but begs that an entirely "neutral" British officer may be chosen from Egypt, Aden or the Persian Gulf.

7. Many schemes for the improvement of conditions in Jeddah have been discussed, notably the lighting of the harbour and the improvement of the present landing stage and customs and quarantine sheds. It is hoped to induce the King to provide the necessary capital for the erection of a lighthouse and beacons. He has already given instructions to the British engineer in charge of the condenser to supply the agency with certain information required by Trinity House, and has promised to consider the question favourably when the final estimate is submitted. There is hope that if facilities can be arranged, he will eventually give his consent to the proposal.

8. There is a growing feeling among Hejazis that a far larger proportion of the revenue accruing from the pilgrimage should be devoted by Ibn Saud to purposes

in the Hejaz, and that Nejd is getting more than its fair share. The criticism is probably justified, though in fairness to Ibn Saud it must be remembered that he owes his position and his power to maintain order in the Hejaz (the fundamental cause of the increased revenue) to his Nejdī supporters.

9. The King is contemplating the formation under Government auspices of a transport company with a capital of £50,000 and disposing of 200 cars and lorries to cope with the pilgrimage traffic next year. The richer and more influential Hejaz merchants are being invited to participate. They have responded to the invitation, though with little enthusiasm, as there is a strong feeling that the cars will be used when necessity arises for military purposes.

10. Among recent orders placed with British firms may be noted a Rolls-Royce for His Majesty's personal use, a wireless receiving and transmitting set, a steam roller and twenty-four perambulators for the airing of the Royal infants, said to number forty-two.

11. The ice plant, of which mention is made in the Jeddah report for June, is now to be ready "on a Friday."

12. During the period under review, no slaves have been repatriated by this agency.

[E 4442/1328/91]

No. 30.

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, October 19, 1927.

JEDDAH telegram No. 47.

I am informed officially that conversations at Massawa have broken down on the subject of Asir, and that promised Italian recognition is consequently to be withheld. Summary of conversations and translations of letters subsequently exchanged between Ibn Saud and the Governor of Eritrea follows in bag 21st October.

[E 4435/22/91]

No. 31.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 242.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 20, 1927.

MY telegram No. 239 of 10th October: Zeidi incursions into Aden Protectorate.

Further reports of Zeidi concentration near Subeihi border and of raids into Aden Protectorate territory are reaching us. If these are confirmed, bombing operations will take place after twenty-four hours' notice has been given for removal of women and children.

You should inform Italian Government.

[E 4461/22/91]

No. 32.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 21.)

(No. 186.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, October 21, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 242.

Italian Government are telegraphing to use their good offices with the Imam.

[E 4499/184/91]

No. 33.

Sir R. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 484.)

Sir,

Gulhek, October 7, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to enclose copies of two comprehensive despatches addressed by the Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India on the subject of Bahrein and its future status.

2. Colonel Haworth recommends that the sheikh should, if possible, be induced formally to request His Majesty's Government to extend to him the protection which was refused to his predecessor in 1849.

3. I am only concerned with the possible reaction of any such request on the Persian Government. I cannot help feeling, however, that, looked at solely from the point of view of Anglo-Persian relations, it would be preferable—supposing that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India approve in principle Colonel Haworth's suggestion—to defer any such action until we have settled satisfactorily some of our outstanding questions, including more especially the negotiation of a new treaty.

4. Admittedly the Persian claim to Bahrein is extremely weak, but it is significant that, when discussing recently with the present Prime Minister the question of the air route to India, his Highness immediately caught me up when I mentioned Bahrein as one of the probable landing grounds in the event of a route along the southern side of the Gulf being decided on.

5. I naturally declined to be drawn into any discussion of the status of Bahrein. I merely report this as showing that Persian pretensions have in no way lessened with the lapse of time.

6. I would not, however, wish it to be supposed, in spite of the Prime Minister's remarks, that any trouble need be anticipated with the Persian Government should it be decided to construct an aerodrome on the island of Bahrein. I understood his Highness's remark rather in the nature of a reminder that Persia's claim to sovereignty had not been renounced than as a warning that the Persian Government would enter a protest.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Government of India and His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. B. H. Haworth to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, September 1, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to state that since I assumed charge of the appointment of Political Resident in the Persian Gulf the question of our relations with the State of Bahrein has given me some cause for reflection. Our position in that sheikhdom, and the amount of control that we exercise, appear to be open to criticism when viewed from an international standpoint. This would be of no great importance but for three factors:—

- (1.) Persia has never ceased to claim sovereignty over Bahrein, and our own Foreign Office have recently not been desirous of raising the question of the status of that place.
- (2.) The *de facto* ruling chief, with whose consent we intervene, was placed in his position by us, when we deposed his father from the chief authority.
- (3.) The new growth of the Wahabi power.

2. The ex-Sheikh Isa, still nominally sheikh, appealed to the Viceroy against his deposition, and through his solicitors despatched a caveat to Government saying that he was not bound by the acts of his sons. An appeal to the League of Nations by Persia forwarding an appeal by Sheikh Isa or one of his relations on the lines of the Persian protest in 1869 would, I think, place us in a difficult position. While I do not consider this a very likely event now, owing to our better relations with Sheikh Isa, it does not seem to be sound politics to leave so important a matter to chance; there are many other combinations to consider, such as Sheikh Hamad himself changing his view with regard to us; interference by Ibn Saud with the religious appeal; indeed, any of the possible derangements which can occur where matters depend upon the personal element alone.

3. In studying the question of the development of our position in Bahrein to its present condition many other matters arise, such as the still existing claims of Persia, and in the past those of Muscat, the Wahabis, the Egyptians and the Turks, all of which affect the validity of the Persian demands.

4. In order to prevent one despatch being too unwieldy I have found it necessary to divide the subject into two despatches, the first dealing with the subjects mentioned in the above paragraph, *i.e.*, the international aspect, the second dealing with the facts which led to our taking so intimate a part in the internal administration of the islands and with the degree to which that interference has now reached.

The first despatch is bound to be a long one. When I say that the important dates which we have to consider to-day are 1783, 1803, 1811, 1820, 1822, 1835, 1848, 1859, 1869, 1880, 1886 and 1892, while many other dates of almost equal importance occur, it will be seen that a period is covered during which constant activity was kept up which cannot be disposed of in a few pages, and of which activity every incident which I quote has an important bearing on the decisions and the opinions to be formed.

5. In this despatch, then, I will deal with the history of the sheikhdom for the last 150 years, showing how Bahrein became involved in our policy in the Persian Gulf and the facts upon which Persia bases its claim to the island, a claim which she has never dropped though it is a century and a half since she has had any form of jurisdiction in the place.

In actuality both the Wahabis and the Sultan of Muscat have had far more recent possession of the islands, and the claim of Persia has been kept alive by purely diplomatic or fictitious incidents which have occurred through the difficulties in which the Sheikhs of Bahrein have found themselves, either in preserving their independence, or in meeting the activities of rival pretenders to the sheikhdom.

The claims of Persia would not intrinsically stand the test of examination by a committee of the League of Nations.

6. For the purpose before us it is necessary to go back to the year 1782, at which date Bahrein was unquestionably in possession of the Persians, who had first occupied it in 1602, when they expelled the Portuguese. How long they held it has apparently not been determined, but in 1718 the islands were taken for a short time by the Omani Sultanate. In the middle of the 18th century the Howalah Arabs controlled the politics of the archipelago, but in 1753 the Persians definitely occupied the islands. In 1783 they were once for all driven out by the Arabs, led by the sheikhs of the Utab tribe, who still hold Bahrein to-day.

7. When it is said at any time that the Persians held the Bahrein Islands, the expression needs explanation. Until as recently as 1854 Bushire, from whence the sea power came, was held by an Arab sheikh under Persian sovereignty, and to this day the Persian islands of the Persian Gulf are occupied by Arabs and Arab sheikhs, who are similarly Persian subjects. These are the men who supplied the ships and the crews which acted for the Persians in Persian Gulf history: the Persians have never been seamen.

8. Thus, in 1783, Bahrein was held by the Arab Sheikh Nasir of Bushire, under the orders of the Persian Government, then settled at Shiraz. The garrison, when attacked by the Arabs from the southern mainland, was commanded by Sheikh Nasir's son, and after a siege of two months' duration, the latter capitulated on the 27th July, and the garrison were permitted to return to Bushire.

Henceforward, the archipelago was ruled by the Al Khalifeh section of the Utabi tribe, a fact which gave umbrage to the Jatahmieh section of the tribe, who withdrew to Qatar on the mainland, whence the Utab had come, and who, for many years to follow, supplied claimants or joined in with other claimants for the attacks on the ruling sheikhs.

9. In the same year, 1783, the Persian Arab Sheikhs of Bushire and Hormuz, assisted by Persian troops, made preparations on a large scale for an attack on Bahrein, in which the Sheikh of the Qowasim on the Pirate Coast was to take part, but the expedition never sailed. In 1785 similar preparations were made, but were broken up by the death of Ali Murad Khan of Shiraz.

During the domestic difficulties of the Shiraz Government which followed Bahrein remained unmolested, during which time it acquired a great mercantile fleet, and the prosperity of the islands developed till they became the chief commercial emporium of the western end of the Persian Gulf.

10. For the next generation such threats as were made to the independence of Bahrein came, not from Persia, but from other sources.

In 1791 Sayyid, Sultan of Muscat, with the encouragement of the Persian Governor of Shiraz, which place was no longer the seat of the Persian Government, declared war on Bahrein.

The Utab Sheikhs, alarmed by his proceedings, opened correspondence with Sheikh Nasir of Bushire, and, on their offering to become tributary to Persia, the sheikh proceeded privately to Bahrein and received an instalment of the revenue for the previous year on behalf of Persia.

11. In 1800 Sayyid, Sultan of Muscat, invaded Bahrein, deported twenty-five of the leading families to Muscat, and established an Omani garrison on Muharraq Island. This garrison was, in the following year, however, compelled by the Utab to surrender and to evacuate Bahrein.

The Persians do not seem to have assisted, but in the same year, 1801, the Muscat ruler, with assistance from Bushire, given with the permission of the Persian Governor of Shiraz, again landed at Bahrein.

12. By this time, however, the Bahrein Sheikhs had secured the support of the Wahabis, who were threatening the outposts of Oman, and Sayyid Sultan was obliged to return to protect his own country. For the next ten years the Sheikhs of Bahrein succumbed, though reluctantly, to the influence of the Wahabis.

In 1803 they sent a fleet to cruise against Muscat during the pearl season, and not only sustained the resultant pecuniary loss, but also received a heavy defeat. In 1805 they joined a movement to destroy Wahabi influence, but in 1810 the Wahabis appointed an agent to live at Bahrein to superintend the administration, though leaving the local authority in the hands of the Utab Sheikhs. At the same time they appointed Wahabi teachers to convert the people to the Wahabi doctrine.

13. In 1811 the Wahabi Amir reduced his garrison in Bahrein in consequence of the gradual advance of the Egyptians on his frontiers. The Imam of Muscat attacked Bahrein, and the Wahabi agent was taken prisoner and the power of the Utab restored.

14. To follow, year by year, the change of fortune of Bahrein, its dependence now upon the Wahabis, its dangers now from the Sultan of Muscat, and then the Egyptians, who had ousted the Wahabis, the claims of Turkey from the date they conquered the Wahabi country, and the continued though intermittent claim of Persia, though every detail of it bears upon our position in Bahrein and that of Persia, has taken a hundred pages of foolscap to note upon. It is obvious that no despatch could bear this weight. I have accordingly written, with the assistance of Major Barrett, Political Agent of Bahrein, a monograph on the subject, which I will forward separately and which can be referred to, if necessary, and in this despatch I will attempt to keep to the main events which have affected the question.

15. In 1817 the Resident found the conduct of the Utab Sheikh most unsatisfactory in connection with piracy, our main concern in the Persian Gulf, and Bahrein became the principal mart for the property plundered by pirates, and the main depot from which the Qowasim, the pirate centre, drew their supplies of rice and dates.

In the previous year, 1816, the Resident, Lieutenant Bruce, of the Indian navy, had made an informal agreement with the sheikhs, and in 1819 an agreement of a similar nature was contemplated by the Government with the object of restraining the Bahrein Arabs from piracy.

16. In 1820 the Persian Governor asked the Sultan of Muscat, and, indeed, the British also, to convey Persian troops to Bahrein. In the same year the Bahrein Government, fearing that an attack would succeed, made full submission to the Sultan of Oman and agreed to pay him an annual tribute of 3,000 dollars per annum.

Both parties appear to have asked for the guarantee of the British Government to this agreement.

In February of the same year a preliminary treaty of peace was made by the sheikhs with the Bombay Government to prevent the sale of plundered goods, and under this treaty the sheikhs were admitted to the benefits of the general treaty of peace of the Trucial Coast.

17. In 1822 an extraordinary incident took place, and it is upon this that the Persians mainly base their claim to the Islands of Bahrein.

Captain Bruce, the Resident at Bahrein, had been considerably worried by the attempts of rival claimants to the Bahrein principality, and he finally came to the conclusion that the only way to achieve peace, and to prevent piracy, was to hand Bahrein over to Persia.

Accordingly, in August 1822 he made an extraordinary and unauthorised agreement with the Prince, Governor of Shiraz, relating to the whole of the Persian Gulf. It may be added that the Governor of Shiraz was also not authorised by his Government to enter into this agreement.

18. In this agreement, with reference to Bahrein, it was stated that the Islands of Bahrein had always been subordinate to the Government of Fars, against whose authority the sheikh of the islands had lately become rebellious, that accordingly the flag granted to the sheikhs under the general treaty of Persia should be withdrawn, and that no assistance should in future be granted by Great Britain to the Utab Sheikhs, that on the contrary she should assist Persia against them by lending one or two vessels.

In other words, the title of Persia to Bahrein was explicitly admitted.

19. The Government of Bombay promptly disavowed the action of their representative in Fars and removed Captain Bruce from his appointment.

In doing so they remarked regarding the agreement:—

“It acknowledges the King of Persia's title to Bahrein, of which there is not the least proof, and to which the British Government cannot assent without injuring the pretensions of the Imaum and the Attabees. It promised our aid against every power possessed of an island in the Gulf, and expressly against the Attabees, to whom we are bound by a treaty of friendship, and with whose conduct we have every reason to be satisfied.”

The Government of Bombay also pointed out that the agreement totally violated all the principles of our policy in the Persian Gulf.

The Shah of Persia appears to have been equally annoyed with his representative for conducting unauthorised negotiations, and he equally refused to ratify the agreement.

20. In 1828 Muscat made its last attack on Bahrein, and was defeated partly by the Utab, partly by cholera.

The Imam lost considerable prestige in the Gulf by his defeat, and in future confined his attention mainly to Africa.

It may be stated that the various attacks of Muscat were based on the failure of Bahrein to pay the tribute to which it had bound itself.

21. In 1830 the power of the Wahabis was again established in Central Arabia, and Bahrein immediately felt the repercussion.

At the end of the year the Wahabis presented the sheikhs with a demand for the payment of zakab and for the cession of Dammam, on the mainland of Hasa, which was still held by Bahrein. The sheikh attempted, without success, to obtain the intervention of the British authorities; in consequence, an agreement was made with the Wahabis in which the supremacy of the Wahabi Amir was acknowledged, and the right to the payment of the zakab admitted. The Amir in return undertook to protect Bahrein against external aggression. In 1833 the sheikhs threw off their allegiance, but in 1836, as there was talk of the Persian Government raising their claim to sovereignty, the sheikhs once more became reconciled to the Wahabi Amir and agreed to pay him 2,000 dollars per annum as tribute, the Amir promising in return to supply troops for the defence of Bahrein.

22. As will have been seen throughout, the object of the British Government had been to achieve maritime peace for the safety of the carrying of their trade, and in 1836 a restrictive line was laid down for the chiefs of the Trucial Coast beyond which hostilities at sea were not permitted. This restrictive line was extended to the Sheikhs of Bahrein.

23. In 1838 the Wahabi Amir was captured by the Egyptians and deported to Egypt, a puppet being set up in his place.

The Sheikh of Bahrein was much alarmed at the rumours he heard and, in

reply to the demands of the puppet Amir Khalid, professed himself to be a subject of the Persian Government; as a result the Persian Governor of Shiraz sent an envoy to reside at Bahrein, but his mission was a failure.

The intentions of Khurshid Pasha, the Governor of Hasa, now became clear, and the Government of India found themselves, to some extent, bound to anticipate the intentions of Her Majesty's Government regarding the policy to be pursued in the Persian Gulf, and the presence of a British naval squadron in the Gulf was made use of, and the commander was instructed "strongly to use his influence" to deter the Egyptian general from further encroachment. The admiral was empowered, in the event of the Sheikh of Bahrein soliciting British aid, to afford every encouragement to resist, and all the support he could render without engaging in actual hostilities.

The Governor-General of India was not disposed at the time to enter into any new engagement with the Sheikh of Bahrein, but the admiral was instructed, in case such an engagement should be suggested, so far to encourage the proposals of the sheikh as to transmit them for the consideration of the Government of India.

In other words, the Government realised the seriousness of the situation if the Egyptians desired to annex Bahrein, but did not wish to be drawn into a difficult situation unless circumstances really demanded it.

24. From this period dates our more active intervention in the affairs of Bahrein.

In a letter dated the 18th April, 1839, the Indian Government advanced beyond the position they had taken up, and empowered the admiral, in the event of the sheikh claiming British intervention, and offering to place his territories under British protection, to assure him of the temporary protection of Her Majesty's squadron and to intimate his action to the Egyptian commander.

About the same time the admiral visited Bahrein, accompanied by Captain Edmunds, Assistant Political Resident, and Sheikh Abdullah gave the latter a promise that he would take no steps to place himself under the authority or protection of a foreign Power without first consulting the British Resident; but in the same year the sheikh unexpectedly acknowledged the supremacy of the Egyptians and covenanted to pay them a tribute of 2,000 dollars per annum on condition that his local authority should be preserved and that no Egyptian representative should be sent to reside at Bahrein. The sheikh justified his action by the Resident's refusal to give him advice, of a specified assurance of support, and of a virtual immunity from disturbance which he had purchased for a trifling and mere pecuniary sacrifice.

25. The Resident delivered a written protest to the sheikh, and another in nearly the same terms to the Egyptian commander. The sheikh protested that he would never, even at the demand of the Egyptians, place himself in opposition to the British Government, and he offered, on condition that distinct pledges of protection should be given him in writing, to repudiate his agreement with the Pasha and to avow himself a dependent of the British Government—but he refused to put this in writing.

26. This circumstance is most illuminating, especially in relation to our dealings with the sheikhs of Qatar and the tracial coast to-day, where the circumstances are very similar. Without our definite pledge of assistance the Sheikh of Bahrein of that day could not afford to compromise himself with the Power on the mainland.

The Egyptian question was brought to an end in the following year, 1840, on the evacuation of Hasa.

27. By his conduct with the Egyptians, Sheikh Abdullah had forfeited the trust of the British Government, and the possibility of his being displaced by a more favourably disposed sheikh was discussed.

In 1842 a rival appeared in the form of one, Mohammed-bin-Khalifeh, a grand-nephew of Sheikh Abdullah. The Wahabis, who were once again in power, supported the young claimant, and Isa-bin-Tarif of Qatar, and Bashir-bin-Rahmak, an Utab chief of the Jatahmieh section, asked permission of the Resident to join themselves with Sheikh Mohammed. This sanction was given, and in April 1843 Bahrein passed into the possession of Sheikh Mohammed.

28. In 1843 the Government of India issued orders that an invasion of Bahrein by the ex-Sheikh Abdullah would be prevented, if necessary, by a British naval force.

In 1847, however, Sheikh Mohammed bound himself to pay tribute to the Wahabis at the rate of 2,000 dollars per annum.

29. In the same year, 1847, Turkish claims to Bahrein were advanced from

Basra, apparently for the first time. The sheikh was invited to declare his allegiance to the Sultan and to submit a detailed list of his shipping in order that it might be registered under the Turkish flag.

For various reasons the sheikh was disposed to accept this advance on the part of the Turkish Government.

30. This caused the Bombay Government to state that it was obviously desirable to exclude interference by foreign Powers in the affairs of the Persian Gulf, inasmuch as without retaining supreme authority the British Government could not hope to secure the performance of the objects which they had attained in that quarter at a large expense.

The board of directors concurred in their recommendation that "any attempts upon Bahrein ought to be resisted by the British naval force." The Resident, Major Hennell, was authorised to ascertain whether the sheikh was inclined to enter into a closer connection with the British power, and some months later Sheikh Mohammed expressed a wish that his sheikdom should be taken under British protection, but in 1849 the Resident was directed to decline the proposal of the sheikh, but to assure him of the continuance of the goodwill and friendship of the British Government.

In 1850 the sheikh was on bad terms with us, and sent insulting messages to the Resident.

31. In 1851 the sheikh was on the point of succumbing to the Wahabis when a British squadron arriving took the islands under their wing.

In the same year a claim by the Porte to the sovereignty over Bahrein was summarily rejected by the British Government.

32. In 1853 the British Government authorised the Government of Bombay to offer every obstacle to an attack upon these islands by the Wahabi Amir, who was now nominally subject to the Ottoman Empire, on the ground that Her Majesty's Government would not permit the occupation of Bahrein by the Turkish Government or by anyone acting for them or in their interest.

In 1859 the Persian Gulf squadron was again despatched for the protection of the islands, and the Wahabi Governor sued for pardon.

33. In 1859 Sheikh Mohammed made simultaneous application for protection to the Persian Governor of Fars, and to the Turkish Vali of Bagdad.

The response of the Turks was delayed, but a Persian agent, one Mirza Mehdi Khan, a well-known Anglophobe, almost immediately arrived in Bahrein, the Persian flag was hoisted, and Persian sovereignty proclaimed. Scarcely, however, had these ceremonies been performed when Mohammed Bey, the emissary of the Mustafa, Nuri Pasha, appeared, the Persian flag was again lowered and the Turkish flag raised into its place—to complete the absurdity the Persian agent refused to leave Bahrein or surrender his imaginary authority.

34. Sir Henry Rawlinson, the British Minister in Tehran, differed from Captain Felix Jones, the Resident, and regarded the matters as of slight account. He contented himself with obtaining from the Shah's Minister an assurance that no military occupation of Bahrein should be undertaken by Persia until the question of title had been settled by diplomatic discussion.

The Government of Bombay instructed the Resident not to interfere with the occupation of Bahrein, whether by Turkey or Persia, otherwise than by a protest, and by an intimation that the matter had been reported to Her Majesty's Government, and that aggression on the neighbouring tribes would be prevented by force if necessary.

While discussion on the subject was continuing, the Turkish and Persian agents apparently vanished from Bahrein.

35. In 1861 the sheikh commenced hostilities against Hasa, but was brought to his senses by the despatch of Her Majesty's ships to the spot. He made submission and signed a convention in May of that year, acknowledging the validity of the treaties and conventions concluded with the British Government by his predecessors, and undertook to recognise the jurisdiction of the British agent and the Political Resident over British subjects of every kind in Bahrein, and to allow the latter to reside in his dominions.

One result of this convention was to assimilate the position of the Sheikh of Bahrein, who was not a party to the Perpetual Treaty of Peace, to that of the tracial chiefs.

36. In 1863 the chief was again behaving badly, and at the end of 1865 the Resident seized one of his war vessels. The Persian Government, who had in 1862 complained about a similar incident, now complained again on the ground that,

under the agreement concluded by Captain Bruce in 1822, Bahrein was dependency of Persia.

The Government of India informed the Minister at Tehran of the facts of the case, and stated that whatever might have been the pretensions of the Shah to Bahrein in bygone days, he could not now be regarded as having any rights in the principality. This view was approved of by Her Majesty's Government in 1867.

37. At this time the Sheikh of Bahrein was paying a sum of 4,000 dollars annually to the Wahabis on account of Qatar, but was held by the Government of India to be independent as far as Bahrein was concerned.

Owing to his treacherous and piratical destruction of Dohah and Wakrah, the chief towns of Qatar, in October 1867, Sheikh Mohammed of Bahrein was deposed in 1868 by the action of the British Government, and his brother, Sheikh Ali, was appointed in his place, and protest was again made by the Persian authorities.

38. A complaint, in which Bahrein was claimed to be the property of Persia, was addressed by the Shah's Minister to Her Britannic Majesty's Minister in Tehran; another was addressed by the karguzar at Shiraz to Colonel Pelly, the Resident at Bushire; and a third, with which were enclosed two letters from the deposed Sheikh of Bahrein, was lodged at the Foreign Office on the 13th April, 1869, by the Persian Minister in London. A principal ground of complaint was that no previous notice had been given to Persia of the British intention to proceed against Bahrein.

39. In a reply sent on the 29th April, 1869, after consultation between the Secretary of State for India and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Persian Minister was reminded that the Sheikh of Bahrein had at different periods in the past entered into direct communication with the British Government; he was assured that the sole objects of the British Government in holding the sheikh to those engagements were the prevention of piracy, of the slave trade and the maintenance of the police of the Gulf, duties of which Great Britain would gladly, if it were possible, divest herself in favour of Persia. In conclusion, a promise was given that, should punitive measures against the Sheikh of Bahrein again become necessary, Her Majesty's Government would, if practicable, cause the Persian Government to be informed beforehand, and that in cases which this might be impossible in consequence of the delay which a reference to the Court of Tehran would involve, a full communication on the subject would be made to the Persian Government.

The object of this reply was to avoid causing irritation at Tehran, but it is not surprising that it was subsequently quoted against us.

40. In the same year Sheikh Mohammed attacked Bahrein and Sheikh Ali was killed in the defence.

The British Government blockaded Bahrein, captured and deported the sheikhs concerned in the attack and replaced Sheikh Ali by his son, Sheikh Esa. (The latter has reigned for fifty-eight years, and was in 1923, four years ago, deposed by us from the actual control, his son, Sheikh Hamad, the present sheikh, being made deputy ruler in his place.)

41. In the same year, 1869, the Persian Government were informed of the action taken and the usual complaint followed.

The Government of India replied to the Secretary of State, pointing out that the Persian Government had no navy and was incapable of assisting the British Government in maintaining the peace at sea, while, had they had a navy, it would only have meant that they would have been embroiled with the Sultan of Oman, with the Arab principalities, with the Wahabi power and with Turkey, all of whom were antagonistic to her; indeed, the assertion of claims by Persia had already caused the revival of similar obsolete claims by Turkey and the other Powers.

42. In a despatch of the 27th May, 1870, the Government of India observed:—

"If we are no longer prepared to continue the performance of the tasks we have undertaken we must withdraw altogether; but the consequences of such a step would be so disastrous, not only to our national honour but to the peace of the Gulf, to the prosperity of the tribes inhabiting the littoral, and to the lives and prosperity of our subjects who during the peace of the last fifty years have settled on the shores and embarked enormous capital in the pearl fisheries and the trade with the mainland, that we cannot contemplate this course as one of which Her Majesty's Government could for a moment contemplate."

43. A protest was also entered by the Turkish Minister in London against the proceedings of the British authorities in Bahrein, which were represented as acts of

British sovereignty over "a portion of Turkish territory." The Ottoman Minister was informed that the British Government could not recognise the Turkish claim to the sovereignty of Bahrein.

44. In 1892 the question came under consideration again in consequence of certain taxes, recoverable from Ottoman subjects only, having been levied at Basra upon natives of Bahrein, and a demand for a refund was preferred by the British Assistant Political Agent, who contended that Bahrein and its inhabitants were under British protection. On this occasion the Turkish Government addressed the British Embassy at Constantinople and denied the title of natives of Bahrein to British protection; but the reply, given under the instructions of Her Majesty's Government, was to the effect that, as Bahrein was now under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen of England, no interference by the Ottoman authorities with the natives of Bahrein could be admitted. A year later, in April 1893, the Turkish Government again protested against the assumption by the British Assistant Political Agent at Basra of a title to protect natives of Bahrein; and once more Her Majesty's Government maintained the right of their diplomatic and consular representatives in the Ottoman Empire to extend their good offices to the class of persons in question.

45. In 1880 interest in the Persian Gulf was being shown by foreign Powers. French, American and Japanese vessels had visited its waters.

In the circumstances, believing that Bahrein, as one of the chief commercial centres, would soon become an object of this attention, the Resident, finding the sheikh disposed to conclude a special arrangement with the British Government, took the opportunity to obtain his signature to an agreement which was approved by the British Government in 1881.

46. It bound the sheikh to abstain from entering into negotiations with or making treaties with other Governments, except with the sanction of the British Government, and he agreed to refuse permission to any other Government, other than the British, to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in Bahrein territory, except with the consent of the British Government.

47. In 1886 the Shah of Persia had verbally requested Mr. Nicholson to convey to the British Government the fact that he considered the communication made to him in 1869 as tantamount to an admission of his rights over Bahrein, and that he was anxious to establish authority over the islands, either by sending a Governor to Bahrein or by recognising the sheikh as his representative, but that he wished the maritime police to remain in the hands of the British naval authorities. An answer was prepared, but not delivered, as the Shah did not revert to the subject. It was to the effect that Her Majesty's Government did not concur in His Majesty the Shah's interpretation of the communication of 1869; on the contrary, they considered Bahrein to be independent.

48. In 1888 an intrigue by certain Persian officials with the Sheikh of Qatar, which place now had no connection with Bahrein, was supposed to contain danger to the islands, and two warships were stationed at Bahrein with instructions to prevent, by force if necessary, any hostile attempt to land by the Turks, Persians or Arabs.

49. In 1892 a document similar to that of 1880 was signed by the Sheikh of Bahrein, with an additional provision against the cession by the sheikh of territory to foreign Governments. In this document the sheikh undertook on no account to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government, not to consent, except with the concurrence of the British Government, to the residence within his territory of the agent of any other Government. And on no account to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, any part of his territory save to the British Government.

50. The reign of Sheikh Isa was disturbed during a number of years by the ambitious projects of the Porte and the formation of a Turkish province upon the adjoining mainland of Hasa. Bahrein was, however, protected by the British Government against the danger of annexation.

51. At times, further claims by the Turks were made, and in January 1893 the local Turkish Governor of Qatif proclaimed that Bahrein and Oman had reverted to Ottoman jurisdiction and Turkish flags were forced on the owners of Bahrein boats. In August of the same year, in a formal notification by the same official, it was stated that the British Government had no connection with Bahrein, which was a part of the Turkish Empire and would in future be treated as such.

This notice was posted up in the bazaars. On representation the notice was withdrawn, but the Turkish Government refused the right of the British authorities to protect Bahrein subjects at Basra or on Turkish soil.

52. In 1895 the British Government intervened forcibly to prevent an invasion from Qatar and attacked the tribes at Zubarah on the mainland, who were supported by Turkish officers. The Turkish Government protested, but the British Government replied that it did not recognise Turkish jurisdiction on the coast of Qatar.

From this date forward, though Turkish claims persisted, no actual fear of annexation occurred.

53. In 1897 the Constantinople Board of Health proposed to establish a sanitary post in Bahrein, but the proposal was abandoned on the statement by the British delegate that Bahrein was under British protection.

In 1898 the Porte, professing that they had heard that a British vice-consul had been appointed to Bahrein, requested Her Majesty's Government to apply to them for an exequatur, a request which naturally was not considered.

54. In 1905 the Porte were again informed that Bahrein was under British protection. At this time our relations with Sheikh Isa were very strained, and in 1906 rumours not devoid of foundation were current that the sheikh desired to place himself under the protection of Turkey.

55. In the meantime the Persian Government had continued to press their claim to the islands. In 1899 our Minister informed the Persian Government that since 1880 the Sheikh of Bahrein had been precluded by treaty from holding direct relations with foreign Powers, and that his subjects were under British protection.

56. In 1905 the Persian Government refused to consider Bahrein subjects residing in Persia as being under British protection. In February 1906 the Legation informed the Persian Government that they maintained the British right to exercise good offices on behalf of Bahreinis, and declared the Persian claim to be entirely inadmissible. They stated that the island was under British protection, and that the Ottoman Government, who had on several occasions advanced a claim to Bahrein, had invariably received this reply. On this the Grand Vizier again raised the question, and referred to Captain Bruce's agreement of 1822. In reply it was pointed out that the agreement in question, so far from having been ratified, had been expressly repudiated by the British Government, and that the Shah had also withheld his approval, and had censured the Prince Governor of Shiraz for entering into such an agreement without his authority.

57. Thus, though both Turkey and Persia had been informed by the British Government that Bahrein was under British protection, neither of them had, up to 1914, when war broke out, waived their claims to that place.

58. In 1910 the political agent, Bahrein, reported that two Persian merchants were issuing passes for travel to Persian subjects in Bahrein, while the Persian officials in Persian ports were taking 100 rupees security from Persian travellers to ensure that their passports on return were visé by Abdul Nabi Kazeruni, a Persian merchant residing at Manameh, the capital of Bahrein.

The matter was reported to Tehran, but the Foreign Office decided that it was undesirable to raise the question by a protest to Tehran.

59. Presumably the custom continued until 1913, for in that year the political agent again reported the incident, but brought successful pressure to bear on the merchant to make him discontinue this practice. Reports show that in 1914 two other merchants were viséing passes, but the signature of any known merchant or the political agent was accepted.

60. The German firm of Wonckhaus had been established at Bahrein since 1901, and in 1909 the German Hamburg-Amerika agent appeared desirous of supporting the Turkish claim, for ships of that line hoisted the Turkish flag while lying in harbour. On the political agent taking up the question the practice was stopped.

In 1913 Ibn Saud captured Hasa, and with this and the Great War Turkey faded out of the picture.

61. During the war Ibn Saud established a commercial forwarding agent at Bahrein, and he began to take some interest in Bahrein affairs.

During the war period there was nothing to notice. At its termination, however, Ibn Saud began to take more interest in Bahrein, and he encouraged the Dowasir tribe in its contumacy by offering them sanctuary in Hasa.

The political agent reported:—

"Ibn Saud is seeking to interfere in Bahrein affairs, and it is to his advantage that inefficient administration should continue, so as to enable him to make secret alliances with independent factions, such as the Dowasir."

When this tribe finally left Bahrein in 1923 they were given shelter by Ibn Saud in Dammam in Hasa.

62. In 1922 the Persian question again arose over the matter of passports. In June of that year the British consul at Bunder Abbas reported that the Persian passport officials at Lingah, the port at which the British-India ships call from Bahrein, had ruled that Bahreinis were Persian subjects and should be given Persian passports. They seized two British certificates of identity issued to Bahrein subjects, but on representation orders were issued from Tehran to Lingah that this action was not to occur again.

In 1923 the Persian Government instructed its officials in the Gulf to treat Bahreinis as Persian subjects, and the Persian consul at Nejef issued a notice to the effect that Bahreinis should register at his consulate as Persians.

In the previous year, 1922, a postal conference was held at Bushire, and the Persian delegate, while not for the moment pressing for the Bahrein Post Office, intimated that his attitude was without prejudice to Persian claims on Bahrein.

At the same time a press campaign was started in the Persian papers, demanding the return of Bahrein to Persia.

63. In 1922 the Foreign Office in London began to take a strong line regarding the conditions prevailing in the Government at Bahrein, and on the 7th December of that year addressed the Government of India in the following terms:—

"I am to express the earnest hope that steps may be taken forthwith for the introduction at Bahrein of reforms tending to ensure the equitable treatment of Shi'ahs."

Colonel Knox, the acting Resident, protested against action being pressed too strongly.

64. In replying to the Secretary of State the Government of India, in their telegram dated the 14th May, 1923, stated:—

"Knox overlooks the fact that the Foreign Office consider the time has come to face the direct issue with Persia, and that should Persia appeal to the League of Nations misrule would be the only serious flaw in our case. Publicity is a new factor that cannot be ignored. Developments are likely to have an unsettling effect on Ibn Saud. Prompt action in Bahrein is imperative, and Knox should be given authority to take it at his discretion. . . . We desire only to put ourselves right in the eyes of Bahrein and the world."

65. In first pressing these reforms, the Government of India stated:—

"Nothing should be done to encourage the idea that the sheikh is introducing the reforms at Government dictation."

66. The question of these reforms and our interference in internal affairs is dealt with in my accompanying despatch No. 295-S of to-day's date.

67. The international aspect of the case is then that Persia, depending upon her possession of Bahrein up to 1783, on the agreement of Captain Bruce in 1822, and on our communication to her in 1869, maintains her claim to Bahrein, notwithstanding the Muscat and Wahabi possession which intervened and the long subsequent independence of the sheikhs. It is doubtful whether she to-day has any knowledge of the fact that on three occasions, in 1791, in 1838 and in 1859, she temporarily assumed protection of Bahrein, though for so short a time that no real claim could be based upon it. In the third case the circumstances would only count against her. However, in Foreign Office letter, dated the 31st December, 1926, addressed to the Under-Secretary of State, India, it is stated:—

"On political grounds it is of great importance to avoid any action which would result in the re-awakening of the controversy as to the sovereignty of Bahrein."

68. In 1922, however, we stated, as quoted above, that Colonel Knox was unaware that we were ready to meet the Persian claim, and even to put it before the League of Nations. Thus, it is obvious it is only our other commitments with Persia which made it undesirable publicly to meet the question openly in 1926.

69. But the real danger is not from Persia, since, if the point was forced on us, we should have no hesitation and no difficulty in disposing of her very illusory

claims. But the resulting investigation would show the weakness of our own position in Bahrein, based, as it is, upon the continued content of the sheikh. Our treaties give us no right to our present domination, a point mentioned by Sheikh Isa in his petition to Government, and which would certainly come out before an international tribunal. All that we could prove would be the independence of Bahrein and our protection based on custom and consent, but should Sheikh Hamad desire it, or should Sheikh Isa intervene, any international tribunal would limit our powers of action in the islands. Except so far as dependent upon the goodwill of the sheikh our past protection would give us internationally no ground for maintaining our position in the future.

70. Indeed, this point we ourselves have brought out in communication to the Sublime Porte, which we now desire to repeat to Ibn Saud. (*Vide* paragraph 5 of Foreign Office letter, dated Foreign Office, the 7th July, 1927, to the Under-Secretary of State for India, forwarded to me under your No. 402-N, dated the 17th August, 1927.)

In that communication we stated that as regards Bahrein and the crucial chiefs of Oman, British rights in the Persian Gulf relied not merely on the agreements concluded and transmitted at that time to the Ottoman Government, but on the custom, consent, and long-established relations between the local chiefs and the Government of India.

71. Persia is not then the real danger except in so far as she would expose the weakness of our position.

The future danger to our policy lies in the growth of the Wahabi power and its extension to the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf.

72. In this reference I will again quote from Sir Percy Cox's remarks at the Central Asian Society on the 27th October last, which I quoted in a previous despatch.

He said, with regard to Ibn Saud:—

"I have discussed his ambitions with him many times. It may be of interest if I tell you briefly what they are. Practically, he thinks that he is justified in principle in regaining any territory that his forefathers had a century ago, whether as territory or as a sphere of influence. Oman was in their sphere of influence."

"In my time, before the war, we had intimate relations with Ibn Saud; we had a treaty with him under which we paid him a subsidy, and it was part of the agreement that he should not attack or molest any friends of ours or any chiefs who were in treaty relations with us . . . but he quite realised we could not go on paying this for ever. But what he felt was this: Up to now I have been under specific obligation not to annoy the British Government by any policy that I pursue . . . but now they have felt obliged to stop any payment to me, I think I am entitled to pursue my own policy and work out my destiny as I think best. He is now doing that. Up to now he has been extraordinarily correct and statesmanlike in all that he has done. We have never been able to put him in the wrong. . . . I have little doubt that in the course of time he will seek to extend his authority over the interior of Oman."

73. The subject on which Sir Percy Cox was speaking was Oman, but if Oman was under Wahabi influence, Bahrein was under Wahabi control, and it would be difficult to say in which place our position was strongest or more important.

74. Here we have from the fountain head a statement of Ibn Saud's projects on the shores of Arabia. Let us see how his action bears out Sir Percy Cox's statements.

In 1916, as Sir Percy Cox states, we had a treaty with Ibn Saud.

In 1927 we attempted to include a section in the treaty with the following wording:—

"His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies undertakes, as his fathers did before him, to refrain from all aggression or interference with the territories of Koweit, Bahrein, and of the Sheikhs of Katar and the Oman coast, who are under the protection of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and who have treaty relations with the said Government."

With the exception that no reference is made to the question of determining the limits of the territories mentioned, this article repeats the provisions of article 6 of the treaty, which we had already made with him in 1916.

75. Yet Ibn Saud now found it inconsistent with his dignity as an independent ruler to accept the phrase "to refrain from all aggression or interference," more particularly because the word interference seemed to him capable of too wide an interpretation (*vide* Section 1, the 26th January, 1927).

He has now asked us for the terms of our treaties, which he knows leave the rulers in question independent, though they may not hold communication with foreign Powers.

But they do hold communications with Ibn Saud.

76. Am I, then, an alarmist when I consider that, with the growth and advance of the Wahabi power, with the activity reported by the political agent (*vide* paragraph 61), with the absorption of principalities foreshadowed as possible in paragraph 8 of Foreign Office letter [E 6118/180/91], dated the 3rd November, 1926,* We have food for thought.

In 1870 Midhat Pasha, Wali of Bagdad, formulated a definite claim to Bahrein as appertaining to the Qaim Majamteq of Nejd, and geographically it belongs to Qatar and Hasa.

We have found that the growth of nationalist spirits in China, in Persia, and in the East generally, has produced new circumstances, which we have had, at any rate partially, to accept. Would not the growth of a nationalist Arab and Islamic spirit make our position in Bahrein a matter of considerable difficulty, if that position were left in its present undefined condition.

77. My more definite suggestions in this reference I make in my accompanying despatch on our position with regard to internal affairs in Bahrein.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have, &c.

L. HAWORTH, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Lieutenant-Colonel Haworth to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

Sir,

Bushire, September 1, 1927.

IN my accompanying despatch No. 294-S, dated to-day, I have dealt at length with the history of Bahrein, the growth of our political interest in it, and international claims with reference to the archipelago.

I now propose to deal with the development of our concern in the purely internal affairs of the island up to the present day.

2. This interest may be said to date from 1877: I quote extensively from Lorimer.

In 1869, we had installed Sheikh Isa as ruler of the island, and it was entirely, and only, due to our support, that he had been able to keep his position.

Since the year mentioned the British Government considered that they were bound "to prevent grave outrage or oppression by the ruler, or, at any rate, not to remain unconcerned spectators of such acts of violence, but rather use their influence to repress them." In consequence, the Resident was authorised to convey to Sheikh Isa and to his brother, Sheikh Ahmad, who was his chief adviser and had a stronger character than the sheikh, the emphatic disapproval of Government at an act which the latter had committed in killing a first cousin of the sheikh, and to convey a warning against such conduct in the future.

The above statements are the key to all future developments in Bahrein.

3. From 1877 to 1900 we were chiefly concerned with external matters, though attempting with our advice to improve internal conditions. At this time the financial condition of the State seems to have given us most concern, and we were attempting to improve the customs system, which had much leakage.

Up to 1879 the Assistant Resident in Bushire occasionally spent some time on the islands, but in 1900, as will be seen in the body of the report, an uncovenanted official was appointed to reside on the island. By this time Lord Curzon was Viceroy, and it is probable his interest in the Gulf and Persian affairs focussed our attention on matters connected with it. In 1903, on his visit to Bahrein, Lord Curzon considered that an officer of the Political Service would have more influence

* See "Eastern" volume, Part XIX, No. 50.

with the sheikh, and accordingly one was appointed in 1904. From this date our interest in internal matters increased. During the five years of the war no action was taken, but in 1919, probably owing to the treatment of the Shiah having provoked a protest in Tehran, our immediate interest in the misrule of the State became very much greater, and on our finding Sheikh Isa entirely obstructive he was removed from active control, his son Hamad acting as his deputy.

With this short summary I will come to details.

4. In 1880 the sheikh entered into closer relationship with the British by a treaty in which was included a provision by which he agreed to have no negotiations with foreign countries, and in 1892 he made a further and more extended treaty in which he stated he would cede no territory to foreign countries.

The protection given by Great Britain to Bahrein resulted in a considerable increase of material prosperity, and our interest, our influence being more and more powerful, was turned to internal improvement and reform, and to precautions against political competition on the part of European Powers.

5. In 1899 differences came to light between Sheikh Isa and his nephew, Ali-bin-Ahmad, son of the Sheikh Ahmad mentioned in paragraph 2, and supplied a possible explanation for the anxiety which Sheikh Isa had displayed to have his son Hamad recognised by the British Government as his heir.

Sanction to this recognition—and it is illuminating that such sanction was considered by the sheikh necessary—was granted in 1898, but it was not actually openly announced until 1901, owing to the obstruction by the sheikh to the reform of his customs, from which he was not receiving the value he should have received, the profits going mainly to the customs farmers.

6. In 1899 the British Government offered to lend the sheikh a British customs official, but he declined the offer, the reason being, apparently, that he considered his dignity and independence would be compromised.

In the same year, in violation of a promise that he would not extend the current customs contract without reference to the British Resident, Sheikh Isa granted a new lease for two years, and enhanced the general rate of duty from 4 to 5 per cent, without giving previous notice to the British authorities.

7. It was felt that the time had come to replace the Indian agent, who had existed since 1829, by an European officer, and in January 1900 an uncovenanted officer of the Bushire Residency was appointed. In earlier days an Assistant Resident from Bushire had been sent occasionally to reside in the island.

8. The question of the customs was allowed to rest until Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf in 1903, when it formed the chief subject of discussion between His Excellency the Viceroy and the sheikh.

Lord Curzon pressed the customs reforms on the sheikh, but the latter maintained that it was a matter which concerned himself, and there is little doubt that he considered the matter as one affecting his independence. Lord Curzon, however, gave him a final warning that the matter could not, and would not, be dropped.

It may be said that in 1901 Sir N. O'Connor had recommended the appointment of a British Director of Customs as a measure which would appear to the Turks a material proof of British authority in Bahrein.

To coerce Sheikh Isa into acceptance of reforms would have been easy, but it was thought better that he should consent of his own will.

9. In 1904, after the failure of various attempts to induce the sheikh to agree to a reform of his Customs Administration, a further enhancement of the status of the British representative in the islands was approved of, and in October 1904 a political agent was appointed from the cadre of the Indian Political Department. Lord Curzon had felt, while at Bahrein, that an uncovenanted officer, hailing from India, did not carry the necessary weight with the Sheikh of Bahrein, and it was hoped that a British officer would obtain more influence.

10. Sheikh Isa's conduct, however, left much to be desired, and he seemed more concerned with preserving his independence from us than with conciliating us, by whom only his independence could be maintained.

11. In November 1904 a riot had occurred in which the bodyguard of the sheikh's nephew Ali attacked the Persians resident in the bazaar at Manameh, the capital of the islands. Captain Prideaux, the new political agent, interviewed the sheikh in the matter, but the sheikh, on the ground that the Persians were Mahometans, declined to admit his interference, and expressed his intention of sending the case to Shara. Ultimately the matter was kept pending until the arrival of the Resident. In the meantime the Persian sufferers had telegraphed to the Shah

and had been informed, in reply, that the British Government would take action on their behalf.

An undesirable incident, in which a German was assaulted, occurred about the same time, in which no redress could be obtained.

12. On the 21st January, 1905, the Viceroy despatched a message to the Secretary of State, from which the following is an extract:—

"The incidents reported appear, in our opinion, to warrant and necessitate vigorous measures with sheikh, who is only encouraged in his obstinacy by our continued forbearance.

"His obstinate attitude in regard to proposed customs reforms was explained in our despatch of the 21st April, 1904, and apart from this present case he has shown a disposition to ignore the advice of our new political agent. The appeals for our assistance received from subjects of the German and Persian Governments seem to minimise grounds for any international objection, and makes the present opportunity favourable for proclaiming our protectorate."

13. The Resident, Major Cox, spent four days discussing the case of the Persians, but without result, the sheikh maintaining that Persians were under his jurisdiction and that the case must be tried by the Bahrein courts.

The status of the Persians as foreigners resident upon an island under British protection, together with the certainty of injustice being perpetrated should the case be made over to a Sunni tribunal, forbade any concession on this point. Deadlock ensued, and Major Cox left the island on the 10th December to report the situation to Government. On the 23rd February, 1905, he returned to Bahrein as the bearer of demands authorised by His Majesty's Government upon Sheikh Isa. He had been empowered to enforce compliance with the same by naval force, if necessary, and the British cruiser H.M.S. "Fox," and the gunboats H.M.S. "Redbreast" and H.M.S. "Sphinx," were assembled in the harbour.

An ultimatum was delivered to the sheikh, from which the following is an extract of the orders received from Government:—

"Demands should be prefaced by a reference to the long-continued support accorded to the rulers of Behrein and to the present sheikh by the British Government, who caused the usurper to be expelled, himself to be installed, and the succession of his son to be recognised.

"The sheikh should be reminded of his assurances to follow the advice of the Political Resident."

14. Government in their memorandum of demands directed the Resident to state:—

"You have not maintained your friendship towards the British Government, and have conducted yourself in a manner which cannot be permitted to continue. In the event of any continuance or repetition of an unfriendly attitude, all support and assistance, whether diplomatic or military, which you, or your predecessors, have enjoyed will be withdrawn from you, and may possibly take another direction."

A warning was conveyed to Hamad, the heir apparent, whose attitude throughout the crisis had been as little satisfactory as his father's, that the ultimate recognition of his claims by the Government of India would depend upon his future conduct.

15. In his No. 123, dated the 11th March, 1905, Major Cox stated that he regarded it as a matter of considerable regret that the exigencies of Imperial politics did not admit of our making our moral protectorate into an open and effective one at the present juncture. In a later letter, he stated that he based suggestion he had made on the facts that:—

- (1.) The Prime Minister in a speech had referred to Bahrein as a British Protectorate.
- (2.) On the 21st January, 1905, the Government of India had expressed the opinion to the Secretary of State that the present opportunity seemed particularly favourable for proclaiming a protectorate.
- (3.) On the 22nd February, 1905, His Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated to the Turkish Ambassador that it was a matter of common

knowledge that the Island of Bahrein and its natives were under British protection.

- (4.) On the 12th August, 1895, the British Ambassador had informed the Porte that all Turkish claims to Bahrein, which was under the protection of the Queen of England, were totally inadmissible.

16. Major Cox had in his letter stated:—

"I do not see how we can expect anything but periodical trouble from a continuation of our laudable endeavour to carry on the government of the islands through the rule of a chief who has shown himself to possess few, if any, of the qualifications necessary for the maintenance of order, the security of the persons and of trade. . . ."

His Majesty's Government did not accept Major Cox's suggestion, but resolved to follow a more cautious policy. It was decided that for the time being the activity of the British political authorities should be confined to the direction and control of the sheikh's external relations and that the amelioration of the internal government should be sought by indirect and pacific means and by gaining the confidence and trust of the sheikh.

17. The position and influence of Great Britain were, however, so Lorimer states, undoubtedly consolidated by the crisis of 1904-05 and the relations of the sheikh with the British political agent improved, though the former still regarded offers of advice as attempts to undermine his authority.

Trade increased by over 50 per cent., but no progress was made in the matter of customs reform.

But it was felt that some features of the internal administration were not creditable to the "protecting British power"—I quote from Lorimer.

The slave trade still flourished and slaves were freely imported from Qatar and Hasa. Oppression of subjects was rife not only by the sheikh and the members of the Al Khalifeh, the ruling family, but also by petty magistrates and revenue authorities, and specially by the Qazis, who grossly abused their functions. The chief sufferers were the aboriginal cultivating population, called the Baharna, Shiah by religion, who lived in a condition of virtual serfage and were liable to forced labour and similar hardships.

In 1905 the political agent was authorised to manumit slaves in suitable and deserving cases.

18. In 1906 rumours were current, which were not devoid of foundation, that the sheikh desired to place himself under the protection of Turkey; but in 1909 we were apparently sufficiently pleased with him to raise his salute of guns to eleven.

19. On the 14th September, 1905, however, the Government of India had laid down their idea of their position *vis-à-vis* Bahrein. They wrote to the Secretary of State that "Great Britain is the protecting Power of Bahrein, and Bahrein is therefore under the protection . . . of Great Britain in the following sense:—

- (1.) The British Government, and they alone, as distinct from Persia, Turkey or any other Power, control the foreign relations of Bahrein. The sheikh has bound himself not to enter into relations with any other Power. The British Government therefore undertake the protection of foreigners.
- (2.) The reciprocal aspect of this obligation is that Great Britain is bound to protect the islands from any external aggression or assault.
- (3.) It results that British influence and authority are and must be in the ascendant in Bahrein. This influence is political both in character and origin, and it gives Great Britain the right to claim that in any matter to which she attaches high importance her advice must be followed. The acceptance of this advice is the return paid by the State for the advantages which British protection confers. The British rights were explicitly stated in the ultimatum presented to the sheikh on the 24th February, 1905. If British advice must be accepted, action in contravention of it, whether it takes the form of vacillation, bad faith, or open contumacy, cannot be tolerated.

- (4.) British paramountcy is commercial as well as political."

20. After the event of 1904-05 the political agent, though not directly empowered by an Order in Council, assumed jurisdiction over foreigners (an Order in Council to rectify this was introduced in 1919).

Sheikh Isa, though he agreed to the right of protection in the case of other foreigners, maintained his own right over Nejd.

In 1917 the political agent suggested we might fall in with this view of the sheikh as a graceful concession, and this appears to have been acted on unofficially up to 1920.

21. Except as above, the internal affairs of Bahrein do not appear to have attracted much attention until the end of the Great War.

The political agent found himself powerless to prevent the many gross tyrannies which were being perpetrated, but used his influence as far as he could to prevent certain abuses.

In 1908 the political agent attempted to improve trade conditions, and in 1910 he reported that the utmost patience had been exercised in order to get the sheikh to agree without coercion to some compromise to meet the requirements of traders with regard to landing arrangements, which he leased as a monopoly.

22. In 1911 the political resident again gave a gloomy picture of the condition of the Bahrein principality due to the incompetence of Sheikh Isa.

He said that all progress was hampered by the bigoted incapacity of the sheikh, to which was to be added the nationalist sentiment which had agitated Islam during the past two or three years. He was of the opinion that Government would have to interfere in the interests of our shipping.

In 1912 the Government of India called upon the sheikh to form a suitable scheme for the landing of cargo, a reform which was suitably carried through.

23. On the outbreak of war the attitude of the sheikh and his two sons was friendly, but the inhabitants of Bahrein were, perhaps naturally, affected by their Islamic sentiment.

The arrest of Wonckhaus' agent and the capture of Basra had a quieting effect. During the war internal affairs necessarily received little attention.

In 1912 Sheikh Isa agreed to the erection of a wireless station in Bahrein, and in 1916, on the departure of the sheikh's quarantine officer on leave, we took over the quarantine duties of the place, a duty which we have continued to perform.

In 1915 Sheikh Isa was invested with C.S.I., and in 1919 with the K.C.I.E.

24. In May 1919 Captain Bray, who had been for six months political agent, accompanied Sheikh Isa's second son, Sheikh Abdulla, to England.

Captain Bray considered that there was some anti-British feeling in Bahrein, that there was no British party, and he considered the activities of the American missionaries to be anti-British. While this is not the case directly, indirectly it must necessarily be so.

25. Captain Bray, the first of a series of officers from Iraq, was very much in favour of an up-to-date Bahrein, with water works, electric power, industrial schools, pearl button manufactures, &c.

The deputy resident, Mr. Hill, was not, however, in favour of these improvements, preferring rather to leave the Arab to develop slowly than to inculcate in him a divine discontent.

26. Six months later Major Dickson reported:—

- (1.) Political situation wholly unsatisfactory.
- (2.) Strong, long-standing and deep-seated anti-British sentiment.
- (3.) British prestige rests on fear and not on respect.

He also stated that Sheikh Isa was a very old and weak man, with sincere feelings of friendship for His Majesty's Government, but easily swayed and confused in his judgment by astute minds and intrigues, dictated for the most part by intentions evil to him and to us. It is amusing to note that as far back as 1898-99 Colonel Meade referred to Sheikh Isa as a very old man with a weak character.

About the same time Government interfered in a difference between Sheikh Isa and Ibn Saud regarding the duties to be charged on goods proceeding to Hasa. Sheikh Isa was compelled to accept 2 per cent. duty, much to his chagrin, as he considered Government had favoured Ibn Saud at his expense.

27. In the meantime, Sheikh Abdulla had visited England and had an interview with Sir Arthur Hertz, which was illuminating with regard to the sheikh's feelings.

Sheikh Abdulla asked that—

- (1.) Sheikh Isa should be put on an equality with neighbouring Arab rulers in the exercise of authority over all persons except subjects of Great Britain and the Great European Powers (*i.e.*, Nejd and Persians, &c.).

- (2.) Sheikh Isa should be empowered to select the bench of magistrates.
- (3.) Sheikh Isa should be given a port at Zubarah in Qatar.
- (4.) Sheikh Isa should be given permission to correspond direct with London.

I need not dilate on the last two points. The first two were part of the sentiment for which Sheikh Isa had been fighting throughout, that is to say, his pride of position with his fellow Arabs and his idea of his independence.

28. During 1920 the question of jurisdiction over Nejdīs and the people of Hasa had caused some friction between Sheikh Isa and the political agent.

On the 5th May, 1920, the Secretary of State for India informed Sheikh Abdulla by letter, through the usual sources, that, with reference to his first demand of the previous year, quoted above, the Government agreed that the Sheikh of Bahrein should exercise jurisdiction over the subjects of other Arab rulers, provided that the rulers themselves concurred, but on the 8th of the same month the political agent had already stated that Ibn Saud objected to the sheikh controlling his subjects, and in July reported that Ibn Saud had in writing requested him to exercise the jurisdiction in question.

The Sheikh of Qatar sent a similar request.

The political agent accordingly issued a notice on the 20th November, 1920, that all foreign subjects, including Persians and subjects of Arab rulers and chiefs other than those of Bahrein, are, while residing in Bahrein, entitled to the protection of His Majesty's Government. Thus jurisdiction over all foreigners passed to the political agent. The situation naturally caused friction with Sheikh Isa and left him smarting.

29. In 1921 Major Daly, who had succeeded as political agent, summed up the situation in Bahrein in the following terms:—

"Sheikh Isa's wife holds a regular court and imprisons and punishes at her will, with a total disregard of the most elementary laws of even Arab justice. The Salifeh divan court has degenerated into a single venal judge owing to Sheikh Isa having become deeply indebted to Rashid-bin-Mohanna . . . a disturbing element is the rapid increase of the family of Al Khalifeh. There is no outlet for the many younger members and no attempt is made to educate them for any occupation."

Major Daly had previously reported the gross oppression practised on the Shīahs by the Al Khalifeh, and especially by Sheikh Abdulla-bin-Isa, who had his father and mother's complete confidence and consequently ruled Bahrein.

30. In 1921 the rising discontent frightened Sheikh Abdulla, and Sheikh Isa appointed his heir Sheikh Hamad to take over the control of affairs under his orders, but Sheikh Isa's wife, the mother of Abdulla, kept such a tight hand over things that Sheikh Hamad was powerless to make any changes.

In December 1921 discontent in Bahrein had reached such a pitch that, as the Resident reported to the Government of India, a deputation of Bahreinīs presented him with an appeal against the tyranny existing.

The Resident, Colonel Trevor, suggested that the political agent should be authorised to intervene in cases of glaring tyranny and to give individual protection pending enquiry when necessary.

31. Sheikh Hamad and Abdulla took alarm at the attitude of the people and on the 11th April, 1922, Major Daly was able to report that the sheikhs appeared anxious for reform, as the Shīahs were becoming restive. He had warned Sheikh Isa that he could expect no assistance in the event of disturbances.

He also reported that orders had been passed for the opening of a Government office with two regular clerks for dealing with public business, and that a regular court had been established for the disposal of cases.

32. On this the Government informed the Resident that they did not desire to be drawn into interference between the ruler of Bahrein and his subjects . . . that nothing should be done to encourage the idea that the reforms were being introduced at Government dictation.

The political agent reported that the sheikhs, frightened at the attitude of the Sunnis, had drawn back from their reforms, and that some Shīahs were advocating open rebellion and were said to be importing arms.

A week later, in July 1922, the Government of India asked the Resident whether, as the sheikh would not act, pressure should not be applied owing to the gross injustice and the victimisation of Shīahs.

33. On the 7th December, 1922, the Foreign Office, London, informed the India Office that they desired to express their earnest hope that steps might be taken forthwith for the introduction at Bahrein of reforms tending to ensure the equitable treatment of Shīahs.

My files do not show it, but I understand that Shīah pressure was being exercised through the Persian Government at Tehran.

Colonel Knox, who was Acting Resident in 1923 at the time the reforms were finally put through, was not in favour of our pressing reforms on Sheikh Isa, as he considered the Persian challenge was directed not against our conduct of affairs in Bahrein but against our position there, and that reforms would not placate Persia but would provoke the larger issue. He pointed out in this reference that if we withdrew from Bahrein it would not be Persia but the Wahabīs who would succeed us.

34. In January 1923 Major Daly reported that Sheikh Isa was purely obstructive in matters to the advantage of the State, and amongst them would never agree to the exploration for oil except under pressure.

Colonel Trevor then reported that the state of affairs in Bahrein called for reform more urgently than ever.

35. On the 17th April, 1923, the Government of India wired to London urging reforms, since misrule had reached such a pitch, but said: "In the present temper of Islam we are anxious to use every endeavour to induce Sheikh Isa to act ostensibly in his own interest and wish to avoid overt intimidation . . . failing that, if it means his enforced retirement and deportation of Sheikh Abdulla we are determined to carry out the reforms ourselves . . . such action would almost certainly force the general issue of our status in Bahrein, and might produce an unfavourable reaction on Ibn Saud, but we presume His Majesty's Government are prepared to face the consequences."

In reply, the Secretary of State gave the required authority to convey a categorical warning to Sheikh Isa.

36. A further disturbance between some Nejdīs and Persians took place in which five people were killed, which assisted Colonel Knox when on the 15th May, 1923, he crossed to Bahrein to take action.

He stated Sheikh Hamad's great fear was of Ibn Saud; and he reported his own anticipation that the whole management of affairs would more and more come into the hands of the political agent.

37. On the 20th May Colonel Knox had an interview with Sheikh Isa. He told him that the Government were much concerned at the condition in Bahrein, and that we were committed to a serious course of reforms, and advised him to stand aside and give Sheikh Hamad a free hand.

Sheikh Isa was obdurate, and on the 23rd May Colonel Knox asked Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Abdulla to make one last effort to induce Sheikh Isa to agree to his measures.

On the 26th May Sheikh Isa was set aside, as far as control over matters was concerned, and his son Hamad appointed to rule for him.

Sheikh Hamad, though well-meaning, was without experience, and had the weak character of his father, though perhaps without so much obstinacy. Consequently, for the next four years he took no step without the help or, indeed, advice of the political agent, and his complete lack of initiative forced Major Daly into the foreground.

38. In June 1923 the Government of India wrote the first of their repeated warnings that the political agent must be on his guard against being tempted to interfere too much and too directly in the sheikh's affairs or to become the administrative officer rather than the adviser.

Colonel Knox pointed out that to evolve order out of chaos steps had to be taken, and that both Sheikh Hamad and Major Daly were in bad odour in consequence of the reforms having been established.

39. Sheikh Isa then appealed to the High Commissioner at Bagdad.

The Sunni tribes were opposed to these reforms, and in November 1923 petitioned Colonel Trevor on his return to the Persian Gulf.

On the other hand, Sheikh Hamad and Sheikh Abdulla asked Colonel Trevor if he would permanently appoint a British customs director for Bahrein. Colonel Trevor supported their request, and also recommended the raising of a small force of Baluchīs to maintain order, along with other local reforms, such as law courts, &c.

Colonel Trevor pointed out this would entail the employment of three British officers, and that without them the reforms could not be carried out.

In reply, the Government of India asked the Resident whether he was not in danger of going rather beyond what was laid down by them, and stated that they desired the sheikh to be actively associated with the measures of amelioration and not merely to follow passively in the wake of changes pressed upon them. They asked whether an Arab from Irak or Egypt could not function as director of customs.

It is unnecessary to go into the further correspondence on the subject.

40. In January 1924 Mr. de Grenier took over the appointment of director of customs, and in the same year a corps of Baluchis was raised under a British officer, and in 1926 an adviser was appointed, who deals with judicial, financial and general administration.

In the course of a compilation of a record of rights, it came to light that Sheikh Isa had frequently sold the same plot twice to different people and had given documents for land included in the property of others.

41. Outrages against life and property now began to be common, of which two were perpetrated by Sheikh Khalid and his sons, members of Sheikh Isa's family, the al Khalifeh.

42. On the 24th July, 1924, the Foreign Secretary wrote that "the Government of India had no desire to proceed further or faster than they could carry the sheikh wholeheartedly with them. They think the political agent and the political resident have shown a tendency to treat the island too much on the lines of a native State in India."

Colonel Prideaux reported that he had obtained the impression that Sheikh Hamad wholeheartedly approved of the reforms.

43. On the 13th February, 1925, Sheikh Isa submitted an appeal to his Excellency the Viceroy against his deposition.

In it he says, "the 'reforms' which my subjects did not want or demand, and which, indeed, they condemned, took the form of forcing on me inadmissible demands for concessions to foreign syndicates."

He also refers to the resolutions passed by his chiefs of tribes, of which one was "that the British consul should abide by the contents of the treaty contracted between the British Government and that of Bahrein and should not meddle with internal affairs."

He concluded:—

"It is against . . . the intolerable persecution to which I myself have been subjected in breach of treaty obligations in the matter of my prerogatives as an independent ruler of Bahrein that I seek protection and redress at your Excellency's hands."

44. At the beginning of Sheikh Hamad's rule affairs in Bahrein were in chaos. Disturbances which owed their inception to the party which desired Sheikh Isa and his misrule, were rife, and finally an attempt was made on Sheikh Hamad's life.

45. In 1926 the subahdar commanding the Baluch levies was killed by one of the sepoys in the force, and Major Daly was attacked and wounded. I consider that this incident, though it had some connection with the general unrest, need not be considered politically. It had no Arab significance, except as a symptom of general conditions; it was not due to the causes which preceded the attempt on Sheikh Hamad's life.

The Baluch Levy Corps was, however, abolished, and an armed police corps of Punjab Mahometans enlisted, again under a British officer.

46. To-day Bahrein is quiet. Sheikh Isa meets the political resident and the political agent, and he draws his allowance. The Dowasir tribe, who left Bahrein, are coming back again on the conditions which we named, and we are attempting more and more to make Sheikh Hamad the obvious head of the State.

47. But it is still obvious to the world that Sheikh Hamad does what the political agent wants him, that he frequently does what he does not want, because the political agent tells him—we should say advises him.

A glaring example of this is the Dowasir case, in which the Dowasir and all the island knew that Sheikh Hamad's sympathies were with the expelled tribe, and he joined with that tribe to obtain Ibn Saud's recommendation to us in order to make easier his task of obtaining their return to Bahrein.

48. In the meantime we have a British administrator, a servant of the State, who sits with Sheikh Hamad on tribunals; we have the customs director and the chief of police, all of whom were appointed by the British Government, though under Sheikh Hamad's signature.

The British are still looked upon as the rulers, and how indeed can it be otherwise? We make and unmake rulers, we appoint administrators and officials. Every important point is referred to us—the question of landing charges, readmission of the Dowasir, arrival of foreigners, visit of the sheikh to Qatar, &c.

49. Now on reading the history of the last 100 years it is not difficult to see how the present situation has come about, nor the causes of the differences which have occurred between the sheikh and the political agent, the difference of outlook of Sheikh Isa and Lord Curzon.

50. In the course of putting down piracy we were bound to take an interest in Bahrein affairs, for we could not allow the islands to fall into the hands of a foreign Power who might allow it to be a centre of disorder. In 1843 we allowed the sheikh to be ousted as we did not find him satisfactory, and he was replaced by us by another who was equally unsatisfactory, and who finally fled in 1868. We then recognised Sheikh Ali, who was killed by usurpers, whom we defeated and deported, and we then installed his son Isa in his place in 1869, and in 1923 we deposed Sheikh Isa and again appointed his son to rule.

51. During all this time we have protected the State from outside encroachment, and since the sheikh was put and kept in his place by our power we have felt some responsibility for his internal administration and have felt that common gratitude on his part must give us some rights of advice.

We have, however, always publicly insisted upon his independence and he has imbibed the idea of the fact that he is independent.

52. But with an uneducated Arab tribesman independence means the power to do many things of which we do not approve. It means administering the islands for the benefit of the chiefs of the tribe to which he belongs, it means—as it means in many native States in India—the exploiting of the people for the rulers, it means to a bigoted Sunni the treating of the Shi'ahs as people of an unprivileged class (as we see to-day in Ibn Saud's country, 50 miles away on the mainland), it means justice tempered with a consideration of the position of the ruling tribes, and to a man of 60, as Sheikh Isa was when the first crisis occurred, it means an abhorrence of all newfangled ideas. Thus the more we insisted, the more he felt his position threatened, and the more he resisted. The trouble that came was bound to come if we desired a clean administration and elementary justice.

Indeed Colonel Knox, knowing the type of man and the civilisation with which we had to deal, pointed out when the reforms were made that it was inevitable that the power should fall more and more into the hands of the political agent, at any rate for some years.

53. But we have already had, in the past, our experience of trying to work by merely advising, and the Government, not the political agent, finally had to insist on threats instead of advice.

Sheikh Hamad is a pleasant man but a weak one, and it is idle to pretend that he and his brothers would not backslide. He has already shown that he is very much liable to the influence of Ibn Saud and to other Arab influences. He has stated that he looks to Ibn Saud as the great Arab ruler whom they would all wish to please.

He, in a way, likes the British officers he meets, but he, like every other Arab sheikh, would gladly be rid of us all and go back to his definite Arab ways amongst his fellow Arabs.

54. The question then is what are we going to do, now that Bahrein is, however little we may desire it or have desired it, administered as a British province, for apart from the British employees, the Levy Corps is entirely Indian and we have nearly completed a revenue survey carried out by Indian surveyors.

55. I am separately from this despatch submitting suggestions for the reduction of the number of the British employees and we are doing all we can to induce Sheikh Hamad to accept the responsibilities of the post which he holds.

56. But the reforms which we have introduced are essentially Western in ethics and in principle, and foreign to the Eastern mentality of an Arab sheikh.

To relax too much, to allow Sheikh Hamad his way, means to go through the same grind through which we have come, and we cannot afford to-day, any more than in the past, to let Bahrein come under the influence of any other Power, Eastern or Western. It must be remembered that only in 1906, thirty-seven years after we had put Sheikh Isa on the throne, and after we alone had kept him from annexation, and notwithstanding our treaties with him, he had ideas of accepting Turkish nationality.

57. Bahrein is more important to us than it ever has been. There is little doubt that with the development of Persia our strength on that coast will be weakened. It is for us to see that it is not weakened with the Arabs as well.

The Persian Gulf is vital to us as a point on the line from which our oil comes. Bahrein is a keypoint on the air route to India and the East, and without it we could not maintain a service. We cannot lose Bahrein. But notwithstanding our outwardly strong position on the islands, a single serious quarrel with Sheikhs Isa and Hamad, a quarrel engineered by Ibn Saud on religious grounds, or through Persian on political grounds, and we should have to vacate our privileged position or force ourselves on the principality in the face of the world, against the wishes of its rulers. The fact that under treaty the ruler is not allowed to correspond with foreign Powers has not prevented him from so doing in the past, and would not do so in the future.

58. In bygone days, in 1849, we did not take over Bahrein when it was offered to us by Sheikh Mohammed because of the commitments it would give us in administration and defence. To-day our position in the islands is accepted by the Arabs, and we have accepted the commitments in administration, and we should have equally to accept the commitments for defence if Bahrein were threatened. Indeed, I am separately suggesting it as a naval base and the headquarters of our squadron in the Persian Gulf.

59. The objections to a protectorate are purely political; they are no longer administrative. But Sheikh Hamad knows that he cannot stand without us, and, indeed, I would say that, notwithstanding his personal outlook, he is content to keep us there for that reason. His state of mind is a mixed one to be swayed either way by the course of events. At present, though turning towards Ibn Saud in his personal feelings, he looks towards us, and has no desire for the rigid strictness of Wahabi rule.

60. I would suggest then that Sheikh Hamad should be induced to approach us saying that he fears the political situation, and would be glad if we would extend to him the protection which was refused to his predecessor in 1849.

With the consolidation of our position we could afford to cut down the British staff to one man, and insist that Sheikh Hamad should make all the show of a rulership, as in an Indian State, since our position would be unassailable except by force.

61. The protectorate thus concluded need not be proclaimed for the moment if it is not desired, but it would legalise and consolidate a position which is loose and uncertain. I cannot, personally, face with equanimity a future based on the present circumstances of world politics, especially of Eastern politics, and the conditions under which we are now tolerated in Bahrein, conditions which with the advance of the Wahabi power might, in place of a willing subordination, become a forcible bond founded on no right with a hostile people in open sympathy with an advancing Islamic power.

62. We are losing our position in the northern coast of the Gulf; we shall equally lose it in the southern if we allow Ibn Saud to consolidate his power on the whole southern littoral.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have, &c.

L. HAWORTH, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Haworth to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.**

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, September 10, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to state that in my despatches of the 30th April and the 9th May last, and in my despatch dated the 1st September, 1927, I have throughout advocated some advance in the policy which we have hitherto followed in the Persian

* This despatch was received later than Sir R. Clive's despatch, but is printed with it for facility of reference.

Gulf, and I think that some explanation is required of my reasons for the suggestions I have made.

2. Our interest in the Persian Gulf dates from 1616.

In 1615 it had been necessary to find markets for our surplus goods in the factory at Surat, and in 1616 the ship "James" sailed for Persia with a mission to Persia, headed by Edward Connock, and with cargo.

The result was that in 1624 we established a factory at Bunder Abbas. Thus our first interest in the Gulf was purely commercial.

3. For the next 150 years our commerce was mixed with war either with the Portuguese, Dutch or French, and our commerce sailed either in armed ships or under armed convoys, and the factories we established in 1643 at Basra and in 1763 at Bushire were protected by military guards.

4. When the danger from European countries ceased, we still had the same problem in guarding our commerce from the Arab pirates, chiefly the Jowasim, and in the common interest of the Gulf we established a police of the Indian navy, which had by this time been formed.

Thus in a despatch to Sir Henry Willock, dated the 3rd October, 1820, the Bombay Government state:—

"You will be pleased to avail yourself of the earliest opportunity of informing the Persian Government that as our views are exclusively limited to the extirpation of piracy, it would be contrary to our policy, in the present state of the Gulf, to afford the mediation we formerly offered between His Majesty and the Utubis of Bahrein."

5. In 1820-21 Sir Mont Stuart Elphinstone made the following note:—

"On the other hand, all the officers—political, naval and military—who have been employed in the Gulf, are of the opinion that without a station in this part of the sea we shall never be able to eradicate piracy . . ."

From this arose our station at Basidu, which we finally evacuated, mainly on account of climate.

6. In 1822-23 the Governor of Bombay observed with regard to the charges against Captain Bruce in connection with the treaty he had made:—

"The object of the British Government was to preserve the peace of the Gulf, as it was owing to the wars among the Powers who inhabit its shores that the growth of piracy was encouraged."

Thus, from 1820 to 1869, our policy was dictated by the suppression of piracy and the prevention of wars of which piracy was a by-product. All our agreements with the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast, Qatar and Bahrein, were to this end.

7. In 1869 we informed the Persian Government that—

"The sole object of the British Government in holding the sheikhs (of Bahrein) to these engagements were the prevention of piracy and the slave trade, and the maintenance of the police of the Gulf—duties of which Great Britain would gladly, if it were possible, divest herself in favour of Persia."

Our interests were still those of commerce.

8. But in 1880 Russia began to take an interest in the Persian Gulf, and in 1881 established a Russian consulate in Bagdad.

From 1888 onwards the dominant note in political affairs in Persia was the opposition existing between Great Britain and Russia, and there were indications of a joint policy, adverse to Great Britain, on the part of France and Russia.

9. From 1894-99, as Lorimer says, was one of incipient movements gathering force which were after its close to invest the Persian Gulf with prominence. The chief factors were the understanding between Russia and France, and foreign schemes for a railway to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf.

A fresh indication of the strategical importance attached by Russia to the straits forming the entrance to the Persian Gulf, was afforded by the journey of a Russian engineer officer, who came by Kerman and Bunder Abbas to Hormuz in the spring of 1895; he remained for two days, made a survey of Hormuz, and at his departure gave it to be understood that the island would be made a Russian coaling station.

10. This brings us to Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty of 1899-1905.

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In his book "Persia and the Persian Question," published in 1892, Lord Curzon had written:—

"It is no exaggeration to say that the lives and properties of hundreds of thousands of human beings are secured by this British protectorate of the Persian Gulf, and that were it either withdrawn or destroyed, both sea and shore would relapse into the anarchical chaos from which they have so laboriously been reclaimed. That the Persian Government has been enabled to reassert its authority upon the northern littoral, that the pirates of the opposite coast have been taught that rapine is not a safe religion, and, where they once swept the sea with laden slave dhows now dive harmlessly for pearls; that the Arab tribes, instead of being subjected to the curse of Pashas, retain the liberty they so dearly prize, is due to the British Government alone. . . . But at least she must, and does, claim, in return for the sacrifices to which she has submitted, and the capital which she has sunk, and for the sake of the peace which she is here to guard, that no hostile political influence shall introduce its discordant features upon the scene. A Russian port in the Persian Gulf, that dear dream of so many a patriot from the Neva and the Volga, would, even in times of peace, import an element of unrest into the life of the Gulf that would shake the delicate equilibrium so laboriously established, would wreck a commerce that is valued at many millions sterling, and would let loose again the passions of jarring nationalities only too ready to fly at each other's throats. Let Great Britain and Russia fight their battles or compose their differences elsewhere, but let them not turn into a scene of sanguinary conflict the peaceful field of a hard-won trade. I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any Power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the *status quo*, and an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British Minister, who was guilty of acquiescing in such a surrender, as a traitor to his country."

11. In 1899-1900 it was clear that the predominance of the British Government in the Persian Gulf was threatened, that with this the security of British India was being endangered by the policy of foreign Powers, especially Russia, France and Germany.

The naval designs of Russia in the Persian Gulf, and her railway schemes in Persia, the French project of a naval base in the Gulf of Oman, and the powers acquired by Germany for constructing a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, were all circumstances of serious import.

12. Our interests in the Persian Gulf were no longer commercial only; they had also become political; and in 1903, Lord Lansdowne, in reply to a question from Lord Lamington, said:—

"I do not yield to the noble lord in the interest which I take in the Persian Gulf, or in the feeling that this country stands, with regard to the navigation of the Persian Gulf, in a position different from that of any other Power. The noble lord told your lordships, with absolute truth, that it was owing to British enterprise, to the expenditure of British lives and money, that the Persian Gulf is at this moment open to the navigation of the world. It was our ships that cleared these waters of pirates; it was we who put down the slave trade; it was we who buoyed and beaconed those intricate waters. . . . In the third place—I say it without hesitation—we should regard the establishment of a naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf."

13. This was, then, our position up to 1914, the year of the war, during which we occupied Basra.

As a result of the war we obtained a mandate for Iraq, Czarist Russia and Turkey disappeared from the scene, and there was consequently no danger, for the moment, of a foreign occupation in the Persian Gulf. As a consequence, the importance of this area was temporarily dimmed.

14. But in the meantime the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had developed their operations, Abadan had been built, and a large part of the oil and petrol which supplies our fleet and our home country was being prepared at the head of the Persian Gulf.

It also became apparent that the Persian Gulf, lying as it does between Iraq and India, was of first-class importance strategically in connection with the air route to the East, and that, since Persia could not be depended upon as a country on that route, the Arab coast was of vital importance to us.

15. Consequently, the southern coast, with the sheikhs of which in bygone days we had been obliged to make treaties for the safety of the seas, now became the important item in the route for aeroplanes.

We had been content in the past to make general treaties, but it had been our object to avoid occupation of any part of the coast, since with regard to our troops, "Our stationing them on the continent, either of Persia or Arabia, could not fail sooner or later to involve us in the politics of those countries."

16. But again our circumstances have changed. To-day we are involved in the politics of those countries.

In the past our policy has been to avoid protectorates. Can we continue to follow this policy?

Two lines of action lie open to us to meet the new situation:—

- (i.) To continue as we are, to await a period of war, if it comes, when we can, as in the last war, seize such vantage points as we may desire.
- (ii.) To prepare the ground beforehand and acquire definite (protectorate) or (b) protection over the countries which we know we shall require.

17. We are, as I have pointed out elsewhere, and as is apparent, losing, with the development of Persia, our strong position on the Persian coast. We cannot afford to do the same on the southern coast.

Whatever may be the position with Ibn Saud on the Hasa coast, we have already established that we can use the Arab air route with a three-engined machine, or in time of war, strategically, with any machine, by making a few necessary arrangements.

18. But if we allow Ibn Saud to acquire the Arab sheikhdoms of the coast, this statement no longer holds good and our line is cut.

Thus, to have matters as they are is no longer possible; we must have a stronger hold on the sheikhs.

Similarly, we must occupy the Massandam Peninsula in order to hold the Gulf and protect the egress of our oil and petrol.

The above, then, is the foundation upon which I have made the recommendations which I have written.

19. But it is also to be remembered that we may not always hold the mandate for Iraq. We may find our position in Iraq that which it is in Persia.

How much the more necessary is it for us to be established at Bahrein and the mouth of the Persian Gulf at Khassab?

Bahrein has an excellent protected harbour to be made at a small cost, has a better climate than the Massandam Peninsula, and should be the headquarters of our fleet, at any rate in peace time. What should be the headquarters in war time it is for the navy to decide.

In the above I have left out Muscat, with its possessions of Gwadar, &c., since they are not definitely situated in the Persian Gulf.

Muscat is, in fact, as definitely a protectorate of ours as is Bahrein, though neither are officially acknowledged, and the question of Muscat has certain complications, such as foreign treaties.

It is, however, connected with the same political issues of defence, of India and the air route.

The Sultan only continues ruling because he has our support, and I think there is little doubt that political events will force us to admit officially the protectorate of the coast of Oman, which in practice exists to-day.

I have, &c.

L. HAWORTH, Lieutenant-Colonel.

[E 4475/22/91]

No. 34.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 804.)

Sir,

Rome, October 20, 1927.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 1236 of the 10th instant, regarding Zeidi encroachment on the Aden Protectorate, I have the honour to report that I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 16th instant in the sense of the language used to Count Rogeri at the Foreign Office. I added that Signor Grandi must remember that the Imam Yahia had already encroached unjustifiably on Protectorate territory, and that, obviously, both British prestige and the safety of Aden demanded that any further encroachment should be met with immediate and drastic action.

2. Signor Grandi replied that he entirely appreciated the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the matter. He did not for a moment pretend that the Italian Government should mediate in questions between the Imam and Aden. But what had pained the Italian Government in the present instance was that, owing to the short notice given, they had had no opportunity of giving a proof of their friendship towards us by taking action with the Imam to secure the prompt withdrawal of the encroaching forces. I answered that so long as the Italian Government entirely understood the situation, and only adopted the attitude which he had described to me, there was nothing more to be said.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 4677/22/91]

No. 35

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 1321.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 2, 1927.

I SAW the Italian Ambassador to-day for the first time since my departure for Geneva at the end of August.

Signor Bordonaro said that he had express instructions to speak to me about the relations of our two Governments to the King of the Hejaz and the Imam respectively. It was the desire of the Italian Government to continue on the lines established by the Rome conversations, to have the fullest and frankest exchange of opinion and to avoid any conflict between themselves and us, but the Imam continued to assert that we were encouraging Ibn Saud in the prosecution of an aggressive policy. When Signor Bordonaro had spoken some time ago to a representative of this Office on the subject, that gentleman had called his attention to the extent to which the Imam was being supplied with arms. Certainly he was buying arms where he could, and, as the arms agreement had been terminated, there was no restriction on such purchases, but the Italian Government continued to inform him that there was no ground for suspicions of the British Government and to give him counsels of moderation. They wished to be assured that our attitude remained unchanged and that we would continue to follow the policy of the Rome conversations.

I told his Excellency that I could at once give him the assurance that there was no change in our policy and that it was our desire to treat the Italian Government with perfect frankness and to avoid any possibility of friction between themselves and ourselves in connection with the affairs of these Arab chieftains. We had given no sort of encouragement to the King of the Hejaz to take any aggressive action whatsoever. On the contrary, our advice had always been of a moderating and restraining character. Our relations, however, with the Imam were difficult by reason of his occupation of lands belonging to the Aden Protectorate, and, as his Excellency knew, in consequence of new aggressions by his people, we had been on the point of taking reprisals when he withdrew his tribesmen on receipt of our protest. We had intimated our willingness to discuss the possibility of an agreement with him whilst reserving our rights to take whatever action might be necessary, and wherever we thought it necessary, in case of any new aggression, but our negotiations could not be on the basis that he was entitled to occupy the territory which he had seized.

Signor Bordonaro then observed that he understood that the Imam's grievances against Ibn Saud were rather that he had given his protection to Asir, which the Imam claimed as his own territory. I said that I believed that it was the case that, threatened by the Imam, the Idrisi had thrown himself into the arms of Ibn Saud, but that I considered the pretensions of the Imam to Asir as being wholly without foundation.

Passing from this subject the Ambassador showed a lively curiosity as to my conversations with Sarwat Pasha. I told him that so far they were proceeding satisfactorily, but it was too early to say what the outcome would be. I thought that the exchange of views would at least remove some difficulties and make our path smoother. Whether it would eventually lead to the conclusion of an agreement I could not say. In any case time would be needed for such a result. There was no question of our signing any agreement during Sarwat Pasha's present visit.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 4746/1328/91]

No. 36.

Acting Consul Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 118.)

Sir,

Jeddah, October 20, 1927.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 60, in which I had the honour to report the failure, over the question of Asir, of the conversations on the subject of the Italian recognition of the King of the Hejaz and Nejd, held at Asmara, between a delegate of His Majesty and the Governor of Eritrea, I now enclose translations of the summary of the conversations, of a letter sent by Cavaliere Gasparini to the King, and of the reply it elicited.

2. It will be recalled that in September last the Italian consul in Jeddah informed His Majesty that the Italian Government was prepared to grant him unconditional recognition, and suggested a preliminary informal meeting in Eritrea.

3. Ibn Saud, agreeing to the suggestion and giving credit to the professed innocent nature of the proceedings, despatched as his representative Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl, a man readier with his tongue than his wits, whose name is humourously used by local notables as a synonym for "sheep."

4. It is conceivable that a stronger delegate would have resolutely shut his ears to the mention of the word Asir, or, as His Majesty's Foreign Minister observed to me in lamentation, diplomatically suggested that the whole question was one of interpretation of the word "dependencies," and, without attempting to define that term, have secured the desired recognition. In the circumstances, however, there is little doubt that the Italians, taking advantage of the obvious inadequacy of the sheikh, used the conference simply to reopen the old sore of the Asir question, and to rub salt in by recording the trend of the discussion in the summary to which His Majesty's delegate weakly affixed his signature, with a despairing reservation on the subject of ratification.

5. Dr. Damluji, the Foreign Minister, who, as soon as Abdullah-el-Fadl had returned with the news, paid a reproachful call on the Italian consul—only to receive scant comfort—came to me to give me copies of the documents which are now enclosed and to assure me how different might have been the result if they had not been misled in the choice of their delegate.

6. His Majesty, when seen at Mecca on the 18th October by a member of this agency, who went up to pay respects on the occasion of the King's departure for Hasa, appeared to be genuinely perturbed by the turn of events, and, in a private interview, asked what was going to happen now. On his being assured that the absence of Italian recognition would probably have as little effect in the future as it had in the past, His Majesty went on to deliver himself of a long and sustained complaint against the Italians. Their action in the Farsan Islands, their incitement of the Imam, and their corruption of Asir notables, were all referred to in terms with which you, Sir, are already familiar. In the proceedings of these Asmara conversations, His Majesty asserted, was the documentary evidence of Italian intrigues we had asked him to produce.

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7. It is perhaps unfortunate that further discussion of the matter with Ibn Saud must now be suspended as he has left Mecca. On the other hand, it cannot but be reassuring to note that His Majesty should, on the 19th October, set out on a journey of five months' intended duration.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Governor of Eritrea to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Nejd.

(Translation.)

Asmara, 13th Rabi-ul-Sani, 1346.

(After usual respects.)

(October 8, 1927.)

I HAD the pleasure of having an interview with your Majesty's representative, Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl, whose visit has pleased me greatly, while perfectly demonstrating the existing friendly relations between Italy and your Majesty's kingdom. During the interview which took place between me and your Majesty's representative, I learnt with great pleasure that your Majesty's Government desires the peace which is desired by the Italian Government. The friendly exchange of views will be of great benefit to economic relations, especially in the field of commerce.

We are extremely grateful to your Majesty for the amicable terms of your letter and for the telegrams despatched to Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl.

(Compliments.)

(GOVERNOR OF ERITREA.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-el-Faisal-al-Saud to the Governor of Eritrea.

(Translation.)

16th Rabi-ul-Sani, 1346.

(After respects.)

(October 11, 1927.)

We beg to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter, conveyed to us by Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl, and thank you for the friendly sentiments expressed therein. We further thank your Excellency for the declaration in which is stated your desire for the welfare and progress of the Arabian nation and trust that this may prove beneficial to the economic and commercial relations of the two countries. We are grateful to you for the kind reception accorded to Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl, who transmitted our previous letter to you.

We are pleased to note your observations relative to the desire of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy to recognise us as King of the Hejaz and Nejd and its dependencies. We do not wish to trouble the Italian Government to recognise any more than what the other Great Powers, Great Britain and France, have recognised.

IBN SAUD.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

Extract from the Conversations between the Governor of Eritrea and Sheikh Abdullah-el-Fadl, King Ibn Saud's Representative, at Asmara, on September 27-October 6, 1927.

(Translation.)

GOVERNOR OF ERITREA: Peace between the Arabian tribes is the greatest desire of His Majesty the King of Italy, and it is, therefore, of great importance to him to see that all matters of dispute between the Governments of the Arabian Peninsula are removed.

ABDULLAH FADL: Such also is the desire of King Abdul Aziz. It is possible that the existing friendly relations between the Italian and the Hejaz Governments may bring about permanent economic relations, particularly in the field of commerce between Eritrea and the Hejaz.

What is the intention of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy relative to the recognition of King Abdul Aziz as King of the Hejaz and Nejd.

GOVERNOR OF ERITREA: The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy do not intend to recognise King Abdul Aziz owing to the change in the situation in Asir, following the treaty between Syed-el-Hasani-el-Idrisi and His Majesty King Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud.

ABDULLAH FADL: The Asir question cannot be mentioned in the official recognition.

In witness whereof I append my signature to this record which is not to be considered valid until ratification by His Majesty the King.

GOVERNOR OF ERITREA.

ABDULLAH MOHAMMED-EL-FADL.

[E 4929/1328/91]

No. 37.

Acting Consul Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 121.)

Jeddah, October 29, 1927.

Sir,

A WEEK after the disclosure on which I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 118, I received a visit from my Italian colleague.

2. Dr. Cesano soon made the observation that in a place so small as Jeddah, concealment was impossible and that the visit of Abdulla-el-Fadl to Eritrea and his subsequent frequent calls at the Italian consulate in the company of the Foreign Minister were everybody's property. I myself, from the balcony of this agency, was, if I chose, in a position to keep a check on his callers. He wished therefore to talk to me quite frankly and openly, although unofficially. What, he asked, did I understand by the word "dependencies," and without waiting for a reply launched out on the question of Asir.

3. He had the impression, he told me, that in their preliminary conversations, Ibn Saud and Sir Gilbert Clayton had defined the position of Asir and that it was specifically mentioned in the Treaty of Jeddah. I produced the text for Dr. Cesano's inspection and reminded him that as you had caused the Italian Embassy in London to be informed, the recognition of the Treaty of Mecca by His Majesty's Government had been referred on the urgent request of the Italian Government.

4. Dr. Cesano then went on to explain that when he came to Jeddah last autumn his definite mission was to arrange for the unconditional Italian recognition of Ibn Saud, which his Government was then quite prepared to grant. The subsequent publication of the Treaty of Mecca, however, had made this course impossible and there now seemed to him only two alternatives: either to attempt to conclude a treaty definitely excluding Asir or to attempt a solution on the basis of the position prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Mecca of which instrument the Italian Government would not "prendre acte." It was simply a question of finding a formula, and my colleague expressed his conviction that eventually his Government would be able to secure Ibn Saud's signature to their terms. In the meanwhile they simply had to mark time.

5. It is instructive to compare this attitude with that of Ibn Saud and his Foreign Minister as reported in my despatch under reference. Dr. Damluji seemed to be a little uneasy and it is obvious that the real reason for the daily postponement of the King's recent departure from Mecca was the hope of coming to an agreement with the Italians. Nevertheless, provided that nothing occurs to precipitate a decision, I would judge that Ibn Saud will stand firm on the argument the Treaty of Jeddah provides for him.

6. It may not be without interest to take this opportunity to place on record the views which Dr. Cesano took occasion to express on the British treaty. He gave as his opinion that the Treaty of Jeddah was markedly superior to that the Italian Government had concluded with the Yemen and one for which His Majesty's Government had every cause for congratulation. His Majesty's Government had gained a considerable consolidation of their position in the Persian Gulf and on the Maan-Akaba frontier, and, in the clause on the slave trade, had a means by which they could denounce the treaty whenever they chose. Dr. Cesano could not imagine what else could be desired. For their part the Hejazi, not that one considered them at all, had merely received recognition.

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7. When he took his departure my Italian colleague expressed the desire that his name would not be identified with the expression of these views.

8. I have addressed copies of this and of my despatch No. 118 to Cairo, Khartum, through Port Sudan and Aden.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 5083/644/91]

No. 35.

Consul Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Jeddah, November 6, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 28th September to the 31st October, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Singapore, Lagos (2).

3. An extract of paragraphs 22 to 24 has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Jeddah Report for the Period September 28 to October 31, 1927.

THE period which has elapsed since the last report has produced the usual talk of unrest in the interior. The ball this month seems to have been started with the urgent order of the King for motor cars from Egypt, and, in the snow of indolent minds in the sooks, soon rolled into alarming proportions. Riyadh reported a murderous attempt on the King's eldest brother; batches of high officials and notables had been deported from Mecca to Taif only to die mysteriously on arrival. Medina was in ferment and open revolt imminent. In fact, the old cry "Wolf!" had been raised.

2. The usual skeleton of fact can, of course, be discovered. There is no doubt as to poverty and distress in the country, and, owing to the long absence of rain, the survival of the camels is even threatened. There seems also to have been an undue proportion of incidents in Medina and Mecca, but all these, even accompanied by a fresh outburst of Wahabi fanaticism, should give no cause for serious alarm.

3. At Medina, apparently, the Governor, suspected of intrigues against the King, has been replaced by the Governor of Taif. Moreover it has been confirmed that the trees in the mosque of the Prophet have been cut down and the well filled in.

4. In Mecca the Acting Grand Kadi and the Minister of Awkaf have been arrested and sent away to an unknown destination. The Religious Committee has issued new orders forbidding public mourning, the shaving of beards, and the wearing by men of silken clothes and gold and silver ornaments. Barbers and tailors are held under strict injunction. In addition, attendance at the mosque at prayer time is made compulsory, and rules are laid down—probably with his tongue in his cheek by the young and dissolute Hussein Mahommed Nasif, head of the committee—for the proper moral conduct of women.

5. It is not, however, to be imagined that a people so thoroughly permeated with the atmosphere of their religion as the Hejazis are likely to resist the new decree. On the contrary, they well know how to adjust themselves to altered circumstances. It is observed, for instance, that in promulgating the order in Jeddah, the Kaimakam has permitted himself the deviation which allows him still to enjoy his cigarette at home while forbidding smoking in the street. Nevertheless, the orders do constitute a disturbing element at a time when, the pilgrimage not having begun, the Hejazi has the leisure to indulge in uneasiness.

6. A further and probably much more significant cause of unrest is to be found in the gradual insinuation of Nejdians into executive positions in the Hejaz. Nejdians have now been appointed chiefs of police in Mecca and Jeddah and are credited with the intention of replacing the existing forces by recruits from their

own country. A Nejdian kadi has been sent to Rabigh to govern the Harb, and there are rumours that other similar appointments are in contemplation. Reference has been made in past Jeddah reports to the cry "Hejaz for the Hejazi!" If the opportunity presented itself the Hejazis might well allow themselves to be carried away by their hatred of this insidious penetration.

7. A last cause for anxiety lies in the Iraq border posts, and it is difficult to see how to allay the suspicion which has arisen in this connection. At the moment the two Governments disagree as to the exact geographical position of the post at Busaiyah, and it is to be hoped that it will prove as easy to arrive at an amicable settlement of the whole problem as it should be to determine the proximity of this post to the frontier.

8. Ibn Saud himself is probably under no delusion as to the state of the country and it is doubtless with the object of rallying his supporters that has led him to leave Mecca for an extended tour. It is of interest to note that by the time he returns he hopes to have overcome the difficulties with regard to the erection of wireless stations throughout the kingdom and to be ready to give a decision on the proposed air reconnaissance at Hasa. As an indication of the King's personal position, it may be added that Ibn Bujad is now reported to be in the closest terms of friendship with His Majesty.

9. As to the external situation, with the exception of the Busaiyah question and a slight set-back with the Italians, progress has been general.

10. Arrangements are now complete for the departure of Hafez Wahba, the King's delegate, to Koweit, where a formal mutual cancellation of the Iraq-Nejd frontier claims is to be arranged.

11. The position on the Transjordan frontier is similarly clearing up. Ibn Saud has now asked His Majesty's Government to adjudicate on the old Trans-jordan-Nejd frontier claims, binding himself to accept their decision, of the justice of which he is already convinced.

12. With regard to any future claims which may arise the King suggests that a British arbitrator be appointed. He only stipulates that the official shall not be connected with Palestine, Transjordan or Iraq, explaining that even British officials, of whose honesty there is no doubt, are liable to a bias in the direction of the Government they serve.

13. The question of Italian recognition of Ibn Saud has caused a mild sensation. In September last the Italian consul in Jeddah informed the King that his Government were prepared to grant unconditional recognition and suggested a preliminary informal meeting in Eritrea. Before the meeting could take place, however, the conclusion of the Treaty of Mecca, by which Ibn Saud extended his sway to Asir was announced. The Italians viewed the changed situation with deep concern. Consequently, when the King's representative—an admitted incompetent—arrived at Asmara, he found an atmosphere very different from that he had been led to expect, and was soon sent back with the news that Asir must be excluded from any treaty negotiations.

14. Notwithstanding their extraordinary choice in the matter of a delegate, the King and his Foreign Secretary were much mortified by this abrupt end to what they seem to have taken to be a pleasant social function. Their experience of the Italians should have taught them better. Fortunately the price of their credulity is not likely to be a heavy one, and the negotiations will now probably be postponed until the return of the King to Mecca.

15. The dispute between the Red Sea Petroleum Company and the Idrisi in the Farsan Islands has taken on a brighter aspect. The King's offer to arbitrate between the rival claimants has been accepted, and his delegate is expected shortly to leave Jizan for the hearing.

16. Meanwhile the opening of the pilgrim season, with its blessed promise for the empty Treasury, is approaching. Advice has been received of the departure from Odessa of a vessel bearing the first of the promised 10,000 Russian pilgrims. Official interest in the Haj is stirred into anticipating a record season of 200,000 pilgrims and to issuing a new set of dues, a list of which I enclose as an appendix.

17. The King's plan for the provision of next year's holy carpet is progressing favourably. A splendid new workshop, estimated to cost £20,000, is in the course of erection at Mecca, and thirty-six weavers, under a year's contract, have recently arrived from India. All the signs indicate that His Majesty's express desire for a carpet better and costlier than Egypt ever supplied will be realised.

18. Perhaps, however, the best pilgrimage news is the report that determined efforts are being made to induce the British India Steamship Company to share in

the pilgrim traffic. It is sincerely hoped that this company will set aside the baseless fears of entering into competition with their associated companies which so far seems to have been their restraint, and now decide to participate and thus line the pockets of their shareholders, bring relief to the swarms of returning pilgrims who wait for weeks for accommodation and, incidentally, sensibly prolong the lives of the harassed members of the staff of this agency.

19. The return of Mr. Philby has now been postponed, on account of serious illness, until the end of November. I understand that he may be accompanied by his wife, in which case it remains to be seen whether, in view of his public references to the ill success of his marriage, Mr. Philby will be able to preserve that secrecy as to his activities in Jeddah which has led him to forbid his unfortunate employees to associate with the other resident Europeans.

20. If, however, we have lost a month of Mr. Philby's company, the balance has been somewhat adjusted by the arrival of Dr. van der Hoog, a Dutch bacteriologist, formerly director of the Public Health Department in the Dutch West Indies. Dr. van der Hoog, who is the second European to be employed by the Hejaz Government in a professional capacity, is now installed with his twenty-eight cases of equipment in the public hospital at the Mecca Gate, where he daily practises his black arts of incubation, vaccination and inoculation. He expects to remain a year, and in that time to complete the instruction of the two Syrian hospital doctors. In the meantime, his smooth shaven face, refreshingly clean looking after the shagginess common to other Europeans here, and his extensive English vocabulary, highly coarse, are here for our profit.

21. Among the departures must be noted that of the French vice-consul at Mecca, who has returned to his native Algeria, while the new arrivals include Mazhar Aboul Ez, Egyptian vice-consul, formerly at Jerusalem. M. Mazhar has come to take charge of the Egyptian consulate during the forthcoming absence on leave of Amin Tewfik Bey. I gather, however, that Amin Bey has had his fill of Jeddah and intends to make a serious effort to change its delights for those of Manchester.

22. The only other movement of note was the departure of the head of the Turkish Diplomatic Mission to the Hejaz. Suleiman Cherket Bey, who left on the 10th October, on his nomination to the Turkish National Assembly as representative of a place he had never heard of and could not find on the map, was an agreeable if very guarded colleague with a weakness for the title "Excellence." He leaves his diplomatic mission, appropriately enough in the land of Mahomet, suspended in mid-air, and the representative of Turkish interests in the hands of an assistant of indeterminate status.

23. Apart from securing for his Government one of the airiest houses in Jeddah, it is difficult to determine what exactly Cherket Bey achieved during his stay here. I know he urged the Italian consul to press his Government to recognise Ibn Saud so as to counteract British influence in the Hejaz. I am also informed that a Senussi who had been refused a visa by the Italian consul was supplied by him with a Turkish passport. Otherwise he seems to have concentrated his efforts on increasing Turco-Bolshevik intimacy. It is true that the present "chargé" of the Bolshevik agency has been thrown on the Turks by the fact that he does not speak the language of any of the other foreign representatives. Nevertheless, the bond is obviously greater than a social one, and the arrival of the steamship "Tomp," which carries the first Russian pilgrims and is said to be bringing to Jeddah a Turkish trade exhibition (apparently of tinned fruits, vegetables and sweetmeats), is awaited with interest not unmingled, in many quarters, with concern.

24. The disfavour with which the Turks are viewed in official eyes has found recent expression in the summary dismissal of the Turkish Director of the Quarantine and his assistant.

25. The Rolls-Royce cabriolet ordered for Ibn Saud having at last arrived has been taken to Mecca, where it will doubtless be used by such Ministers as dare until the return of His Majesty six months hence. The appearance in the Hejaz of this car, expensive and handsome though it may be, does not, however, compensate for the rapidly diminishing British share in car imports. One can only hope that as a Royal car the Rolls may be spared the treatment which has driven other British cars from the field of competition.

26. Some doubt is now entertained as to what is to happen to the two steam rollers when they arrive. If they are put to repairing the Mecca road, expert opinion anticipates that they will sink in the sand and stay there. Stone for road making is plentiful in the Hejaz, but whether the money will ever be forthcoming for the

systematic road construction and maintenance which alone can justify the purchase of steam rollers is a matter of considerable speculation.

27. Indeed the general question of transport may achieve critical importance during the coming season. I have already referred to the anxiety that the camels may die through the drought. Another danger awaits their survival in the ever-increasing competition of the motor car. The position is a difficult one. Ibn Saud himself has a great passion for motor cars and is sufficiently modern to buy them when he has no money to pay for them. He himself is interested in a new company formed to run a fleet of cars between Jeddah and Mecca.

28. That the local Hejazis realise what a boon is motor transport to many classes of pilgrims and that they regard it as one of their best advertisements is clear from the confident way in which orders for cars are being placed. On the other hand, the position of the camel driver, who sees his livelihood steadily and securely snatched from him, must by no means be ignored. A little Wahabi fanaticism working on his uncouth nature might well produce incidents on the Mecca Road next summer of the gravest import to the existing régime.

29. The Government has now definitely placed in London an order for ammunition amounting to several thousands of pounds. This I gather is entirely a credit transaction, and for that reason is not likely to be followed by an order for arms.

30. A new silver coinage to accompany the current golden sovereign and to displace the old Turkish mejidieh has been ordered. Thus gradually every trace of former Turkish domination is being effaced and soon a little pleasing architectural ornament will be the sole reminder of gentle Johnny.

31. During the period the 28th September to the 31st October, two slaves have been repatriated by this agency.

APPENDIX.

Taxes to be Collected from Pilgrims for 1346.

In and out quarantine dues, in and out passport fees and inspection commission fee at Jeddah	Pt. 106
Sambuk hire: Outside the harbour	Pt. Tk. 10
Sambuk hire: Middle harbour	" 7½
Sambuk hire: Inside the harbour	" 5
Compensation to Jeddah mutawwif agent	" 20
Porterage from sambuk to house	" 5
House rent for three nights (over that Pt. Tk. 1½ per night)	" 2½
Baladie tax on each shuquf	" 2
Official agent and assistant	" 2
Porterage on luggage from sambuk to quay	" 0.20
Sambuk hire to the island for three days (above that Pt. Tk. 2½ to be charged per head daily)	" 14
Porterage from house to sambuk on return	" 3
Jeddah agent's fee	" 5
House rent for three nights (over that Pt. Tk. 1½ per night)	" 2½
Amount payable by each Java pilgrim, being house rent, food supplied in Mecca, Arafat, Mina, compensation to his sheikh and numbering charges	£6
Compensation for the mutawwif of Indian and Bengali pilgrims	Rs. 15
House rent	" 14½
Gratuity to zamzam water supplier	" 3
Hire of tent during Haj days	" 4
Gratuity to mutawwif for each Egyptian pilgrim (house rent excluded)	Pt. Tk. 120
Gratuity to mutawwif for each Syrian and Algerian pilgrim (house rent excluded)	£1 and 2 mjds.

(Camel hire will be fixed by Government.)

[E 5081/22/91]

No. 39.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 682.)

Sir,

Cairo, November 18, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that Hafez Wahba, Ibn Saud's adviser, just before my return, arrived here on his way to the Iraq-Nejdi Tribal Claims Conference. He unburdened himself at some length to a member of my staff on the subject of the differences between Ibn Saud on the one hand, and the Imam Yahia and the Italians on the other.

2. Hafez Wahba began by stating that the negotiations between Ibn Saud's representative and the Governor of Eritrea for His Majesty's recognition by Italy (see Jeddah despatches Nos. 1020 M. (30/41) and 1022 M. (30/41) of the 28th and 29th ultimo, respectively), had broken down on the question of Asir. According to Hafez Wahba, Ibn Saud did not ask that Asir should be mentioned in the treaty. He would have been satisfied by his recognition as "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies." The Italians, however, demanded that mention should be made of Asir as not being included in the term "Dependencies." Ibn Saud refused to make this express exclusion, arguing that the terminology accepted by Great Britain and France should be equally acceptable to Italy. It is to be noted, however, that the acceptance of Ibn Saud's above-mentioned title by Great Britain and France was anterior to the publication, though not to the date, of the Treaty of Mecca, by which the Idrisi recognised Ibn Saud's suzerainty over Asir.

3. Hafez Wahba went on to say that he wished to consult us confidentially on the subject of the relations between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahia, supported by the Italians. The prospects of reaching an agreement with the Imam were far from promising. Ibn Saud's two latest envoys to Sanaa had returned with news to the effect that the Imam claimed the whole of the Asir, including Kufida, and the Najran, but was graciously prepared to leave the Hejaz and Nejd to Ibn Saud. The Imam based his claims on the fact that his ancestors had ruled over the whole of the territory he was now claiming. Ibn Saud had naturally retorted that his own ancestors had exercised more recent domination over that territory and even almost up to Sanaa. Hafez Wahba admitted that this ancestral argument from either side was quite irrational. Ibn Saud was prepared to confirm the *status quo*, by which the Imam would retain such part of the Asir, including Hodeidah, as he had already occupied; Ibn Saud would maintain his suzerainty over the rest of the Asir still under the Idrisi, and the tribes of Najran would remain in their present virtual independence of both Ibn Saud and the Imam. Ibn Saud had now sent another envoy to Sanaa, and it remained to be seen what news he would bring back.

4. The Imam, Hafez Wahba maintained, was obviously being incited against Ibn Saud by the Italians. Against whom else, he asked, could they be supplying to the Imam all these aeroplanes, arms and munitions? Not against Aden, presumably.

5. Hafez Wahba pointed out that the Ahwan were at present unemployed and that they were inclined to be a nuisance when inactive. It would not be at all inconvenient to Ibn Saud to keep these restless warriors busy by an expedition against the Imam. They could not fight the Zeidis in their hill-country, but the Zeidis would not be able to resist the Ahwan in the Najran and the coastal regions.

6. What, Hafez Wahba enquired, would be the attitude of England? Our language hitherto to Ibn Saud in these matters had been friendly, but not quite definite. The Arabs were simple folk and liked to be told things clearly. Italy was obviously out to undermine England's position in the Arabian Peninsula. This Italian effort would result in throwing discord among the Arabian chiefs and work out to the detriment of the peninsula. He (Hafez Wahba) had an anti-British reputation, but he served loyally his present master and had consistently advised him to be friendly to us because it was clear that England's interest lay in the direction of a strong and independent Arabia. Ibn Saud and most Arabs were of this opinion. But, if the Arabs saw a second-rate Power like Italy undermining in the peninsula the position of England, which they had so long regarded as the only serious Western Power in Arabia, it was obvious that they would be puzzled and distracted in their inclinations.

7. The serious nature of his statements and question was pointed out to Hafez Wahba. He was reminded that the Italian Government had consistently denied any intention of inciting the Imam against Ibn Saud and had declared that its objects were purely economic. His Majesty's Government had always desired that peace

should be maintained among the Arab chieftains, and, if his enquiry were referred to London, he would certainly get no answer which might seem an encouragement to Ibn Saud to attack the Imam. But had he (Hafez Wahba) instructions from Ibn Saud to make this enquiry, or was he only speaking for himself?

8. Hafez Wahba replied that Ibn Saud had told him to speak to me in the above sense.

9. In view of the dubiousness expressed as to the extent of his authority, Hafez Wahba said that he would send a messenger from Kuwait to Ibn Saud at Riyadh, asking him for a letter addressed to me and mentioning that His Majesty authorised Hafez Wahba to lay the matter before me on his return journey through Cairo. Perhaps, Hafez Wahba added, developments might have occurred meanwhile which would incline Ibn Saud to defer reference to London. In these circumstances I presume that we can wait for Hafez Wahba to return to the charge. He may well have been only trying to ascertain our views.

10. The difficulty in estimating the situation lies largely in the fact that there is no British diplomatic or consular authority responsible for more than a part of the peninsula and able to co-ordinate information and policy in Arabia. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Italy and the Yemen is no doubt governed by considerations of wider policy beyond the Arabian horizon. But even supposing that such considerations prevent our taking a strong line, it would seem important that we should be in a position to realise clearly what the local consequences of our abstention are likely to be. Things appear to be drifting towards a conflict between Ibn Saud, who is on friendly terms with us, and the Imam Yahia, whom the Italians are actively supporting. It is possible that a general review of the Arabian situation taken as a whole, in which we are imperially interested, might reveal to us more ultimate danger to Anglo-Italian relations in our abstention than in definite insistence that Italy should cease encouraging and arming an Arab potentate who has usurped a part of the Aden Protectorate and is, thanks to Italian support, contemplating aggression against the principal Arabian ruler, whose maintenance is at present conducive to peace in Arabia and is not inimical to our time-honoured interests in the peninsula.

I have, &c.

LLOYD,

High Commissioner.

[E 5081/22/91]

No. 40.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd (Cairo).

(No. 1105.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 6, 1927.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 682 of the 18th November reporting an interview between a member of your staff and Ibn Saud's adviser, Hafez Wahba, and I entirely approve the answer which was returned to his tentative enquiries and insinuations. It is, I think, fairly clear that Hafez Wahba was, as your Lordship suggests, simply endeavouring to ascertain the views of His Majesty's Government on a question of importance to Ibn Saud; and it remains to be seen whether he will, in fact, return from Iraq armed with His Majesty's definite authority to enter into conversations with yourself.

2. The argument advanced by Hafez Wahba that the Italians are working to undermine our position in Arabia is not, in my opinion, well founded. All my information goes to show that they are working primarily to establish for themselves a position in Arabia, but this operation by no means requires the undermining of ours. It is true that they are arming the Imam, and that they support his claim to the whole of Asir; but there is no reason to suppose that they are encouraging him to assert his claim by force. Indeed, it is difficult to see what precise Italian object could be secured by thus precipitating a conflict between the Yemen and Nejd.

3. As your Lordship observes, the lack of centralised diplomatic or consular representation in Arabia occasions at times some difficulty in estimating the general situation in the Red Sea area, and in co-ordinating information and policy. It is, however, not at present feasible to combine the establishments at Aden and Jeddah under a single authority; and it is clear that the simple substitution of diplomatic for consular representation in the Hejaz would not solve the problem of duality.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 5309/323/91]

No. 41.

Acting Vice-Consul Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 125.)

Sir,

Jeddah, November 22, 1927.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 65, I have the honour to submit the following report on the recent stay in this port of the Soviet steamship "Tomp."

2. My intention was first drawn to the intended visit by Haji Abdullah, Kaïmakam of Jeddah, when he returned the call I had paid him on my arrival here. He appeared to have heard of a paragraph in the "Times" to the effect that a Russian ship was bringing pilgrims, flour and sugar to Jeddah, and that it was hoped to establish a regular commercial service between Odessa and the Hejaz. Haji Abdullah reminded me that last year a Russian vessel had called at the height of the pilgrimage season when, apart from a little natural curiosity, she had attracted no great attention. The flour she had brought had been easily absorbed. The kaïmakam went on to say, however, that the question of establishing a regular service was a very different proposition, and if, as was rumoured, the Russians intended to undersell the current market price, the Jeddah merchants would sustain heavy losses on the stocks in hand and would be compelled to place future orders in Russia instead of India. I agreed with him that such a step would be lamentable but could suggest no remedy. I pointed out the parallel case of petrol in England and the matter was soon dropped.

3. It was next mentioned by the manager of Messrs. Gellatly Hankey (Sudan) (Limited), who informed me that his firm had been asked to act as agents to the "Tomp," and wished to know whether there was any objection to their accepting. I assured him that I saw none, and he therefore notified the Soviet agency of his willingness to undertake the agency on the distinct understanding that no petrol was to be landed, a condition which is explained by the fact that Messrs. Gellatly Hankey represent the Shell Company in this country.

4. Almost immediately following came the disturbing news that a member of the Soviet agency had been touting the market for buyers, freely offering flour and sugar at £1 a ton less than the current price, and adding that he was prepared to undercut the market at any price.

5. As soon as this news reached the kaïmakam's ears he acted quickly. Calling together the chief merchants of the town, he drew up a memorial for their signature and sent it off to Mecca, begging for protection. As a result a meeting was arranged at Bahra, on the Mecca road, at which the Amir Feisal, the Acting Assistant Viceroy and the Director for Foreign Affairs met for discussion with the kaïmakam and another representative Jeddah merchant.

6. As a consequence of this meeting the Director for Foreign Affairs burst into Jeddah on the morning of the arrival of the ship, the 11th November, to inform the consuls concerned that the plan, of which there had been vague rumours in the town, of levying some sort of discriminative tax on Soviet goods which would bring their prices up to market level had been abandoned, and it had been decided to impose a boycott on the goods. He therefore asked for our co-operation.

7. My Italian and Egyptian colleagues, who had followed the course of events with considerable anxiety, readily agreed to this proposal and immediately had their merchants warned. I was saved from an obvious embarrassment by the fact that Messrs. Gellatly Hankey's nervousness on the subject of petrol served to them as a check as regards the other commodities, and the local Indians, the only other British merchants, had, both in Mecca and Jeddah, voluntarily met and resolved not to touch the Soviet goods. The only doubtful supporters of the scheme were therefore the Turks, the Bokharis and a few Syrians over whom the French consul seems to exercise very slight authority. With characteristic vigour, however, the kaïmakam had had these waverers informed in unmistakable terms of the course they were to adopt if they wished to continue in his favour.

8. The 12th November, therefore, heralded a series of skirmishes between the kaïmakam and the Bolsheviks, who, in the face of such opposition, were straining every nerve to prevent their venture ending in failure and passed in their interminable squabbles with lightermen, customs and municipal officials, all of whom had been instructed to place every conceivable obstacle in the way of the new traders.

9. The 13th November gave a more serious turn to the situation. On that day it became generally known that six Russians had arrived by the vessel to take over the direction of Soviet commercial interests in the Hejaz. My Italian colleague was immediately up in arms. Obviously, if the Russians had brought their own commercial personnel they could themselves sell the wares. He therefore asked me to join him in an official protest.

Permission had been refused, he said, to certain Italians who had wished to establish themselves in Jeddah, and in view of the grave political interests involved he was not going to stand by and meekly see the country thrown open to the Bolsheviks.

10. I assured him that I appreciated the possibilities of the situation, but I regretted that, in the absence of definite instructions, which I had had no time to seek, I could not join him in an official protest. Happily, I added, a case such as he could present needed no support of mine. Dr. Cesano therefore went alone.

11. He had, however, barely lodged his protest when it was reported to the kaïmakam that the newcomers had no Hejazi visas on their passports. The explanation is the simple one that these visas are only obtainable in Cairo and Suez, and landing in Egypt had been forbidden to the passengers of the "Tomp."

12. But the opportunity which now presented itself was too good for Haji Abdullah to miss, and he issued an order that the Bolsheviks were to return to their ship at once. At this the unfortunate individuals not unnaturally took refuge in the Soviet agency, and when, later in the day, two ventured into the street, they were promptly seized by the police and clapped into gaol.

13. In the face of this affront the Bolshevik representative set off for Mecca to see the Amir Feisal, threatening that if he received no satisfaction he would go to Riyadh and see the King himself.

14. He does not appear to have effected any material change for the better by his threats or his persuasions. While the ship was being unloaded and buyers again being sought in vain it was decided that two of the six, one a doctor and the other a consular secretary, should be allowed to remain. The other four must return whence they came. Consequently, when the "Tomp" steamed out of Jeddah harbour on the 16th November, the staff of the proposed Soviet commercial bureau went with her.

15. With the departure of the ship, however, a further problem arose. What was to happen to the cargo which was still lying in the customs uncleared? Rumour was not slow in fixing on Husein Lary, the local Persian trading consul, as the only man who had the means and would dare to buy. The kaïmakam therefore sent for his compatriot and told him quite clearly what was required of him. Lary seems to have been non-committal, but when, later, the rumour crystallised into the form that Lary had bought at the rate of £17 10s. 0d., duty paid, as against the current price of £20, the kaïmakam did not hesitate to summon Lary again. What passed at this second interview is not known, but if the consul was the buyer he is too scared to take delivery, for the goods are still lying in the customs while the Soviet agency tries to arrange warehouse accommodation. In the meantime, the kaïmakam has taken the further precaution to announce that no camels will be available for transport into the interior of goods of Soviet origin.

16. The cargo of the "Tomp" consisted chiefly of oak planks, sugar and two qualities of flour from Russia. In addition, some conserves of Turkish origin and a certain amount of brass trays and vessels such as samovars were carried. The name of the company chartering the ship is said to be the Russo-Turkish Company, whose head office is in Moscow and whose vice-president is, I understand, Ghaleb Kemali Bey, who formerly held diplomatic appointments in Greece and Italy. The names and some particulars which I have been able to gather concerning the six Bolsheviks who were on board are as follows:—

Belkin, Naum.—Managing director of the company to promote the commercial service between Odessa and the Hejaz.

Stancebitz, Alexandre.—Diplomatic courier.

Ozetov, Vladimir.—Sub-director of Near Eastern Affairs at Moscow. Formerly secretary at Tehran.

Babadjan, Benjamin.—Described as a Tartar from the Crimea. Holds a doctor's diploma of Petrograd. Formerly at Kabul.

Bilz, Rudolf.—Intended Jeddah manager of the company.

Stupan.—Consular secretary, formerly attached to the Soviet Embassy at Angora.

Of these, the doctor, Babadjan, and Stupan have been allowed to remain.

17. It may be of interest in this connexion to note the attitudes adopted by various colleagues. The Italian consul, who has not hesitated to label the incident as one of the most important in the recent history of the Hejaz, acted throughout with great vigour and determination. In view of the proximity of their colonies, his Government evidently view the possibility of the Bolsheviks obtaining a foothold in the Hejaz with considerable apprehension. Consequently, Dr. Cesano is not a little pleased with the part he played and accordingly credits himself with no small share in the success achieved. He has been very communicative to me throughout. My Egyptian colleague has also apparently received

strong instructions from his Government and, during the period under review, he fully maintained his habitual close relations with Dr. Cesano. I found him very willing to impart his version of the day's news. I have not been able to measure my French colleague's interest. He seemed somewhat remote from the available sources of information and created for himself a further handicap in refusing to talk in the presence of his vice-consul, of whom he openly declares his suspicions. M. Gault commits the error of seeking the easiest available society, that of the Turk, to escape from his consul's hypochondria. The Turkish representative, in anticipation of the trade exhibition, supposed to be on board, arranged his rooms, it is said, and brought out and dusted some odd tins of preserves which remained from a former exhibition. On learning, however, of the attitude of the local authorities, he telegraphed to Angora for instructions and, receiving none, promptly took to his bed, where he remained until the "Tomp" sailed. His first public remark on his reappearance is noteworthy; it was to the effect that if Russian ships were not acceptable, Turkish ones would be tried.

18. The attitude of the Hejaz Government is interesting. It is generally admitted that in internal politics the present Government has little to fear from the Bolsheviks. It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Government will waste time upsetting this primitive monarchy while the Mecca pilgrimage gives them unique opportunities for easy propaganda in the East. Their interests are best served by a stable Government in the Hejaz to guarantee a regular influx of pilgrims. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that the Hejaz Government took drastic action to oppose the consolidation of Soviet interests through nervousness of its own immunity from attack. It is true that the Minister for Foreign Affairs talked to me very largely of what the Government, as represented by himself, did, and went so far as to say that if the Bolsheviks had not given themselves up he would have sent in to their agency and had them brought out. I suspect Dr. Damluji, however, of an attempt to steal another's glory, particularly as when opposition was first mooted, the cardinal principle laid down, and subsequently applied in the boycott, was that there should be no direct Government intervention. Moreover, I am assured that when the Bolshevik representative saw the Emir Feisal at Mecca he was informed that the Government had no knowledge of the matter, and it is clear that the King in Riyadh was not consulted. Indeed, I should not be surprised if the boat sailed before His Majesty was aware of its arrival.

19. All the evidence, in fact, points to the kaimakam as the hero of the piece. It must be remembered that not only is he the leading authority in the town but he is also its biggest merchant. It was he who was first alarmed at the news of the coming of the "Tomp," and I have little doubt that, realising that if Russian products gained a hold in the Hejaz, he would not only lose heavily on his stock in hand, but also, with the diminution of imports from India, his commission as a leading shipping agent and his share in the profits of his Bombay house, Haji Abdullah went up to Bahra with his mind fully made up and presented his case with such conviction as to bring away almost absolute authority to act in the emergency. After all, excess of zeal on the part of the local authorities would serve as an excellent excuse if ever one were required.

20. There is, however, no reason to suppose that any query will be raised, for I am credibly informed that the Bolshevik representative has already apologised to the Government for the technical breach of the regulations regarding entry of foreigners into the Hejaz. This, in itself, is a significant indication of the attitude which the Soviet Government is likely to adopt. I believe the kaimakam imagines that he has frightened the Bolsheviks away for good and all. It is to be feared that he underrates their persistency. A single rebuff will not cause the Bolsheviks to abandon their scheme for a regular commercial service extending down the eastern coast of the Red Sea as far as Aden. Next time they will be better prepared, and it will then remain to be seen what effective measures can be taken to oppose them. One thing, at any rate, seems certain; that the second stage of Soviet activities in Jeddah, foreshadowed by Mr. Mayers in his despatch No. 26 of the 18th March, 1927, has begun.

21. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo and the Political Resident at Aden.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

[E 5586/644/91]

No. 42.

Acting Consul Jakins to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 134.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 9, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 30th November, 1927.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Jerusalem for transmission to the Royal Air Force Officer Commanding in Palestine and Trans-jordan, Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut, Damascus, Khartum through Port Sudan, Singapore, Lagos (2).

3. An extract of paragraphs 10 to 13 has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. G. JAKINS.

Enclosure in No. 42.

Jeddah Report for period November 1 to 30, 1927.

WITH the arrival of Ibn Saud at Riyadh, after a record-breaking journey which the "Umm-el-Qura," in large headlines, holds up to the admiration of its readers, the wild talk of unrest has subsided. Medina still gives cause for some anxiety, and it is therefore noteworthy that the Kaimakam of Jeddah, who is rapidly becoming the only remaining man in the Hejaz who will deal with the King bluntly, has written to His Majesty strongly urging him not to allow Wahabi fanaticism to impose religious restrictions which may adversely affect the pilgrimage traffic. As the pilgrims are now arriving, it is probable that this timely warning will serve to bring restraint to the city and save the green dome of the prophet for at least one more season.

2. The new religious laws are slowly being lived down. In Jeddah, thanks again to the kaimakam, they have been cancelled, while in Mecca the extreme measures taken in some of the courts of refusing to accept witnesses wearing vicious gold and silver trinkets has been a godsend to many a brazen rogue, for plausible witnesses command a high price to-day.

3. If, however, Ibn Saud keeps peace within his borders, he has had one signal failure beyond them. The Iraq police post at Busaiyah was razed to the ground on the 5th November. At the moment of writing no details have filtered through from Nejd, indeed, the Foreign Minister assures me that he has had no news from Riyadh for three weeks. It seems, however, clear that the incident represents the culminating expression of the suspicion to which the establishment of the post had given rise.

The common view is that the erection of the post was unjustifiable, and however sincere the protestations from the other side of the frontier, there is a unanimous conviction on this side which no explanations or photographs can overcome: Busaiyah was a fortification.

4. The immediate result of the incident is most unfortunate, in that the Koweit Conference has been postponed pending satisfaction on the Busaiyah question; and this double calamity entails the absence of Ibn Saud's delegate at the very moment when his influence as the strongest man in the King's entourage may be most needed.

5. To the south Ibn Saud is himself responsible for wiser councils. On the 26th November Shereef Sharaf, one of the advisers to the Hejaz Government, left for Jizan after some tiresome delays on the part of the Petroleum Company, who, it appears, wish to have their 1928 protection fee paid before a decision is reached in their quarrel with the Idriisi.

6. Other signs of Ibn Saud's interest in Asir are not lacking. I learn that he has recently sent a Syrian doctor to open a hospital at Sobiah, while a wireless station is now working at Jizan.

7. Negotiations for the Italian recognition of Ibn Saud have been resumed, this time by the Italian Consul at Jeddah in correspondence with His Majesty, and

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I understand that a copy of the latest Italian formula has been sent to Riyadh. While, however, the King remains in Nejd it is likely that negotiations will be somewhat protracted.

8. On the representation of this agency the Government have now nominated a separate naqib for Indian pilgrims. Formerly there was one naqib for both Indian and Bokhari mutawwifs, and consequently there are many reasons to be grateful that the Government has agreed to this very desirable separation.

9. A further proof of the Government's interest in the welfare of pilgrims is to be found in the copy of the regulations for the registration of deceased pilgrims and the checking of their effects, which I enclose as an appendix. In requesting me to bring this to the notice of the Governments concerned, the Foreign Minister has asked that in order to facilitate the task of their employees the following suggestions may be followed:—

- (1.) The name of the holder should be written in Arabic on every pilgrim's passport.
- (2.) The name of the pilgrim's heir or executor should similarly be noted.
- (3.) The necessity of properly completing the required forms should be brought to the notice of pilgrims in their passports.
- (4.) The important points of the regulation should be printed in the various pilgrim languages and suitably displayed on shore and in pilgrim vessels.

At this time of year it is perhaps too late to hope that arrangements can be made to meet with all of these four requests. I would, however, suggest that the utmost possible be done to comply with the wishes of the Government in this matter. The Hejaz authorities are daily demonstrating their concern for the pilgrims, and it is therefore the more fitting that every effort should be made to lighten their tasks and to encourage them.

10. So far as residents in Jeddah are concerned, the event of the month has been the initial failure of the Soviet agency to establish a regular commercial service between Odessa, Constantinople and the ports on the east coast of the Red Sea, including, it is said, Aden. During the last pilgrimage season a Bolshevik vessel arrived in Jeddah carrying pilgrims and a certain quantity of flour, which was easily sold. As a result of this visit a Turko-Russian company seems to have been formed with the object of transporting Russian pilgrims and bringing flour and sugar for sale. The project would, without doubt, have succeeded if a member of the Soviet agency had not ostentatiously solicited buyers in the sook, roundly asserting that in their determination to secure the market they were prepared to offer goods at appreciably cheaper rates than those ruling, however much the prices might fall. It was not to be expected that the larger merchants would sit still under this threat. It is true that they could easily have bought up all the Russian stocks, sold at their own price, and covered themselves in future by placing their orders with the Bolsheviks. The chief merchants, however, have also interests in India; and so the kaimakam, who is a shipping agent as well as a merchant and a partner in a Bombay exporting house, led the opposition. With the tacit consent of the Government the subsequent proceedings became a very pleasant game of booting the bear, in which Government officials, an occasional consul, merchants and even lightermen all joined to their own amusement and to the entertainment of the interested spectators, the final kick coming from the Egyptian consul in the form of a wire informing Suez that the ship had left Jeddah without a bill of health. During her stay here a boycott was successfully imposed on the flour, sugar and wood she brought, and four individuals who had come from Russia to establish in Jeddah a branch of the commercial agency were refused permission to remain. There, for the moment, the matter rests, and the Soviet wares remain in the customs, where demurrage charges mount daily on the rot that the rains have started.

11. The incident has had, however, a much wider general acceptance. Nobody imagines that the Bolsheviks came here for purposes of trade. A country with flour and sugar to sell does not, without some reason, seek out buyers in a primitive land where the total yearly consumption amounts to some 80,000 bags. The history of the Soviet agency in Jeddah clearly indicates that a definite attempt was made to establish here a political bureau under the familiar guise of a commercial agency. The fact that the Soviet Chargé in Jeddah admitted that one of the individuals turned back was a sub-director of the Middle-East Section of the Foreign Office at Moscow lends considerable support to this view.

12. The failure of the attempt must be attributed from the Soviet point of view to criminal incompetence on the part of their local representatives and from that of the Hejaz Government to the fortunate accident which sent the Bolsheviks here with no Hejaz visa to their passports and thus provided a good excuse for refusing permission to land. It cannot, however, be hoped that the next ship will come so unprepared, and it will then remain for the Hejaz Government to show that they do not necessarily rely on lucky chances to rescue them from their difficulties. So far as can be gathered at present the masterly policy of the Mecca Foreign Office is to wait and see.

13. Two items of local news might opportunely be mentioned in this connexion. The first, the death in Constantinople of Haji Kassim Zeinal, a relative of the present kaimakam and a very warm supporter of the Bolsheviks. The other, the rumoured appointment of Abd-el-Gani Sunni as agent and consul-general of Turkey for Hejaz, Nejd and Yemen. I also hear that Ibn Saud is being pressed to appoint a diplomatic representative in Constantinople.

14. From Mecca comes the news that the King is being urged to establish an air service between Mecca and Nejd so as to facilitate his visits to Riyadh. As this is accompanied by the report that Sadiq, the King's trusted chauffeur and confidant, is to be sent to England for the necessary training, it would appear that this slippery young gentleman has again been at the Royal ear. Indeed there are signs that the spring will see many fancies turning to thoughts of their loves, for Dr. Damluji hankers on renewing his acquaintance with the Kit-Cat, while the Emir Feisal has imported an Egyptian teacher to rub up his English—presumably not for the benefit of this agency.

15. The "Star" cars, specially made for His Majesty, have arrived and have done something to redress in British interests the balance of car imports, which have shown a disturbing tendency to swing to the American side. Among the cars supplied are several for the King's harem, and it is to be hoped that place will be found for the 149th lady on whom His Majesty has now been pleased to bestow his hand—"la main droite"—of course. An instructive demonstration of the technique of a social climber and advertising specialist might incidentally be observed in the "Times" report on these cars, where the present London manager of the firm concerned builds for himself a giddy social eminence in Royal and distinguished circles on the slender basis of his connexion with the nurse of a Jeddah Dutchman's black baby.

16. November has been marked by a detection of a recent slave route. Danakils have lately been responsible for the arrival at Kufida of dhows containing over 100 slaves. It is distressing to learn that the waiting buyers include most of the leading authorities in Jeddah and Mecca, including the Assistant Viceroy himself. There is apparently very little hope that the Hejazi will spontaneously discard this old and ingrained custom, particularly as he appears to be completely incapable of appreciating that the slave he buys for his pleasure is part of the same shameful traffic as the one he buys for his work. The only consolation to be drawn is that there is a general complaint about the high prices ruling, and that a notorious European member of the consular corps has had to go to the expense of producing from far Syria a "sister" to add to his Abyssinian "aunt" and his "cook" from one of the Somalilands.

17. The number of slaves repatriated during the month of November is two.

APPENDIX.

Regulations for the Registration of Deceased Pilgrims and the Administration of their Effects.

ROYAL orders have been issued sanctioning such regulations on the 28th Rabi Tani, 1346.

In the name of God the Most Merciful and Compassionate.

Royal orders have been issued sanctioning the regulations for the registration of deceased pilgrims and the administration of their effects on the 28th Rabi Tani, 1346.

[17675]

Article 1. The expressions used in these regulations will have the following meanings:—

- (1.) Such regulation will be known as regulation for the registration of deceased pilgrims and for the administration of their effects.
- (2.) Mamour Beit-el-Mal is the person in charge of the registration of deceased pilgrims and the administration of their effects.
- (3.) The pilgrim is the person who comes to the Hejaz for the purpose of performing the pilgrimage in its special season.
- (4.) The word "foreigner" includes everyone who is not the subject of His Majesty the King.
- (5.) The mutawwif is the person authorised by the Government to practice the profession of being in charge of pilgrims in the pilgrimage season.
- (6.) The passport is the document which the pilgrim taken from his Government to show his description, name and profession and so on.
- (7.) The effects are the movables which the deceased pilgrim leaves.
- (8.) The word "mutawwif" wherever it is mentioned in this regulation includes his agent, representative or whoever acts for him.

Art. 2. Every mutawwif has to write a list in duplicate as per form No. 1 attached to this regulation giving the names of the pilgrims who come to him.

Art. 3. The mutawwif will be held responsible by the Government if the pilgrim becomes lost or if loss is caused to him through the mutawwif's will or negligence. The mutawwif must forward the necessary information about every pilgrim under his charge when required by the Government to do so.

Art. 4. The mutawwif will keep the lists referred to in article 2 until the Government requests him to forward the original copy of the same.

Art. 5. Every mutawwif has to give to the pilgrims under his charge forms in addition to those mentioned in article 2, so that every pilgrim may write down all the movables which he carries. He will then sign the form which will be referred to when necessary. Such forms will be in accordance with the specimen No. 2 attached to this regulation.

Art. 6. When a pilgrim dies his mutawwif must do the following:—

- (1.) Notify the Health Department of his death by a note similar to the specimen No. 3 attached to this regulation for the purpose of obtaining permission for burial.
- (2.) Bring together, in a meeting, the heir of the deceased or his guardian (if he has an heir or guardian: in that case their names will appear on the passport of the deceased or in any other document proving that they are the heir or guardian), and two more men of the companions or relatives of the deceased in order that a declaration may be made checking the effects of the deceased as mentioned in the list referred to in the above article.

Art. 7. After notifying the Health Department and obtaining permission for burial, the mutawwif must inform the Mamour Beit-el-Mal of the death and forward to him the declaration of the effects of the deceased in order that the latter may take the necessary steps to take charge of such effects.

Art. 8. If the death occurs in travelling, the camel contractor and the mutawwif's agent are responsible for keeping the effects and writing the declaration in order that it may be forwarded, together with the effects, to the nearest Beit-el-Mal station.

Art. 9. If the deceased is one of those who has no mutawwif, the officials of the Police, Health and Municipality Departments are responsible for keeping the effects and delivering the same to the nearest police station, where a declaration for the effects has to be written and forwarded with the effects to the nearest Beit-el-Mal station.

Art. 10. Mamour Beit-el-Mal must write down the names of the deceased people, about whom he is informed, in daily lists in which details concerning every deceased pilgrim are to be written. In writing such lists the subjects of each Government must be put in a special paper in order to facilitate making the monthly lists and checking the same. In such lists the details mentioned in specimen No. 4 attached with this regulation must be written down.

Art. 11. After the Mamour Beit-el-Mal has written the descriptions of the deceased as mentioned in the above article and the declaration of the effects has been handed to him, he will receive the effects mentioned in the declaration and keep them in safe custody for necessary action to be taken concerning them and for their delivery to the authorities concerned when necessary.

Art. 12. If anybody claims to be the heir of the deceased or his guardian, he has to prove this in court. The Mamour Beit-el-Mal has no right to hand any of the effects to those people who claim to be heirs or guardians until the court has issued its judgment.

Art. 13. The court will not issue a judgment in favour of the claiming heirs or guardians until they have produced the "Sharia" (religious) evidence and after the court has made certain from the passport of the deceased about the names of the heirs or guardians and after it has seen their passports as well so as to ensure that they are the persons mentioned in the passport of the deceased pilgrim or in an official document endorsed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Art. 14. The court should not be satisfied with the witness of two people from the country of the deceased as a sufficient proof on which to base its judgment nor consider as proved the heirship or guardianship of those who claim the same, but it has to take a guarantee from two additional persons of the country to guarantee that the witnesses are true in what they say and are not telling lies.

Art. 15. Those people who cannot prove their heirship or guardianship by official written documents issued by the authorities concerned of the countries to which they belong will not be handed the effects of the deceased to whom they claim to be the heirs or guardians. Such effects will be kept at Beit-el-Mal in order that they may be delivered to the legal heirs of the deceased through the authorities concerned.

Art. 16. The court will write its judgment approving the heirship or the guardianship on the model of the document shown in the specimen form No. 4 attached to this regulation. After such judgment has been passed by the court, the Mamour Beit-el-Mal will hand the effects to the person in whose favour the judgment has been issued against a receipt, a copy of which is written on the back of the form No. 2 mentioned in article 5. The judgment paper is to be attached with the declaration of the effects.

Art. 17. The Mamour Beit-el-Mal will write down in the special place in the daily lists of registering deceased pilgrims (form No. 6) the disposal of the effects, whether approved for delivery or not, and he has to put down the number of the Sharia document proving same in the proper place.

Art. 18. Before the end of the last day in every month, the Mamour Beit-el-Mal will forward through the court to the office of the Viceroy a general monthly list in duplicate showing the names of the deceased pilgrims and giving the subjects of every country separately. Such lists are to be compiled from the forms No. 4 before mentioned.

Art. 19. If new entries happen to come after the monthly lists containing the names of the deceased whose heirs or guardians have not been proved, they will be written in special lists for the next month, and a note must be written to say that such names have already been forwarded in the list number so-and-so, in the names of so-and-so.

Art. 20. After the lapse of the pilgrim season a committee composed of the employees of the Beit-el-Mal and representatives from the municipality and the Government will be constituted to liquidate the remaining work of the Beit-el-Mal. Such committee will prepare the final result and will give the number of the deceased pilgrims of every nationality and the quantities of the effects already delivered and those which are still kept by Beit-el-Mal, and will mention the names of their owners in detail as per specimen form No. 4. This committee has to finish its work in a period ending by the month of Moharram every year.

Art. 21. These lists of effects will be forwarded by the courts to the Viceroy's office for necessary action.

Art. 22. On delivery of the effects, a statement is to be written by the Government authorities and the authorities concerned, who will act as intermediary to deliver the effects to the rightful owners. The forwarder and the recipient will both sign two copies of the statement and each party will keep a copy.

Art. 23. Those people found lying prostrated on the ground who can be identified will be treated in the same way, as explained in the above-mentioned articles, with regard to the delivery of their effects.

Art. 24. People found lying prostrated on the ground whose names are not known and who cannot be identified will have their effects kept at Beit-el-Mal until the heir or guardian can be legally proved and obtain a judgment to receive the effects. If no heir or guardian can be found, the effects will be kept for a period of not more than six months and then be sold by auction by a special committee, and the proceeds will be handed to the Finance Department.

Art. 25. After the effects have been disposed of the employees of Beit-el-Mal will begin entering the names of the deceased pilgrims and their effects in the big registers used at Beit-el-Mal in the ordinary way. The various forms and lists should be kept in such manner as to render reference prompt, easy and accurate.

Art. 26. The fees to be collected by Beit-el-Mal on the pilgrim's effects are as follows:—

- 5 per cent. on cash.
- 2½ per cent. on the price of the ticket.
- 5 per cent. on the value of the movables.
- 2 per cent. for brokerage and appraising movables is to be paid to the appraiser.

Art. 27. Anybody who is proved guilty of deception, stealing or forging or cheating in the matter of the pilgrim's effects, whether he is a mutawwif or his agent, or of the police, or an employee of the municipality, will be punished by being discharged from his post, compelled to refund the value of the effects in question, and will be fined a certain sum which the Government will impose on him, together with the punishment it considers fit.

Art. 28. The employees of the Jeddah Beit-el-Mal should come up to Mecca to help their colleagues from the 5th Zel Heja every year.

Art. 29. The forms and the lists referred to in this regulation will be printed and put into force from the beginning of Rajab next, 1346.

Art. 30. The Viceroy has to take the necessary steps to have this regulation applied, together with Chapter 5 of the decree issued on the 14th Safar, 1346, regarding the organisation of the Sharia Courts.

CHAPTER II.—SYRIA.

[E 2964/44/89]

No. 43.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 24, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 26 of the 28th January, I have the honour to report that M. Ponsot, French High Commissioner, arrived unostentatiously at Beirut on the 21st June after an absence of some five months.

2. He continues to maintain his usual reserve, and so far has given absolutely no indication of his intentions. This uncertainty is undoubtedly a source of discomfort to many, among whom may be included most of the higher native functionaries, who do not yet know whether the de Jouvenel Constitution will be so modified as to lose them their very comfortable jobs.

3. M. Ponsot will probably proceed at an early date to Damascus. It is believed that his new delegate there is to be M. Maugras, formerly French consul-general in Palestine and French Minister to Persia. He is at present going there as acting delegate. M. Pierre Alype, the retiring delegate, left yesterday for Paris.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Damascus and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4573/74/65]

No. 44.

Consul, Aleppo, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Aleppo, October 27, 1927.

OWING to serious situation in Kurdistan a Turkish delegation is now in Aleppo seeking extra facilities for transport of troops, &c., by rail through Syrian territory. I am not sure of the attitude of the French, but believe it unfavourable. (Repeated to Constantinople and Bagdad.)

[E 4671/72/44]

No. 45.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 70.)

Sir,

Aleppo, October 24, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of the 15th March last on the subject of the Bagdad Railway, I have the honour to report that the Paris Office has now authorised the putting in order of the stretch from Derbessieh to Nisibin. It is believed that a change in the board of directors led to this reversal of the previous decision to spend no money on this project.

2. The amount sanctioned is said to be 900,000 fr., which will be sufficient for the cheaper scheme lately proposed by Mr. Folliet (see paragraph 4 of my previous despatch under reference). I am informed that the work will be completed by next June, after which regular train services will be run to Nisibin.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Constantinople (No. 19), Bagdad (No. 57), Beirut (No. 84) and Damascus (No. 71).

I have, &c.

W. HOUGH.

[E 4745/44/89]

No. 46.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 169.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 25, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that the revision of the Lebanese Constitution of the 23rd May, 1926 (the de Jouvenel Constitution) has at last taken place. That this was in the air was mentioned in the fourth paragraph of my despatch No. 141 of the 28th July. The heat of the dog-days, coupled with a natural disinclination on the part of some of those concerned to cut their own throats, caused things to hang fire for some time, but, finally, some six weeks ago the President of the Lebanese Republic presented both to the Senate and to the Chamber of Deputies a scheme of revision which had been approved in Paris. Then began a series of unofficial discussions of the scheme, both by Senators and Deputies, which threatened to be both prolonged and sterile. At this stage the High Commissioner appears to have intervened through Colonel Catroux, head of the Intelligence Service, and to have let it be known that, if the two Chambers could not put the scheme through, he could and would. It is even said that a definite date, the 15th October, was fixed by which everything was to be finished.

2. However this may be, there was at once a distinctly changed atmosphere. On the 6th October the Senate met at 10 o'clock and dispersed again three hours later, after having unanimously pronounced itself in favour of discussing the revision scheme. The Chamber of Deputies met late on the 7th October, and it, too, decided, by 21 votes to 7, in favour of the discussion of the scheme.

3. These preliminaries over, summonses to attend a joint meeting of both Chambers, which is known as the National Assembly, were issued for the 10th October. The Assembly duly met and appointed a commission to study the scheme and report within twenty-four hours. The report did not, however, come before the Assembly until the morning of the 13th October. The Assembly at once got to work, and by the same evening had disposed of the principal articles of the scheme, including those dealing with such debatable matters as the nomination by the President of one-third of the members of the one Chamber with which the Lebanon will henceforth be provided, and the right of the President alone to dissolve that Chamber in certain eventualities. The High Commissioner's delegate intervened in the latter question, pointing out that dissolution was foreseen in cases where the Chamber took any action likely to endanger the security of the mandate. An article as to the collective responsibility of the Ministry was voted with the addition that the Ministry must contain a majority of persons belonging to the Chamber.

4. On the 14th October, at 9.30 P.M., the Assembly finished its discussion of the scheme and voted for its adoption. Apparently the two most important matters then discussed were the circumstances in which a dissolution of the Chamber could be brought about and the question of how the situation created by a failure of the Chamber to vote the budget before the end of its session should be met. The scheme laid down that in such a case the President of the Republic could issue a decree bringing the budget as presented to the Chamber into force. The Assembly voted in favour of an extra month being given to the Chamber, after the end of the session, in which to finish dealing with the budget.

5. The proceedings above described, which were in due course confirmed by the President of the Republic, having left the Lebanon provided with but one Chamber, composed of forty-five members, of whom fifteen, corresponding to the former Senators, are nominated, the next step was the election of the president of that Chamber. The candidates were Sheikh Mohammed-el-Jisr, the former president of the Senate, and M. Moussa Nammour, the former president of the Chamber. There was apparently some intervention by the High Commissioner's delegate. In any event, the sheikh, who is a Moslem, won the day and was elected by 21 votes to 18.

6. The first step towards the revision of the unsuitable and costly Constitution with which the Lebanon was somewhat hurriedly provided by M. de Jouvenel has now been taken. Presumably the present phase is only a transitory one, and steps will in due course be taken to decrease the number both of Deputies and of Ministers, which is excessive. The cost is also excessive, and the Lebanon is not a rich country. But, naturally, retrenchment will be unpopular, so that things will move slowly. Further, M. Ponsot himself appears to be a cautious man, and averse to rapid decisions. I have heard it said, and it seems reasonable, that one of the main reasons

why he was anxious to get on with the revision of the Lebanese Constitution was that the question of a Constitution for Syria will soon come on the tapis, and that he did not wish to be faced with a demand for two Syrian Chambers, as would have been the case if the Lebanon had possessed two.

7. I imagine that in due course the Lebanese Constitution as now altered will be printed, and when this occurs I will send home a copy for record. It will then be clearer than it is at present what other modifications, apart from those already mentioned, have been made.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4744/44/89]

No. 47.

Mr. Henderson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 640.)

Sir,

Ramleh, October 29, 1927.

A SERIOUS split has occurred in the "Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress." Although personal factors have no doubt played a part in this development, it would seem that the division is between those who, in despair, want to come to terms with France and the die-hards, who are for no compromise.

2. In Egypt the die-hards are led by Sheikh Rashid Rida, editor of the "Manar." He and some of his uncompromising colleagues have, it would appear, long been perturbed by the reported efforts of "Emir" Michel Lotfallah to come to terms with the French Government. The committee's delegation in Europe, headed by Emir Shekib Arslan, shared the apprehensions of the extremists here, and reported that the Lotfallah Brothers were endeavouring to secure an acceptance of the French terms by the committee merely with a view to obtaining for one of the brothers, from a grateful France, the principality of the "Greater Lebanon." They were accused of exploiting in their own interest the sacrifices of the Syrian martyrs.

3. The extremists' resentment was increased by an interview which Michel Lotfallah gave to a correspondent of the Beirut newspaper the "Maarad," supporting the maintenance of the present frontiers of the "Greater Lebanon." He subsequently refused to publish a declaration to the effect that his statements to the Beirut paper represented only his personal views.

4. The death, in August, of Neguib Shoucair, the secretary and mainstay of the committee, removed the one man whose tact and skill might have reconciled the conflicting elements.

5. Finally, on the 19th October, the schismatics, consisting of Sheikh Rashid Rida, Assad Dagher, Khair-ed-Din Karkali and Gamal-el-Husseini, met at the sheikh's house and voted the deposition of Michel Lotfallah from the presidency of the committee, leaving him, however, the quality of member. Assad Dagher was elected secretary of the committee thus modified.

6. Michel Lotfallah retorted by summoning a meeting of his partisans in the committee. This meeting elected Wahba-el-Issa to the post of secretary, and Dr. Shahbader as a new member to fill the vacancy created by the death of Neguib Shoucair. The fourth member of the committee as established at this meeting is Towfiq-el-Yazghi. This combination has been approved, and the behaviour of the schismatics condemned by the Bakris and by an influential Syrian group at Amman, including the Rikabi family.

7. There are thus two rival groups in the field, both claiming to be the "Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress." Possibly this confusion will be ended by some change of nomenclature, and the representative characters of the two groups be thus defined more clearly.

8. The significance of the schism lies in the personalities of those who have rallied to the cause of compromise with the French. Dr. Shahbader was the civil leader of the rebellion. You are familiar with the active rôle played by the Bakris in the warfare, including the attack on Damascus in October 1925. Their houses and property have been either destroyed or sequestered by the French. The Rikabis have had to suffer all kinds of vexations, including imprisonment, for their anti-French attitudes. These are the elements which have been in contact with the realities of the rebellion and its sufferings. The schismatics, on the other hand, are, on the whole, men of the doctrinaire, literary type, who have not had to suffer the immediate reactions of a ruthless warfare. The Lotfallahs themselves are, of course, of a

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peculiar species and cannot be regarded as genuine Nationalists, whether of the realist or doctrinaire kind. They are out for their own personal advantage, for notoriety. They also cherish fantastic dreams of Syrian or Lebanese principalities. Their espousal of the cause of moderation shows that they see no further opportunities in extremism for the advancement of their personal ambitions, which they no doubt now hope to further by co-operation with the French.

9. It is obvious that France has now a great opportunity, if she can overcome the feelings of vindictiveness which are so strong in the French nature. Without the acquiescence of these Damascene exiles, feudal lords and political leaders, France can hardly hope to establish in Syria a régime which will admit of any real popular participation in the government of the country. These exiles, no doubt in despair and without any enthusiasm for France, are, it would seem, now prepared to go a long way in the direction of conciliation. A Marshal Lyautey would seize the opportunity, perhaps fleeting, to establish Franco-Syrian relations on a mutually tolerable basis.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general, Beirut, and to His Majesty's consul, Damascus.

I have, &c.

NEVILLE HENDERSON,
Acting High Commissioner.

[E 4791/44/89]

No. 48.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 172.)

Sir,

Beirut, October 31, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 169 of the 25th October relative to the modification of the Lebanese Constitution, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the Lebanese "Official Journal,"* containing the Law of the 17th October, which gives effect to the decisions of the National Assembly mentioned in my despatch under reference.

2. The text of the original Constitution was sent to you in my confidential despatch No. 199 of the 22nd October, 1926. A good many of the alterations now made are rendered necessary by the fact that the Lebanon now has one Chamber instead of two. Of the others, the following are the more important, the numbers being those of the articles of the present law:—

Article 5, which lays down the number of Ministers to be taken from the Chamber. At present there must be four; article 9, which prolongs the second session of the Chamber until the end of the year; article 29, relative to the reasons for a dissolution of the Chamber; article 31, which gives the President the right to request the Chamber *once* to reconsider a law already voted by it; article 32, concerning the procedure by which the President can render executory an urgent Bill not passed by the Chamber within forty days; article 34, rendering the Ministers jointly responsible to the Chamber for the general policy of the Government as well as, as heretofore, individually responsible for their own acts; article 37, which lays down that a vote of non-confidence emanating from the Chamber requires a two-thirds majority and not one of three-quarters; articles 41, 42 and 43, relative to a modification of the Constitution; and articles 46–48, dealing with financial matters. By article 48 it is laid down that if the budget is not voted by the end of the second ordinary session—that is, by the end of the year—an extraordinary session of the Chamber lasting one month can be convened. If nothing is then achieved, the President brings the budget into force.

3. It will be noticed that under article 2 of the law, which lays down that there are two kinds of Deputies, elected and nominated, it is stated that the number of the latter is to be half that of the former. At present the respective numbers are thirty and fifteen. The article permits of a reduction to more reasonable figures, and article 51 lays down that for the present the hitherto existing Senate and Chamber are united to form one Chamber.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

* Not printed.

[E 5086/74/65]

No. 49.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir,

Aleppo, November 8, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Turco-French Mixed Commission has just met at Aleppo to discuss certain questions of routine in connection with the application of the treaty agreement regarding movements of Turkish troops across Syrian territory by rail.

2. It is known here in a general way that the internal situation in the eastern vilayets remains very serious, but no detailed information can be obtained, as the Turks prohibit very strictly any movement between those provinces and Syria. Hence it was correctly anticipated that the Turks would strive their hardest at that conference to secure an interpretation of the agreement which in practice would amount to a modification of its terms. These are, I understand, that small units may pass without previous notice, forty-eight hours' notice being compulsory for slightly larger units and five days' notice for more considerable forwardings of troops or material.

3. I am informed by M. Reclus that all such efforts on the part of the Turkish military authorities were politely but firmly resisted, and the business of the conference was limited to its proper field of routine and detail, certain innocuous concessions only being granted for the sake of courtesy, such as the waiver of notice for hospital trains moving west.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Constantinople, No. 20, Bagdad, No. 60, Beirut, No. 88, and Damascus, No. 77.

I have, &c.

W. HOUGH.

[E 5450/44/89]

No. 50.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, November 28, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that certain changes in the staff of the French High Commission have at last been made by M. Ponsot.

2. M. de Reffye's long tenure of office as secretary-general has finally come to an end. He left Beirut for good a week or so ago after a short stay devoted mainly to packing up his belongings and saying good-bye to his friends. Despite his shortcomings, he certainly served his country well here. He was extremely hard-working, and he bore the brunt of the Sarraïl and de Jouvenel régimes. Also, he was left in charge for long periods with extra work and responsibility but without the possibility of taking a definite line of his own. Although always busy to the point of overwork, he was invariably courteous. He has been talked of for Cairo and Addis Ababa, to either of which posts he would be glad to go, but is apparently to be left unemployed for a time, which will at any rate give him a rest.

3. In his place there are now two secretaries-general, one M. Maugras, at one time French consul-general at Jerusalem and more recently French Minister at Tehran, and the other a M. Tetreau, who came here from Barcelona, where he was French consul-general. M. Maugras will deal with the internal political work and M. Tetreau with the administrative side of things. As regards the former, it is unnecessary for me to add anything to the remarks made by Sir R. H. Clive in his 1926 report on the heads of foreign missions at Tehran, unless it be to say that M. Maugras is no longer a bachelor, the strange adventure of matrimony having, as he put it, recently befallen him. As for M. Tetreau, who is less attractive both in manner and appearance than his colleague, it would appear at first sight that he rates the dignity and importance of his new office rather highly. In addition to the two secretaries-general, there is also a M. Hoppenot, formerly of the French Embassy at Berlin, who holds the post of head of the Diplomatic Bureau, which means that, in the first instance, at any rate, he deals with questions raised by or affecting the foreign consular representatives. The assistant secretary-general, M. Lépiessier, who is a consul, remains for the present and presumably acts as a general maid-of-

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all-work, a rôle to which by now he must be pretty well accustomed. The secretary-general was certainly overwhelmed by a mass of detail and routine work, and no doubt the duplication of the post was necessary.

4. The result of this was that internal political work got largely into the hands of the Intelligence Service, which not only collected information but also apparently had much to say in the matter of policy. Colonel Catroux, the head of the service, has just left for France to take up a military command. He is reputed to know Syria well and should do so, as he has seen much of the country. When I first met him he was the High Commissioner's "delegate" at Damascus. The fact that he has gone and that M. Maugras has been given the duties already mentioned seem to show that the High Commissioner wishes that policy should henceforth be decided by the civilian rather than by the military element. It is believed that Colonel Arnaud, assistant head of the Intelligence Service, will succeed Colonel Catroux. He is quite another type of man, solid but apparently not brilliant. Although Colonel Catroux was always friendly and courteous, I never felt that he was really sincere or friendly to us. I fancy that all the three British liaison officers who have served here and who have naturally seen more of him than I have felt the same.

5. There is a new Financial Adviser, a M. Le Bec, who has succeeded M. Maurin, who in any case was due to retire this year. There is also a new Adviser for Public Works in place of M. Vasselet, who has recently been attached to the Lebanese Government. The High Commissioner has placed at the disposal of that Government a very considerable sum, derived from the extra customs revenue which was being "blocked" for public debt payments, to be used for an ambitious programme of road construction on modern lines, and M. Vasselet's duty is presumably to see that the money is spent as usefully as possible and not frittered away.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad and Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 5484/44/89]

No. 51.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 2513.)

Sir,

Paris, December 20, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 15th December the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate considered the present situation in Syria. A Senator, who had recently returned from a visit to Syria and the Lebanon, pointed out how necessary it was for France to give as soon as possible some proof of her intention to set up the organic statute for the whole area, and thus to fulfil the terms of the mandate entrusted to her. This Senator also called attention to the unsatisfactory state of affairs at present prevalent in the judicial and economic spheres.

2. M. de Jouvenel, the late High Commissioner at Beirut, spoke in the same sense, and pressed for the early creation of some definite organic Constitution. He argued that the question of the frontiers between the different States should be settled without delay once and for all, that something should be done to restore economic prosperity to the territory, and that a treaty should be made between France and Syria. Finally, M. de Jouvenel emphasised the necessity for remaining on good terms with the various neighbours of Syria and, in particular, with Ibn Saud.

3. The commission passed a resolution expressing the hope that the organic statute, as provided for by the terms of the mandate, might shortly be drawn up.

4. No doubt inspired by this discussion in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate, two interesting articles on Syria have recently appeared in the Paris press—one in the "Journal" of the 16th December and the other in the "Temps" of the 17th December, the first being written by M. Barthélemy, vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies. Both these articles take the line that, though it is indisputable that France has done a great deal in Syria and the Lebanon from the material point of view and has effected very considerable improvements of this nature in the mandated areas, yet, on the political side, French policy has been uncertain and vacillating, and has failed to please or satisfy either the inhabitants of the State of Syria or the normally francophile Lebanese. Both articles urge that the organic statute should be drawn up without

further delay, since otherwise France will be failing to justify her position in the mandated area. The "Temps," in particular, calls attention to the discontent which is gradually spreading everywhere in Syria and the Lebanon in regard to the inaction of the French in this connexion. M. Barthélemy also refers to the highly unsatisfactory state of the economic situation and to the many difficulties which have arisen in regard to the administration of justice.

5. These two articles, which sound a warning in regard to Syria and call attention to the potential difficulties of the situation, are of interest, since for a long time past little or no attention has been paid by the French press to Syria.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

CHAPTER III.—IRAQ.

[E 4511/122/65]

No. 52.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople).

(No. 86.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 28, 1927.

YOUR despatch No. 520 of 18th October: Protest to Turkish Government regarding frontier incident at Arush.

Unless you see local objection, you should inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government, to whom matter has been referred, view with grave anxiety general attitude of Turkish authorities in regard to districts recently allotted to Turkey by Frontier Delimitation Commission. They take particularly serious view of present incident in which armed Turkish soldiers violated the frontier.

They must urgently press for release and return to Iraq of captive refugees, and trust that strict orders will be issued to Turkish frontier authorities to avoid similar incidents in future in areas where line has recently been adjusted in favour of Turkey.

[E 4641/122/65]

No. 53.

Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, November 1, 1927.

YOUR telegram No. 86.

I have spoken to Minister for Foreign Affairs as instructed. He said that he had already called for report, and undertook to send urgent instructions that if the facts were as stated captives should be released.

[E 4702/86/65]

No. 54.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 2747.)

My Lord Marquess,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1927.

M. DE FLEURIAU mentioned to me to-day the interest which in consequence of their mandatory position in Syria the French Government necessarily felt in the conversations which were now proceeding between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq in regard to Iraq's possible entry into the League. He said that the French Government would be very grateful if they could have early information of any change that was contemplated. To him, personally, it appeared almost impossible that the League should admit as a member a State which was under mandate or guardianship ("tutelle").

I replied that I quite understood the interest which the French Government felt in the matter and that I would endeavour to give him early information as to the trend of the negotiations on this point.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 4870/86/65]

No. 55.

IRAQ: TREATY REVISION.

Meeting held at Foreign Office, November 10, 1927.

Present:

Sir Austen Chamberlain.
Mr. Ormsby-Gore.
Sir Hugh Trenchard.
Sir Henry Dobbs.
Sir John Shuckburgh.
Mr. Oliphant.
Captain Holt.

His Majesty King Feisal.
Ja'far Pasha.
Rustam Bey Haidar.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, after welcoming King Feisal, invited His Majesty to open the discussion.

KING FEISAL thanked Sir A. Chamberlain for his reception. He referred to the negotiations in progress between Sir H. Dobbs and Ja'far Pasha. Both parties, he said, had put forward drafts of a revised treaty; but the two drafts appeared to proceed on different principles. He referred to his conversation with Sir Henry Dobbs at Bagdad in March last. His wish had always been to negotiate on the lines of that conversation, and he had come to England under the impression that this basis was accepted also by His Majesty's Government. He asked whether he was correct in his impression.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN replied that the basis on which His Majesty's Government were prepared to negotiate was that of the communication made to the Iraq Government by the Acting High Commissioner after receiving Mr. Amery's telegraphic instructions of July last. The main conditions were threefold, viz.:—

1. His Majesty's Government are unable for the present to press the candidature of Iraq for admission to the League of Nations.
2. Whatever changes may be made, the treaty powers conferred upon His Majesty's Government for the purpose of enabling them to discharge their obligations towards the League of Nations must remain intact.
3. Where no agreement can be reached as to the modification of any particular clause or provision, the text of the existing treaty must remain operative. In other words, there can be no change without the agreement of both parties.

KING FEISAL realised that it was impracticable for Great Britain to press, for the moment, the claims of Iraq to membership of the League; but he would like to ask when it would be practicable. Secondly, he enquired whether he was to understand Sir Austen's second condition as meaning that no article in the old treaty that dealt with our international obligations could even be discussed.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN replied that that was not his meaning. We were prepared to discuss any modifications, but with the reservation that our powers in respect of international obligations must be preserved.

KING FEISAL said that, since agreement had now been reached as to the basis on which negotiations were to proceed, he would like to start discussions all over again on this changed principle. If any point arose on which agreement could not be reached, he would refer to His Majesty's Government for guidance as to policy underlying Mr. Amery's instructions. (He instanced the question of foreign relations, as to which he was willing to give us all the facilities required.) On the question of form, the King said that treaty provisions might be drawn in very general and elastic terms, or they might be stated with great precision. In the existing treaty, the latter alternative had been adopted, and the British draft of the revised treaty followed the same line. He himself favoured greater elasticity.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN thought that the King must be under some misapprehension as to the basis on which we had entered the discussions. The principles which he had laid down, and which he understood the King to accept, were those which had, in fact, guided the Dobbs-Ja'far conversations. His Majesty's Government were prepared to continue discussions on that basis, and to endeavour

to negotiate a treaty in terms that would cause King Feisal the minimum of difficulty, provided always that the guarantees essential to themselves were preserved. If the Iraqi representative would bring a spirit of conciliation and goodwill to the discussions with Sir H. Dobbs, he was sure that a new treaty could be concluded which the King could take back with him to Bagdad as a clear indication that real progress had been made (1) in the relations between Great Britain and Iraq, and (2) in the national development of Iraq itself.

He would now deal with the origin and character of our obligations towards the League of Nations. He would remind King Feisal that our treaty with him was in substitution for the ordinary form of mandate, as applied to other territories similarly placed. The origin and conception of the mandatory system was stated in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the following terms:—

"To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant."

In other words, it was provided in respect of Iraq and other territories, that the Government charged with the duty of supervision and tutelage was responsible for its charge to the civilised nations of the world.

The article further provided as follows:—

"In every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge. The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council."

In the execution of this trust and in the discharge of this obligation the mandatory Power had to render a report each year to the Permanent Mandates Commission, which in turn reported to the Council on the manner in which the trust had been discharged. The King would see that the strictest obligations had been imposed upon the British Government, who were called upon year by year to render an account of the manner in which their obligations had been fulfilled. In our desire to discharge our duties in the manner most agreeable to King Feisal and his people, we had converted our relationship with Iraq into a treaty relationship, in replacement of the usual form of a mandate. But before the Council of the League would accept this arrangement they had insisted on being satisfied that the treaty did in fact reproduce the conditions which a mandate would have contained, and was the equivalent of a mandate.

He would now come to a later stage in the history of Iraq's relations with the League. It was one absolutely vital to Iraq. By the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey agreed that the boundary of Iraq should be determined by the Council of the League. The King was no doubt aware of the long consideration which the Council had given the matter. He (Sir Austen) could speak with direct personal knowledge on this point, for he had been at Geneva during all the critical discussions on the subject and had been closely associated with his colleague, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Had it not been for Mr. Amery's very able defence of the interests of Iraq, and for the insistent and continuous support of the British Government, Iraq, as we know it, would not now exist. There was for long a grave danger that a very large portion, if not the whole, of the Mosul Vilayet would be given to Turkey, and Iraq left mutilated, weak, and exposed to attack. It required all the influence of the British Government to avert that disaster and to secure a decision favourable to Iraq; and even the British Government was only able to accomplish this object on condition of giving certain explicit assurances to the League. It was the League, and not the British Government, which insisted that if the Mosul Vilayet were awarded to Iraq, the British Government should undertake, unless relieved by the League at an earlier date, to continue to act as mandatory for not less than twenty-five years. It was the League that insisted, and not the British Government that asked, that assurances should be given for the proper treatment of minorities and for the future administration of the Kurds. These were matters which the British Government would have been content to leave for settlement between the Iraq

Government and themselves. But they were conditions without which the Council would not give Mosul to Iraq, and failing which Iraq would have been left a mutilated trunk, perpetually menaced by an unsound frontier, deprived of a province necessary to her economical development, and crippled from her birth. Mr. Amery and himself had to conduct a great struggle at Geneva to secure a favourable decision. So insistent was the League on these engagements being undertaken by the British Government in a most solemn manner that, even after Mr. Amery (who was the authorised spokesman of Great Britain) had given the necessary pledge, the Council required his pledge to be confirmed by Sir Austen himself as Foreign Secretary and the Minister with whom foreign Powers were accustomed to deal. The King would see that the obligations imposed upon us were obligations that we could have escaped only if we had been willing to sacrifice Iraq and cut her territory in two; that they were solemnly undertaken before the assembled nations; and that it would be impossible for the British Government to withdraw from. We could not change the treaty accepted by the Council except with the Council's assent, and we must be in a position to satisfy the Council, when asking them to agree to modifications of the old treaty, that the terms of the new treaty enabled us to keep our engagements. We must be able to point to a text which would reassure them. It would be of no use to conclude with King Feisal a treaty so vague in its terms that the Council could not accept it as a fulfilment of our obligations. The King would see that it was not necessary merely to reassure the British Government, but also necessary, through the British Government, to reassure the Council.

KING FEISAL agreed with Sir Austen Chamberlain that there was room for the spirit of compromise and conciliation, and that if that spirit inspired the discussions a solution would be reached. He asked for Sir Austen Chamberlain's indulgence while he spoke on the subject of the League of Nations. His views on this subject were those of Iraq and of the Arabs as a whole. He was aware that Sir Austen was one of the staunchest supporters of the League, and for this reason he feared that some of his remarks on the subject might give offence. He begged, however, to be allowed to speak freely in order to make his position quite clear.

He had been in Paris during the Peace Conference and had participated in the discussions regarding the Arabs. The Council of Ten had asked him on one occasion for a statement of the Arab claims. He had replied briefly that the Arabs were not sheep and did not expect to be divided up into sections under the tutelage of different European Powers. They had fought for independence and had not expected merely to change masters. They needed the help of the West in the creation of one living independent Arab State. This had taken place before the League of Nations had come into existence. When the League was founded and the mandatory system was promulgated, King Feisal had protested to the utmost of his power that the Arabs did not accept article 22 of the Covenant, or the mandatory principle, as applicable to their territories. He had foreseen that the inevitable consequence would be the division of the Arab people into various, perhaps numerous, States under different European Powers. As he had foreseen, so it had happened. The Arabs were not satisfied with the position. They did not recognise the mandates, nor did they accept article 22 of the Covenant as fulfilling their aspirations. They had placed their fate in the hands of Great Britain, not in those of Germany or anybody else, and it was to Great Britain that they looked for fulfilment of their aspirations. They could not regard the League with favour, seeing that its policy had resulted in the division of their own people and had destroyed their national unity and entity. The League made no appeal to their sympathy and was not regarded as sympathetic towards themselves. In these circumstances, he would not discuss in detail the text of the Covenant. He recognised that the results of the Covenant could not be undone; but it was to Great Britain that he and his Government looked for help and assistance. It was his firm conviction that the mandates had not been given by the League, but that the principal Allied Powers had distributed them among themselves at San Remo. In these circumstances, he could not feel that the mandates were actually a gift from the League. Would the League now be prepared to ask the Arab people whom they wished to have as a mandatory? Neither he nor the Iraq Government had ever accepted the authority of the mandate or the authority of the League to give mandates. It was to Great Britain, and to Great Britain alone, that they looked for guidance and help. It was not to the League. If, therefore, Great Britain wished to build up relations with Iraq on the basis of mandates and League principles it would be impossible for him to agree. He asked pardon for the length and vigour of his remarks concerning the League, but he wished to lay stress on what were not

only his personal views but the views of all the Arabs. British responsibility was towards the Arabs. He could not recognise the responsibility that Great Britain might have entered into with other States. He had come to England in a happy and hopeful mood to negotiate a revision of the treaty. He wished to go on with the negotiation, but he could not enter into the question of Great Britain's relations with the League, which were not his affair and concerned Great Britain and the League alone.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN was content not to join issue with King Feisal on these points provided His Majesty recognised that we, at any rate, were concerned, and that, as we had undertaken obligations towards the League, so we should maintain them. The King would have little faith in a Government which made a treaty only to break it, and would mistrust our word to himself if we failed to keep faith with others.

KING FEISAL thanked Sir Austen Chamberlain for what he had said. He wished to be as frank and clear as possible. He recognised that our obligations existed and wished to do nothing to interfere with our due fulfilment of them. He recognised that Great Britain's undertakings with the League were of greater force and weight than his own pledges to his people. If it were found impossible to reach an agreement which would meet his point of view, and at the same time safeguard British obligations, then he recognised that the existing treaty would have to stand; but in that case Great Britain would have to carry out her engagements without counting on his personal co-operation.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN did not wish to dispute about words. The facts, however, must be clearly recognised. But for Great Britain, there would be no Iraq. But for Great Britain's engagements to the League, the King would now be ruling over only half his territory, or, at any rate, a greatly diminished area. It might be that all the aspirations which the King had cherished had not been fulfilled, but His Majesty ought not to underrate, and would not be wise to underrate, the great assistance that Great Britain had already given him or the need in which his people still stood, and would for some time continue to stand, of the support, sympathy and assistance of the British Government. He would not go back on the past. He preferred to turn to the more practical aspects of the question. Sir H. Dobbs had fully reported to the British Government the conversations that had taken place up to the present. If he (Sir Austen) rightly understood the Iraq point of view, the difficulties which had arisen turned on the requirement of the British Government that their advice should be taken in those matters which affected the execution of our international obligations. The King seemed to suppose that, while we claimed the right to offer such advice and to have it accepted, we were making no corresponding contribution on our own part. But if he had rightly interpreted the King's objections, they seemed to be based on a misunderstanding. The British Government were prepared to support a claim by Iraq for admission to the League as soon as they considered the conditions to be such as to make it likely that Iraq's application would be favourably entertained. They had intimated to the Iraq Government that, if all went well in the interval, and the present rate of progress were maintained in Iraq, they hoped that the time for action would have come by the year 1932. Meanwhile, both Governments were desirous that Iraq should, at the earliest possible moment, accept full responsibility both for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of the country against external aggression; but both recognised that the resources of Iraq at the present moment were insufficient for this purpose. We were prepared to agree with the King and the Iraq Government that the British Government should, for the time being, render material support to Iraq in her internal defence and the preservation of the integrity of her territory and her national independence. We should be prepared, in the course of negotiations, to propose a draft article embodying an agreement on these lines, and to indicate to Iraq the character of the assistance which we would provide in the immediate future. We must be the judges from time to time of what the extent and method of this assistance should be; but we recognised responsibility to Iraq as long as we were in our present mandatory position, and we were prepared to give expression to that responsibility in the new treaty. He hoped that what he had said would have removed the misunderstanding which had perhaps been the King's chief difficulty up to the present, and that he had facilitated the progress and success of the negotiations which he hoped that, after the present conversation, our respective representatives would resume.

KING FEISAL said that he had left Bagdad with the conviction that the Government of Iraq could not be carried on in the face of the one great difficulty which existed, viz., the ambiguity of the position in regard to the responsibility for defence. He would very much like to know whether Iraq alone was responsible both for external and internal defence, or whether Great Britain was responsible, or whether responsibility was shared equally between the two Governments. If this point were not cleared up, the position would be impossible, and he could not contemplate returning to Bagdad.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN replied that it was the desire both of the King himself and of the British Government that Iraq should assume full responsibility when in a position to do so, and should thus qualify for admission to the League as a full-grown nation. He recognised, however, that the time for that had not yet come, and that until it came we had a responsibility as well as Iraq for the maintenance of internal security and external defence. We desired to place on formal record—

1. Our wish to see Iraq standing in an independent position as soon as possible.
2. Our recognition that in the meantime we had a responsibility in common with the Iraq Government to help Iraq both in the maintenance of internal security and in external defence.

The British Government must be the judge of the amount of assistance to be given to Iraq and of the method in which it was to be given. It rested with us to decide the number and character of troops to be furnished. That number and that character would naturally vary with Iraq's development and other circumstances, but we should be prepared in the course of discussions to indicate what we were ready to do in the immediate future. That would give the King something by which to measure the practical results of the principles which he (Sir Austen Chamberlain) had laid down.

KING FEISAL said that the question of the nature of assistance to be given was one for Great Britain and not for Iraq. He understood that the British Government were prepared to recognise that they were jointly concerned with Iraq in the defence of the country.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN interposed that we were not prepared to accept that form of words. What we were prepared to do was to insert in the treaty an undertaking that the British Government would render such material support and assistance to Iraq as in their opinion might be required. That was the proper way in which to express in the treaty our readiness to give the assistance of which the King asked for an assurance.

KING FEISAL replied that he had no desire to go into details which were of no consequence to him. What was of fundamental importance was that Great Britain's acceptance of joint responsibility for the defence of Iraq should be stated in the treaty. If only this joint obligation could be defined and clearly recognised in the treaty, he would not ask for any other change in existing treaty arrangements.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN said that he and the King had gone as far as possible towards making the position clear and defining the principles on which treaty revision must proceed. He ventured to suggest that, so far as they two were concerned, they had done all that they could. The conversations between Ja'far Pasha and Sir Henry Dobbs should now be allowed to continue and a text embodying the proposals laid down should be prepared and discussed. He recognised the need for the insertion in the treaty of some words that would give the King an assurance of our readiness to assist. That met His Majesty's first point. The King should now wait until the proposed text had been drawn up. This was a matter for the negotiators and should be dealt with when negotiations were resumed. Till then no further progress could be made.

KING FEISAL said that he would still like to press for a clear statement whether Great Britain was prepared to state in the treaty that she was jointly responsible with Iraq for internal and external defence. It would avoid misunderstandings later if the point were cleared up now.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN said that he could not accept that particular form of words, which might lead to trouble in future; but he was anxious to meet the King's point and would endeavour to have a suitable formula drawn up.

He thought that King Feisal scarcely realised the importance of the statement which he (Sir Austen Chamberlain) had made. He would ask the King to await the proposed text, when he would be able to estimate the statement at its full value; negotiations turning merely on the use of particular words were seldom successful; if either party were to make conditions of that kind the negotiations would fail, as, indeed, any negotiations would fail if conducted on such lines. The King had received an assurance of our readiness to furnish him with a formula which, in our opinion, would meet his point. He would ask His Majesty to await its receipt.

KING FEISAL said that he recognised and understood the difficulties in which the British Government were placed *vis-à-vis* their own people, in accepting a formula such as he desired. He would ask them also to recognise the difficulties in which he himself was placed in agreeing to certain phrases contained in the British draft treaty. His people had aspirations towards independence, and expected him to return with an honourable treaty. He agreed that discussions might continue. He hoped that if the British Government did not see their way to meet him in regard to the wording of the article concerning defence, they would recognise that he himself could not accept the precise wording of certain other articles.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN remarked that the British Government had not asked for any change at all in the treaty. They were prepared to go on with the existing one. It was the King and his Government who desired a change. His Majesty seemed scarcely to appreciate even yet how much the British Government were prepared to do to meet his wishes. When the King fully understood what Sir A. Chamberlain had said to him, and had seen the proposed formula, his doubts would be removed, and he would be able to return to Iraq feeling that he had fully accomplished the mission on which he had come to Europe.

KING FEISAL said that, in conclusion, he would like to congratulate Sir A. Chamberlain on two successful treaties which he had recently concluded with two other Eastern States, viz., one with Nejd and the other (according to a report he had just seen) with Egypt. He felt sure that he himself would not be allowed to return to Iraq with a treaty less honourable than those accorded to Egypt and Nejd.

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN thanked the King for his congratulations, but pointed out that no treaty had been concluded with Egypt. The position was merely that he had had certain conversations with Sarwat Pasha which he hoped had laid the foundations on which a treaty might ultimately be based. He added that he had a good deal of experience in negotiating treaties, and had found that never in any single case had he been able to secure the insertion in the treaty of every particular phrase or provision that he desired. King Feisal would realise that he could scarcely expect to experience greater fortune in this respect than the rest of the world.

[E 4897/122/65]

No. 56.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir G. Clerk (Constantinople).

(No. 772.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1927.

THE Turkish Ambassador asked me to receive him to-day, and in reply to my question as to what had procured me the pleasure of his visit, said it was a small matter which, for convenience, he had embodied in an *aide-mémoire* which he would ask me to read instead of repeating it verbally.

I accordingly read the *aide-mémoire*, of which I attach a copy. I told his Excellency that I should naturally like to inform myself exactly as to the facts so that I might reply to him with the certainty and detail that would be necessary, but that I felt confident that a large part of what was urged in the *aide-mémoire* must be due to misinformation or misunderstanding. I could at once assure him that no British officer had countenanced or would countenance any use of the territory of Iraq for the purpose of fomenting any aggressive actions against Turkey. The League of Nations had insisted and we had undertaken that as large a measure of autonomy should be provided for the Kurds of Iraq as could properly be allowed to them, but we had no intention of allowing those who, for whatever reason, took refuge in Iraq territory, to abuse its hospitality in order to plot against the security of Turkey. I should, however, like to speak to him with

full knowledge of the facts. I would therefore reserve my reply until I had made enquiries as to what had actually occurred.

It so happened that only a few minutes before the Ambassador's arrival I had had before me the telegram from the Acting High Commissioner of Iraq under date of the 8th November reporting another violation by Turkish troops of the frontier. I accordingly sent for these papers and, after reading to the Ambassador a paraphrase of the Acting High Commissioner's telegram, I said that I had just given instructions to your Excellency to lodge a protest with the Turkish Government against this continued violation of the frontier by Turkish troops. I added that I did not for a moment suggest that the Turkish Government either desired or connived at such violation, but it was evidently necessary that they should impress upon the local authorities the need for avoiding these most unfortunate incidents.

The Ambassador then enquired whether there was any truth in reports which were circulated to the effect that we had resumed negotiations with the Soviet Government. He himself had not so understood the Prime Minister's speech at the Guildhall. I remarked that that speech had defined the conditions which were a preliminary to any resumption of diplomatic relations, but that there were no pourparlers in progress with that end in view.

The Ambassador further sought to ascertain my view of the treaty just signed in Paris between France and Yugoslavia. I told him that I had not yet seen the text, though I gathered from rumour that it was very similar if not exactly the same as the treaty already existing between France and Roumania. I expressed my disbelief of the existence of any secret engagements and suggested that, when the commotion caused by the throwing of this stone into the pond had subsided, it would be found that very little had been changed in the situation. In short, whilst the Ambassador sought to draw from me an admission that it must prejudice the relations of Italy with both countries—perhaps lead Italy to encourage Bulgaria in opposition to Yugoslavia and generally provoke trouble—I sought as far as possible to minimise its probable consequences whilst making it plain that I had even now no knowledge of the text, that I had not been consulted by either of the parties as to the step which they contemplated, and that I viewed the whole proceeding as a detached observer.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Aide-mémoire.

1. AU cours d'un entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir, le 5 septembre dernier, avec le Sous-Secrétaire d'État permanent aux Affaires étrangères, je lui ai signalé le rassemblement de 500 Nestoriens armés près du village turc Aroche sur la frontière turo-irakienne, en priant le Ministère de Sa Majesté d'user de son influence auprès du Gouvernement de Bagdad aux fins d'assurer l'éloignement et la dispersion de cette bande.

2. Subséquentement par ma note en date du 20 septembre, je me suis permis d'attirer l'attention du Ministère de Sa Majesté sur les attaques auxquelles s'est livrée cette bande contre des postes-frontières turques.

Je n'ai pas encore été mis au courant du résultat auquel les démarches faites à ces sujets doivent avoir abouti.

3. D'autre part, mon Gouvernement a reçu ultérieurement des informations suivant lesquelles :

- (a.) Des éléments de race assyrienne et des Nestoriens sont en train d'être groupés et installés dans la région d'Amadiéh et Zakho, à proximité de la frontière ;
- (b.) On s'apprête, en outre, à établir 15,000 Arméniens au nord-ouest de la ville de Mossoul.
- (c.) D'intenses propagandes se font actuellement à Amadiéh, Zakho, Akra, Zibar et Dehok pour y former des associations kurdes ayant pour tâche de réveiller chez les Kurdes le nationalisme et d'assurer son expansion. Des réunions se sont tenues à cet effet auxquelles il nous est revenu qu'à part quelques gouverneurs de nationalité irakienne, des officiers britanniques ont également participé.

4. Mon Gouvernement est d'avis que l'installation aux environs de la frontière turque des groupes compactes de Nestoriens, d'Assyriens ou d'Arméniens—éléments qui ont tous manifesté, à diverses reprises, leur hostilité envers la Turquie—ainsi que la continuation d'une systématique propagande ne sont pas faites pour contribuer au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité tant désirés, dans la région frontière par les signataires du Traité d'Angora.

5. Persuadé que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique partagera complètement cette manière de voir de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de faire appel à sa bonne volonté ainsi qu'à ses bons offices pour entreprendre des démarches auprès du Gouvernement de Bagdad à l'effet de le décider à renoncer à l'installation, à proximité de la frontière, des éléments perturbateurs dont il s'agit et à ne pas permettre le développement de l'agitation nationale qui, si elle continuait, constituerait certainement une menace pour l'ordre et la tranquillité existant très heureusement dans les régions frontières.

*Ambassade de la République turque, Londres,
le 14 novembre 1927.*

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Note by Sir Austen Chamberlain.

IT is, I think, desirable that I should record what passed between King Feisal and me at yesterday's luncheon. I had carefully refrained from saying anything to the King about the negotiations, but towards the close of lunch the King opened the subject himself. He expressed his regret and disappointment that the negotiations had broken down, and his anxiety lest the result should be trouble in Iraq. I replied that I, too, regretted their failure, and was the more disappointed because after the long conference which Mr. Ormsby-Gore and I had held with His Majesty, I had really believed that success was well within our reach, but, I added, perhaps it was better to make no change at the present time. After all, the new State only came into existence eight or nine years ago. Such a period was nothing in the lifetime of a nation, and we might well find that, if we waited a year or two, such further progress would be made as would render easy the conclusion of such a new agreement as we had been unable to reach at the present time. As to what His Majesty had said about the possibility of disturbances, I felt confident that, if His Majesty would keep in close touch and consultation with the High Commissioner and gather about him the best advisers that his country could provide, he and his Government would have no difficulty in explaining the position satisfactorily to his people and in preserving peace and order.

His Majesty then enquired whether, if the troops which we now had in Iraq were, in the opinion of the High Commissioner, insufficient to maintain order, His Majesty's Government would send reinforcements. I told His Majesty that we could not take engagements to cover a hypothetical case. He must trust to our doing what was necessary and proper if and when the emergency arose, but the real answer to his question lay in the facts of the case. As long as we had a High Commissioner and a body of British troops in Iraq, we could not be indifferent to their security, and any events external or internal which menaced their safety must necessarily closely concern us.

His Majesty then enquired whether, speaking as Chamberlain and not as Secretary of State, I should be prepared to recommend an increase of forces if the High Commissioner demanded it. I replied that it was extremely difficult to answer such a question, as I could not take indirectly engagements which His Majesty's Government were not prepared to take directly. Nevertheless, I observed, if His Majesty and his Government had followed the advice of the High Commissioner, and in consequence trouble arose which in the opinion of the High Commissioner required a reinforcement of our troops, I conceived that in such a case His Majesty's Government would not hesitate to take action. On the other hand, if the trouble were caused through neglect to consult the High Commissioner or failure to follow his advice, His Majesty's Government might well tell the Government of Iraq that, as they had got themselves into trouble, so they must get themselves out.

At this point I repeated briefly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was sitting on the other side of the King, the question which His Majesty had put to me and the reply which I had given, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer expressed his concurrence. The King then said that, when he went back to Iraq, he would constantly consult the High Commissioner and closely follow his advice, and that he would get the High Commissioner to write him a letter once a month to certify that he had, in fact, done as the High Commissioner wished. I at once told the King that that was not the way to deal with Englishmen. We behaved as gentlemen and liked to be treated as gentlemen. Let him be guided by the High Commissioner, who would receive his instructions from His Majesty's Government, and let him have confidence in the friendship of His Majesty's Government.

The King, who had previously told me that he was leaving on Thursday, then said that, in consequence of this conversation, he would postpone his journey. He was prepared to reopen the negotiations and would await a communication from the High Commissioner. I informed His Majesty that the High Commissioner would be at his service at any time he chose to name, and I immediately informed Sir Stanley Wilson and Sir Henry Dobbs of what had passed between us. I understand that later in the afternoon the King saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and that he confirmed his desire to reopen the negotiations and expressed his readiness to abandon the claim to "complete independence."

A. C.

Foreign Office, November 29, 1927.